Legislating Foreign Policy

Also of Interest

Presidential Leadership and national Security: Style, Institutions ,
and Polities, edited by Sam C, Sarkesian

The Politics of Resource Allocation in the H.S. department of defense,
Alex Mint?

Congress and the Presidency in U.S. Foreign Policymaking: a Study of
Interaction and Influence , 1945-1382, John T. Rourke

Inside idle Legislative Process: The Passage of the Foreign Service
Act of 1980 , William I. Bacchus

The legislative Veto: Congressional Control of Regulation, Barbara
Hinkson Craig

*The Illusion of Presidential Government, edited by Hugh Heclo and
Lester Salamon

*The President, the Budget, and Congress: Impoundment and the 1974
Budget Act, James P. Pfiffner

Inside the Bureaucracy: The Vi&t from the Assistant Secretary's Desk,
Thomas P. Murphy, Donald E. Nuechterlein, and Ronald J. Stupak

Rhetoric and Reality: Presidential Comissions and the Making of
Public Policy, Terrence R. Tutchings

The Hoover Commissions Revisited, Ronald C. Hoe

*Available in hardcover and paperback.

A Westview Special Study

Legislating foreign Policy

edited by Hoyt Purvis and Steven ) Balter

Beginning with the pr e«i«e that Concrete ham reasserted Itm role
In 0 S foreign policy, the authors of this book describe, analyse,
and evaluate hew Congress la exercising Its formal and Informal
power* and responsibilities rive policy studies examine congres-
sional action in major policy areas, placinq Congress'll behavior in
the Institutional and political contexts necessary to sn understand-
ing and evaluation of the congressional role/ In combination, the
studies provide an insightful look at some major development* in
recent U S foreign policy

Uoyt Purvis is director of the fulbrJght Institute of Inter-
national Relations at the University of Arkansas He served fer many
years ss an aide to Senator J W Fuibrfght and then as foreign/
defense policy adviser to Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd Steven
J Baker Is associate professor of international policy studies at
tho Monterey institute of International Studlesi Or Baker vas a
SALT II consultant and foreign policy adviser to Senator Byrd

Legislating Foreign Policy

edited by Hoyt Purvis
and Steven J. Baker

HINDUSTAN PUBLISHING CORPORATION (INDIA)
DELHM 10007 1986

Copyright © 1984 by Wcstview Press, Boulder, Colorado.

First Published in India - January 4986

Rs. 65.00

Published by Hindustan Publishing Corporation (India), 6-UB JawaharNagar,
Delhi-110 007 and printed by Mohan Mafchijani at Rckha Printers Pvt. Ltd.,
New Delhi-110020.

Contents

Preface . vlll

1 Introduction! LEGISLATIVE - EXECUTIVE

INTERACTION. Hoyt Purvis . . 1

2 EVALUATING CONGRESS' FOREIGN POLICY PER-
FORMANCE, Steven J. Baker . ..... 13

3 TRACING THE CONGRESSIONAL ROLEl U S FOR-
EIGN POLICY AND TURKEY, Hoyt Purvis . . 23

4 THE PANAMA CANAL TREATIES! LEGISLATIVE
STRATEGY FOR ADVICE AND CONSENT,

John Opperman . . . . 77

5 CONGRESS, COUNTRY X, AND ARMS SALES,

Hoyt Purvis, John Opperman, and Ture
Campanella ... 106

6 NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION,

Steven J Baker , 136

7 THE SENATE AND AAHSefDHTROLt THE SALT

EXPERIENCE, J. Philip Rogers 160

8 Conclusion SHARING RESPONSIBILITY,

Steven J. Baker 196

Bibliography . . ...... . 219

Index . .... 22J

About the Editors and Contributor* ....... 229

vil

Preface

This volume is the result of a collaborative effort
that began while the editors worked together as con-
gressional staff members concerned with foreign policy
and defense issues. After leaving Washington, and
while both served on the faculty of the University of
Texas, that collaboration continued and work began in
earnest on this book.

Based on both our governmental and teaching experi-
ence, we see a need for greater attention to the con-
gressional role in foreign policy and international
security affairs. Although there have been some note-
worthy contributions to the study of Congress' role in
the formation and conduct of American foreign policy,
too often academic and journalistic treatments of the
subject have tended to view Congress' role negatively
and out of context. While Congress' shortcomings are
thoroughly discussed and analyzed here, we proceed from
the conviction that Congress is a factor in American
foreign policy, if sometimes only a subordinate factor,
and that it is essential to examine Congress' foreign
policy involvement in a broader perspective.

American foreign policy cannot be understood with-
out a recognition of the congressional role. Likewise,
the congressional role cannot' be understood without a
recognition of the importance of the legislative proc-
ess, of politics, and of congressional personalities
and procedures.

While we have drawn heavily on our own experience
and research in preparing this book, we have also had
the benefit of the efforts of three individuals who
have worked with us in research and analysis of the
congressional role in foreign policy. The contribu-
tions of John Opperman, J. Philip Rogers, and Tura
Catnpanella are an important part of this volume.

This book builds around five policy studies, which
examine and analyze the role of Congress in a wide

viii

range of policy areas. Father than describing a single
case, these chapters {3 through 7) place Congress' be-
havior in the issue, institutional, and political con-
texts that are necessary to an understanding and evalu-
ation of Congress* performance,

The book begins with an introductory overview, pro-
viding a framework within which the congressional role
should be considered, as well as acme specific examples
of the formal and informal interaction between the
legislative and executive branches, and the direct and
indirect congressional influence

Chapter 2 introduces explicit criteria for evalu-
ating the congressional performance, and in the con-
cluding chapter the congressional role In each of the
policy study areas is evaluated on the basis of those
criteria

Congress reasserted its foreign policy prerogatives
in the early 1970s, and much of the existing literature
focuses on that important period Legislating Foreign
Pol lev looks at how Congress is exercising the powers
and responsibilities that it earlier recaptured Each
of the policy studies includes a major set of issues
dealt with by Congress in the late 1970s and early
1980s, However, there is an effort to provide a
broader hiatorlcal perspective, and each policy study
relates the development of these issues over a longer
period. In particular, Chapter 3 focuses on tr.S rela-
tions with Turkey as a means of examining the evolution
of post-World War II American foreign policy and of the
changing pattern of congressional involvement in for-
eign policy over the years In a similar vein, Chapter
5 begins its consideration of the congressional role in
arms sales by examining the “Country X* loan program,
when Congress first delved into executive branch arms
sales activities And, in Chapter 7, the limited con-
gressional Involvement at the time of the first stra-
tegic arms limitation agreement (SALT IJ serves aa a
contrasting background for the more active congres-
sional role in subsequent anas control matters.

The collective product not only describes end ana-
lyres the congressional role, but provides what wa
believe la an insightful look at some of the major de-
velopments in recent American foreign policy. It is
intended to be a book that is instructive in its exam-
ination of both process and policy. We hope that it

beYp IWusiiiste eacYi ot tneaa areas.

The concept of this book, as well as its develop-
ment, resulted from a joint effort by the editors In
addition to our individual contributions, Baker devel-
oped the evaluative criteria, while Purvis exercised
overall editorial responsibility.

The editors are, of course, particularly indebted
to the three other contributors to thie volume. Addi-
tionally, there are a number of individuals who in

X

various direct and indirect ways have been helpful to
us in completing the booh. Among those to whom we owe
gratitude for their comments or suggestions on various
aspects of the book are J. William Fulbright, Bruce
Buchanan, Len Weiss, Sidney Weintraub, Richard McCall,
and William E. Jackson, Jr. A special acknowledgement
is due to Esther Purvis' for her support and encourage-
ment. Barbara E. Rieper has been especially helpful in
doing the word processing and in preparing the manu-
script. We also express appreciation to our former
Senate staff colleagues and to Robert C. Byrd, with
whom we were privileged to work.

H.H.P.

S.J.B. ‘

1

Introduction-

Legislative-Executive 1 nteraction

Hoyt Purvis

Foreign policy consists of the external goals of «
nation and the mean* adopted to pursue those goals In
United States history, predominance in the making of
foreign policy has shifted back and forth between the
two institutions entrusted by the Constitution with
foreign policy responsibilities — the executive and the
legislative branches of the federal government

However, in the 1930s the United States entered a
lengthy period when the executive was to be largely
dominant. This van a period of continuing crisis—
depression, war. cold war Tn the years after World
War 11, the President retained the pre-eminent position
in foreign policy that executives usually have been
accorded during wartime There were a number of major
foreign policy initiatives in those post-war years z
establishment of the united National the Truman
Doctrine and Greek-Turkish aid program j the Marshall
Plan; the North Atlantic Treaty; and the 'Point Four*
aid program. These were moves in which there was some
degree of congressional involvement and collaboration,
although that collaboration was generally confined to a
very limited number of congressional leaders It is
looked upon as an era of bipartisanship in foreign
policy, although the depth and durability of that
bipartisanship is often exaggerated

Presidential power increased and the congressional
role in foreign policy diminished while U S. commit-
ments and involvement around the world grew and weap-
onry became Increasingly sophisticated fly the 1960s,
the balance between branches of government was further
distorted when the influence of television served to
strengthen the presidency Television easily focused
on the presidency, while Congress, a more disparate in-
stitution, woe more difficult to cover, lacking the
glamour and singular focus of the presidency Televi-
sion reinforced the tendency to look to a single leader.

But, Jn the mid-1960s, Congrcee gradually began to

reassert itself in the foreign policy field. That
assertiveness increased in the early 1970s in response
to the experiences of Vietnam and Watergate.

by the late 1970s, the two branches had settled
into an uneasy balance. The executive has the leading
role in foreign affairs, but Congress plays an active
part at almost every stage, in some cases serving as a
check on what are perceived as excesses or potential
excesses or errors by the President.

A Stronger Hole

Congress has its formal foreign policy powers, some
of which have been left dormant at times. The most
prominent of these are Congress' constitutional powers
— the power to declare war, maintain the armed forces,
appropriate funds, and exercise oversight of the execu-
tion of laws. The Senate has the special responsibil-
ities of approving treaties and confirming appointments
of key officials within the executive branch.

In addition to those constitutional powers, Con-
gress has taken a series of steps to strengthen its
involvement in foreign policy. Most notably, Congress
sought to reestablish its role in commiting U.S. forces
overseas with the War Powers Resolution, enacted in
1973 over a presidential veto. Through other legisla-
tive measures, Congress placed restrictions on presi-
dential actions? for example, aid to certain countries
was prohibited or made conditional because of objec-
tionable human rights practices or nuclear policies of
those countries. Although many of these restrictions
applied to Third World countries, in 1974 Congress
approved the Jackson-Vanik amendment to the U.S. -Soviet
trade bill, requiring freer emigration of Soviet Jewry
as a condition of American trade. The move was deeply
resented by the Soviet leaders and was seen by some as
a primary factor in derailing prospects for real de-
tente between the U.S. and U.S.S.R.

• -Detailed restrictions on economic and military aid
have become commonplace in foreign assistance legisla-
tion. Congress also staked out a stronger role for
itself by insisting on greater involvement and over-
sight in such key areas as intelligence and arms trans-
fers., As an -example, in the arms sales field, the
executive was allowed to proceed with the 1981 sale of
AWACS aircraft to Saudi Arabia only after intense
scrutiny and some concessions to congressional concerns.

Some of the provisions designed to ensure Congress
a voice in various foreign policy and security areas
were ■ called into question by a 1983 Supreme Court
decision banning the "legislative veto.". Under the
legislative veto, a provision used primarily in domes-
tic legislation. Congress granted authority to the

3

executive but reserved the right to reject or reveres
particular use* of that authority. Despite the Court's
action/ there vers otill a number of means by which
Congress could exercise its oversight.

War Powers

The Court's legislative veto ruling also raised
questions about the War Powers Resolution/ specifically
the provision allowing Congress, by a concurrent reso-
lution, to force the withdrawal of U S troops engaged
In hostilities overseas without specific congressional
authorization. Many authorities agreed, however, that
the other basic War Powers provisions remained intact.
(Those provisions require notification to congress when
U.S forces are sent Into hostile or potentially hos-
tile situations or while equipped for combat or In
numbers which substantially enlarge U S forces already
in placet and prohibit the president from keeping
troops in hostile situations for more than CO to 90
day* unless Congress gives its authorisation 1

Although presidents have frequently questioned the
constitutionality of the law, there have been a number
of instances of presldental reports to Congress in com-
pliance with the law. For example, not long after the
19B3 Court decision, President Ronald Reagan adhered to
the War Powers provision on notification when he in-
formed congress of the dispatch of AWACS and fighter
planes to Chad.

However, Reagan and Congress locked horns over the
application of the War Powers Resolution to the pres-
ence of U.S Marines in Lebanon Controversy over the
troops in Lebanon heightened in late summer 1983, after
several Marines were killed Initially, Beagan was
reluctant to acknowledge that the troops were subject
to the War Powers Resolution. But, under congressional
pressure, Administration officials worked out a •com-
promise" agreement with Senate Hajority Leader Howard
Baker and Bouse Speaker Thomas (Pip) O'Nelli, Jr
W^ile the agreement authorlred the President to keep
u s troops in Lebanon for as much as 18 months, it did
make the action subject to the War Pdwera Resolution.
Senate Democrats and some Boose members argued that 18
months waa too long, and attempted unsuccessfully to
shorten the authorised period. Some claimed that the
authorisation actually undercut the War Powers Rcso-
iwJ 1 ®? t n<i charged that the President was being given a
blank check,* amounting to another Tonkin Gulf Reso-
lution, which Presidents Johnson and Mixon used to
claim congressional author! ration for the war in Viet-
nam, Nonetheless, although Reagan was given a long
leash by Congress, the major War Powers provisions had
been invoked for the first time. Reagan also said that

it would be bis intention to seek congressional approv-
al if there was a need for any substantial expansion in
the number or role of U.S. troops.

A short time later r when C.S . forces invaded
Grenada, there was some initial criticism from Speaker
O'Neill and others in Congress. However, after a fact-
finding mission of House members sent to Grenada by
O'Neill reported to him that the action was "justi-
fied," the Speaker reversed his position. This rever-
sal came amid evidence of strong public support for
President Reagan's action on Grenada.

Congressional Influence

In recent years Congress has been increasingly in-
volved not only in foreign aid and international secur-
ity issues, but in defense spending as well. It was
Congress that pushed for relative decreases in defense
spending in the wake of the Vietnam War. Then, in the
late 1970s, Congress led the way in insisting on an up-
turn in defense spending. Still later, it was Congress
that insisted or drawing the line on some of the Reagan
Administration proposals for massive increases in the
military budget.

The Senate has also been increasingly inclined to
exercise its constitutional prerogatives on treaties
and nominations. Both the Panama Canal Treaties debate
and the argument over SALT II, each discussed in this
volume, demonstrate the intensity of Senate involvement
in the treaty process. The confirmation of presiden-
tial appointees is usually routine, with few nominees
rejected outright by a Senate vote. But the Senate has
become more assertive in its use of the .confirmation
process — influencing choices, forcing withdrawal of
some nominees, and approving others only after lengthy
debate.

Informal Processes

Although most studies and analyses focus on those
areas of formal congressional authority, the formal
powers have been reinforced and supplemented by infor-
mal processes of consultation between the President and
members of Congress and interaction between congres-
sional staff and the executive branch's foreign policy
bureaucracy. Though Congress can have its most obvious
impact through the exercise of its formal powers, it
can also be influential in a more informal sense. Be-
cause of the need to gain congressional support for
most foreign policy actions and programs— or the need
to at least avert congressional disapproval— the exec-
utive frequently engages in a consultative dialogue

5

with Congress. Many Issues are negotiated or bartered
between the two branches. In some cases policies and
proposals are tailored to meet congressional desires
without any formal action having been initiated by
Congress.

This informal congressional role 1 b manifested in a
variety of ways As noted, although it is rare for the
Senate to actually reject a presidential nominee for a
position in the foreign affairs field--Senate approval
being required by the Constitution for appointments of
'ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls,* and
by law for various other positions— the Senate can have
considerable influence on the selection process, Ap-
pointments are ofter 'cleared* with key senators. The
threat of Senate rejection or a nasty fight over a nom-
ination is often enough to forestall an appointment
The objection of one key senator can in some cases be
an effective veto of a potential appointment Like-
wise, members of Congress can be influential in helping
to determine who does get such appointments.

president Carter sent the nomination of Theodore
Sorensen, who had been a top assistant to President
Kennedy, for Senate confirmation as director of the
Central Intelligence Agency in 1977 But, in the face
of strong Senate opposition, Carter withdrew Sorensen's
nomination Sore interpreted this as a sign of presi-
dential weakness early in the Carter Administration,
and It may have hampered Carter's ability to deal with
Capitol Hill. On the other hand, a President can risk
souring relations with Congroas if he sticks with a
nominee despite strong Senate opposition Carter did
stick with the nomination of Paul Wamke as chief arms
control negotiator and head of Arms Control and Dis-
armament Agency (ACDA) Warnke was a man of proven
ability, but his views on arms control and defense were
anathema to some senators After much debate, his nom-
ination was approved, but the confirmation was used to
■send a message* to tha President. Although Warnke
received the simple majority necessary for confirmation
as arms control negotiator, the vote fell short of the
two-thirds that would be required for Senate approval
of an arms control treaty. Warnke remained in office
until the SALT II Treaty negotiations were nearly com-
plete, and then resigned. It wa9 recognized that the
treaty — which faced a difficult time in the Senate—
would not be helped by Warnke 'a identification with It.

In 1983, a number of senators used the nomination
of Kenneth Adelman as head of ACDA as an opportunity to
v* Pta-gt" f/teVr it.i_Tt.titr ‘ •& ira •pati.-

cles. Adelman's nomination was opposed by the Foreign
Relatione Committee, where he encountered criticism for
what was seen as a lack of experience and lack of
commitment to arms control Despite the controversy,
Reagan ultimately won approval for Ms nominee, 57-42,

6

with many senators deferring to the President's choice,
even though expressing doubts about the choice.

Senator Jesse Helms (R-North Carolina) emerged in
the late 1970s as one of the several foreign policy
entrepreneurs in Congress. Helms was particularly
successful at influencing foreign policy appointments
within the Reagan Administration. He used his posi-
tion on the Foreign Relations Committee and his ability
to rally conservative support to influence several
nominations to foreign policy positions and to block
others. In some cases Helms managed to delay con-
firmation until he extracted concessions from the
Administration .

One who had Helms' backing for a Reagan Administra-
tion position was Ernest Lefever, nominated in 1981 to
be assistant secretary of state for human rights. But
the nominee encountered strong opposition because of
his controversial views on human rights and a series of
contradictory statements. The combined support of
Helms and President Reagan was not enough to save the
embattled lefever. When the Foreign Relations Commit-
tee voted 13-4 against the nomination, with a majority
of the Committee' 8 Republicans among those opposing
Lefever, Reagan recognized that the nomination should
be withdrawn.

This was not a direct confrontation because no
final showdown occurred. The nomination was withdrawn
before a vote was taken on the Senate floor. But it
was an instance where the President had to back down in
the face of overwhelming Senate opposition.

Another Presidential "defeat” came on Reagan |s 1982
proposal for production funding for the MX missile with
the "dense-pack” basing system. Presidents seldom ex-
perience a direct rebuke on weapons system requests,
just as their nominees are rarely rejected. But, in
this case, Reagan's MX plan was decisively defeated in
the House of Representatives — despite strong lobbying
by the President who called the MX funding absolutely
essential for national security. A House-Senate con-
ference committee did retain some research and devel
opment funding, thus keeping the MX alive. And, fol-
lowing the recommendations of a blue-ribbon commission
appointed by Reagan, in" 1983 Congress approved some
funding for still another version of MX basing. {At
the urging of some members of Congress, the President,
in return for their support of the MX, did agree to
accept their recommendations on a new approach to arms
control negotiations.) The MX came up repeatedly as
approval and funds were requested for various stages of
research, development, testing, and procurement and had
to go through the congressional authorization and ap-
propriations processes in both Houses. Thus Congress
had numerous opportunities to debate the MX.

Confrontation ana Consultation

There are the dramatic examples of confronation
between the two branches— the Versailles Treaty In
191?; the disputes over Vietnam and Cambodia i the con-
gressional thwarting of executive branch policies in
Turkey and Angola in the 1910s j the later battles ever
policy in Central America, particular on “covert* aid
to anti-government rebels In Nicaragua

Despite the occasions when Congress has blocked or
restricted presidential policies. In the final analysis
Presidents usually prevail, even though they may have
to modify policies and proposals somwhat Approval of
appropriations for the anti-ballistic missile system
(Richard Nixon, 1969), the Panama Canal Treaties (Jimmy
Carter, 1979), and the sale of the AWACS to Saudi
Arabia (Ronald Reagan, 1991), are examples of bitterly
fought battles In which the President prevailed by the
narrowest of margins

But these examples of confrontation and well-publl-
cited battles over foreign policy are certainly less
characteristic of legislative-executive relations than
the more routine, informal interaction between the two
branches Por example, one of the reasons that presi-
dential appointments are routinely approved is that, as
noted earlier, they are informally "cleaied" in advance
with key senators Few major foreign policy proposals
are sent to Capitol Hill that ore not the product of
Intense interaction at the staff level Trouble re-
sult* when this procedure is Ignored For example, the
Carter Administration proposal to resume military and
economic aid to Pakistan in January 1980, was received
coolly in Congress due to a lack of groundwork j Con-
gress had been responsible for cutting off aid to
Pakistan in 1979.

Similarly, the Carter Administration's surprise an-
nouncement In December 1978 of its Intention to estab-
lish formal diplomatic relations with the People's Re-
public of China and to terminate the U S, -Taiwan mutual
defense treaty, drew sharp criticism in Congress The
Administration's failure to consult Congress In advance
jeopardized support for the action. Even some who fa-
vored the move were critical of the lack of consulta-
tion. An amendment to the International Security As-
sistance Act Of 1970 had expressed the sense of Con-
gress that the President should consult with Congress
before making any changes in China policy. (There were
some ardent supporters of Taiwan who would have opposed
the Carter policy in any case, regardless of advance
consultation. Some of these opponents launched on un-
successful court action to challenge the President's
right to terminate the treaty without congressional
sanction.) In its defense, the Carter Administration

maintained that the move to formalise relations with
China was the logical and anticipated conclusion to a
normalization process begun during the Nixon Adminis-
tration, and was, therefore, no surprise. Although
Carter did inform at least one member of the congres-
sional leadership of his plans, the Administration
noted that the matter had to be dealt with quietly, so
as not to undercut negotiations with the Chinese, who
were very sensitive about how the issue was handled.
Ultimately, Congress went along with the action, al-
though the terms it included in the Taiwan Relations
Act of 1979, which governs the "unofficial" relation-
ship between the U.S. and Taiwan, went considerably
beyond what the Administration wanted.

Another Carter initiative which understandably
required a high degree of secrecy nonetheless drew
criticism from Congress because of the lack of any
advance consultation. This was the April 1980 effort
to rescue the American hostages in Iran. The fact that
the rescue mission failed caused many to question the
planning and judgement involved, as well as the lack of
consultation. Had the mission succeeded, undoubtedly
the criticism would have been muted. Even though many
in Congress conceded that the President was justified
in maintaining secrecy on plans for the raid, others
argued that the matter Bhould at least have been dis-
cussed with the top congressional leaders. Ironically,
since early stages of the hostage crisis and the subse-
quent Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, high-ranking
State Department officials had been meeting regularly
with congressional leaders to discuss developments and
possible actions. And only hours before the raid,
President Carter discussed a possible rescue missions
with Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd, but .gave no
indication that such an action was imminent. Later,
Carter commented that he probably should have involved
Byrd more directly in the planning for the mission.

Informing Congress: The "Pseudo-Crisis"

Despite these, problems in executive-legislative
consultation, the Carter Administration did consult ex-
tensively with Congress on certain other issues. It
might even be argued that the Administration's eager-
ness to inform key members of the Senate inadvertently
contributed to the failure to gain approval of the SALT
II Treaty. As is discussed in Chapter 7 (“The Senate
and Arms Control"), prospects for SALT II approval were
badly damaged by the handling of the "discovery" of a
Soviet "combat brigade" in Cuba in August 1979. At the
time, the outlook for SALT II passage seemed increas-
ingly favorable. The treaty had come through Senate
committee hearings in relatively good shape and chances

9

for Senate approval fieened good— with the addition of
certain reservations and understandings to the final
resolution of ratification But the handling of the
Soviet-troops-in-Cuba issue dealt a severe blow to SALT
II The Administration was sensitive to suggestions,
primarily frora*Senator Richard Stone (D-Florida) , whose
constituency included a large Cuban population, that it
was not being sufficiently vigilant in regard to Soviet
activities in Cuba Stone had raised the natter sev-
eral timds during the Foreign Relations Committee’s
hearings on SALT II. When intelligence reports turned
up evidence of some maneuvers by Soviet troops In Cuba,
the Carter Administration felt compelled to react The
Administration apparently feared that opponents of the
treaty might break the news first Intelligence infor-
mation is often leaked in Washington, and members of
Congress and the congressional staff networks have
their own contacts and information sources Therefore,
the decision was made to inform senior members of Con-
gress, who were away from Washington for the Labor Day
holiday, of the develop-ients

Chairman Prank Church of the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee was one of those informed of the “dis-
covery* of a Soviet “combat brigade • After discussing
the matter with Secretary of State Cyrus tance and
Others by phone, Church said that It the Administration
did not Intend to make e public announcement about the
discovery, he would Church then held a news confer-
ence at his Idaho home, and called for “the immediate
removal of all Russian combat units from Cuba* and
later said that the Senate would not ratify SALT II
while the combat troops remained in Cuba Church’s
statements were followed by sweeping, categorical
statements by Administration officials.

Church supported SALT II, but was sensitive to the
fact that some treaty opponents would make a major
issue of the Soviet troops Church was also facing n
tough re-election campaign in Idaho in 1980 {which he
Subsequently lost) and Was being strongly criticized
for his leading role in supporting Senate approval of
the Panama Canal Treaties He had earlier encountered
criticism for hia opposition to the U.S role in Viet-
nam It la widely believed that Church quickly seized
the “Soviet troops - issue in an effort to proie his
"toughness" on foreign policy and discomfit hia crit-
ics, Church denied this, but, whatever his intent, the
result was a serious blow to chances for SALT II
approval

Subsequent information Indicated that there was
nothing particularly unusual about the Soviet activi-
ties, that the troops had been in Cuba seme years? and
that there was no violation of any 0 S -Soviet agree-
ments Soviet leaders insisted that the troops were
part of a “training center ■ Gradually, the controversy

10

died down, but it had caused a costly delay in the
Senate schedule on SALT II. As is portrayed in Chapter
7, with the passing of time the treaty encountered a
number of other serious problems, but the "pseudo-
crisis" over "Soyiet troops” undoubtedly hurt the
treaty's prospects.

Intensity of Congressional Interest

All of these experiences, and those featured in the
policy studies in this volume, make clear the complex-
ity and sensitivity of executive-legislative rela-
tions. They also make clear the intensity of congres-
sional interest in most foreign policy issues. The
central point is that Congress wants to be in on the
action.

Knowing when Congress should be informed or brought
into a decision-making process, who in Congress should
be consulted, and how consultations should be carried
out, can be thorny problems for the executive. Al-
though presidents often have broad latitude in dealing
with foreign policy, failure to consult and/or inform
Congress or mishandling of the consulatative process
can be a prelude to serious difficulties.

Some members of Congress, particularly those in key
positions, develop their own relationships with some
part of the executive bureaucracy and build an alliance
of interests. On occasion this leads to circumvention
of presidential programs and policies. In August 19B1,
Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger was reported to
favor the airborne "big bird" mode of deployment for
the MX missile. But Air Force planners, who had been
excluded from the MX decision, let Senate Armed Ser-
vices Chairman John Tower (R-Texas) know of their
opposition. Tower publicly attacked "big bird" and
effectively shot it down.

In addition to contacts within the executive,
members of Congress can rely on greatly increased
resources and support in dealing with foreign policy,
most notably the much-enlarged (some would say over-
enlarged) congressional staff. The "staff explosion"
since the beginning of the 1970s has meant a doubling
of members' and committee staffs in many cases.

The expanded resources available to Congress can
result in more thorough oversight of executive activi-
ties, and better research and investigation. On the
other hand, the growth in staff undoubtedly contributes
to some "make-work" projects within Congress, and, and
turn, the inquiries generated by such projects often
add to the burden of work within the executive branch.

The congressional hearing remains as a primary and
frequently effective means of carrying out the over-
sight responsibility and of focusing attention on

11

particular issues Hearings may deal with specific
legislation or with broader policy questions, such as
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's hearings on
Ctilna policy in the early 1970s The increased size
and capability of congressional staff can result in
better preparation for the hearings. But the prolif-
eration of subcommittees in Congress sometimes results
in excessive and essentially meaningless hearings.

The importance of congressional travel has
increased too Overseas trips by members of Congress
have often been labeled as Junkets, and unquestionably
there are many congressional trips that fit In that
category However, travel and meetings with foreign
leaders by influential members of Congress can be
extremely significant The opportunity for first-hand
observation can be highly valuable in making informed
judgments on key foreign policy issues This was par-
ticularly true in the case of the Panama Canal Treat-
ies, as is depicted in Chapter 4 Senators saw the
canal for themselves, and many realized that it was
highly vulnerable to sabotage or terrorism, and
concluded that it should be defused as a political
issue They also had a chance to discuss the terms of
the treaties with Fanamaian officials and to clarify
and, in effect, renegotiate aspects of the treaties.
In another instance, travel to Iran by Senators Thomas
Eagleton and John Culver raised questions in their
minds about the stability of the Shah's regime, even
though their warnings were unheeded (See Chapter 5 J
In 1978, when Robert Byrd visited Iran and was asked by
the Carter Administration to give encouragement to the
Shah, he returned with the assessment that the Shah was
unlikely to survive in power A number of congres-
sional delegations have had meaningful discussions with
Soviet and Chinese leaders During the Reagan Adminis-
tration many congressional groups visited PI Salvador
for a first-hand view of developments there A trip to
Grenada in November 1983 by a congressional delegation
led many initially skeptical members to conclude that
President Reagan was justified in sending in American
troops

All of these examples of congressional involvement
arc evidence of the fact that American foreign policy
is a legislative as well as an executive natter Many
governments in the world today are "authoritarian*
regimes of one type or another, in which popularly
elected legislative bodies, if they exist, have little
cc rrcr puwur Even in democratic societies, both
parliamentary and presidential, the tendency is to
leave foreign policy questions to the executive and to
the professional foreign service bureaucracy Most

members of most parliaments are "informed" by the
government about the nation's foreign policy, but have
little direct impact on that policy Therefore, the

12

American system of shared powers in foreign policy is
distinctive, and poses some distinctive problems:
sometimes it becomes difficult to conduct foreign pol-
icy if there is not a single, authoritative voice;
there is a potential gap between executive commitments
to foreign governments and the approval by Congress
necessary to carry out those commitments; and there is
a tendency for Congress to write into law matters that
elsewhere are left to the discretion of the executive.
Co-determination in foreign policy has its advantages,
but few would deny that it complicates the making of
foreign policy.

This volume describes, analyzes, and evaluates the
strengths and weaknesses of the congressional role in
the foreign policy process. There is every indication
that Congress will continue to play an active role. In
most cases, the President has certain key advantages in
any struggle with Congress. The President retains
greater control of and access to information, the abil-
ity to initiate action, and can appeal to the need for
national unity in times of "crisis." Normally, the
Congress, press, and public are reluctant to oppose the
President on critical foreign policy issues, .and the
President will usually get the benefit of the doubt.
But Congress does have to be factored into the foreign
policy equation. The critical question, then, is not
whether the executive should be stronger or the con-
gressional role be reduced, or vice versa, but how each
can be strengthened to carry out their respective roles
and to best meet the challenges facing American foreign
policy.

2

Evaluating Congress'
Foreign Policy Performance

Steven} Baker

Why has Congress grown more active In foreign
policy in the past two decades? A variety of factors
have been cited to explain this increased congressional
role First, there are broad-scale explanations that
transcend a particular institution or time period For
example, there is the argument that there are cycles of
executive or legislative predominance in foreign af-
falrsil historical trends, the force of individual
personalities, and particular issues favor either pre-
dominance by the executive or legislative branch An
alternative broad-scale explanation lirXa the change in
Congress' role to a shift in the substance of foreign
policy in an interdependent world where the distinction
between foreign and domestic politics is less valid
that ever before 2 Blurring the distinction between
foreign and domestic affair* Implies that the foreign
policy preeminence of the executive is less clean
when foreign policy problems impinge on the daily lives
of Americans, then Congress has to be as interested in
foreign policy a* the president

A second set of explanations at an intermediate
level of generality stress structural changes that have
occurred in both the executive and Congress, but par-
ticularly the latter For example, the decline of cen-
tralized leadership and dispersal of authority within
Congress, the growth in the number of subcommittees,
the "staff explosion," 3 are all pointed to as factors
making it easier for individual members of Congress,
such as Senator Jesse Helms, to become involved in
foreign affairs These structural characteristics are
subject to change, but there 1 b little evidence of a
trend back towards greater centralization end disci-
pline in Congress Therefore, the ability of Congress
to perform its foreign policy tasks coherently con-
tinues to be open to question

A third set of explanationa emphasizes the impact
of very specific circumstances — foreign policy crises

13

such as the Vietnam War or Angola , or the succession of
weakened and/or ineffectual presidents — Nixon, Ford,
Carter. Such explanations would leave room for major
short-term variations in the rate and kind of congres-
sional participation in foreign policy, depending on
the specific circumstances and on the individual occu-
pying the White House . 4 For example, in the absence of
a divisive foreign policy issue or in the presence of a
president who was perceived as clear-sighted and able,
Congress' involvement in foreign policy could be ex-
pected to diminish.

These factors, and a variety of others, have all
contributed to the increase in congressional activity
in foreign affairs. However, weighing the contribu-
tions of each differently leads to different conclu-
sions regarding prospects for Congress ' foreign policy
role in 1 the years ahead. For example, if broad trans-
national trends are at work, there is less expectation
for short-term variation. The election of a Carter as
opposed to a Reagan may not affect the level of Con-
gress involvement in foreign policy. Alternatively, if
the level of congressional involvement is tied to spe-
cific crises or specific presidents, short-term varia-
tion is to be expected — at least to the extent permit-
ted by the intermediate range of structural factors.
For example, a strong president would prevail except
when existing foreign policy legislation mandates con-
gressional involvement and Congress' structure permits
individual members to push their own foreign policy
priorities and interests.

There is disagreement over the significance of the
congressional resurgence in foreign policy. Some main-
tain that Congress ' reassertion constitutes something
of a revolutionary change, with the result that we now
have "foreign policy by Congress ." 5 If foreign-policy
making is perceived as a zero-sum situation, then a
more active Congress must necessarily operate at the
expense of the President. But it might be argued that,
as the range of government activities has expanded,
there are more foreign policy roles to play; if this is
true, then an expanded congressional role need not nec-
essarily be at the expense of the President, and Con-
gress may have regained some of its lost power — but
without really weakening the presidency . 6

Complex Interaction

The policy studies in this volume suggest that the
changes in Congress' role in foreign policy in the last
decade have been dramatic but not revolutionary. Con-
gress has become a more active and more visible par-
ticipant m foreign policy than it was in the post-
World War II period, but the executive retains key

15

prerogatives— especially in taking foreign policy ini-
tiatives and in implementing policy. What is rev and
extremely important is that the executive has been com-
pelled to consult Congress more regularly and, in some
cases, more formally on foreign policy questions The
result is a complex pattern of interaction between the
executive and Congress.

The Constitution's shared powers create an 'invita-
tion to struggle" for control over foreign policy,? and
some foreign policy issues become the subject of insti-
tutional confrontation But, dramatic confrontation
remains the exception, not the rule Khat has evolved
over the last 15 years is a pattern of interaction that
usually facilitates the elaboration and implementation
of American foreign policy Even on highly publicised
and politicized Issues such as the Panama Canal Treat-
ies, a President who is willing to consult with Con-
gress has a good chance at achieving what he wants,
even where public support is weak What Congress has
insisted on, and continues to insist on, is the right
to be consulted—bofore, during, and after the fact

The preponderance of scholarly opinion seems to see
Congress as the weak link in the policy process,® the
part of the policy apparatus most in need of reform 9
Some analysts have called for restricting Congress'
foreign policy role because 'the coat at conflict and
decentralization have became too great *1° however,
other analysts have recognized the potential benefits
of increased congressional involvement in foreign pol-
icy. For example, Congress' involvement is seen as a
way of formulating a foreign policy that enjoys a
higher degree of public support and is therefore easier
to implement and more consistent over time. Consulta-
tion with Congress sometimes Improves the quality of
foreign policy by airing the issues and alterna-
tives, Even institutional conflicts between the

executive and Congress can sometimes be turned to
dipionatic advantage But these positive contributions
are outweighed or lessened In the estimation of many
observers by the negative consequences ot a frequent
lack of coherence in ll S foreign policy and an inabil-
ity to carry through objectives — weaknesses that are
attributed at least in part to the congressional role.

legitimacy and Efficacy

In Judging whether congress' foreign policy asser-
tiveness is a good or bad development, there are two
interrelated dimensions that have to be dealt with*
the question of legitimacy and the issue of efficacy
The legitimacy of Congress' involvement In foreign
policy has its foundation in the Constitution* consti-
tutional provisions clearly establish foreign affairs

16

as a "shared power" between the executive and the leg-
islative branches, with special responsibilities given
to the Senate. Two-hundred years of precedents vali-
date the notion that Congress has a right and a respon-
sibility to participate in the making of American- for-
eign policy. But the level and type of congressional
participation has varied widely through history.
Therefore, there is a second kind of legitimacy test
that must be applied, one that relates to the climate
of opinion Df the times. Beginning in the 1960s, Con-
gress' resurgence coincided with and was partly caused
by a decline in the political consensus that had sup-
ported postwar American foreign policy, 13 a reaction
fed by the perception that actions of successive presi-
dents threatened the constitutional system. Congress'
expanded role gained legitimacy from public support. A
new foreign policy consensus has not emerged to replace
the old, and concerns about the executive's abuse of
power declined during the Carter presidency. Without
the support of a clear public consensus on foreign pol-
icy, the responsibilities so assertively regained by
Congress in the early 1970s have been exercised with
circumspection through the early 1980s.

There are fewer questions about the legitimacy of
Congress' deep involvement in foreign policy than there
are about how well Congress performs its foreign policy
responsibilities: efficacy is a bigger issue than
legitimacy. The preoccupation with efficacy is not,
however, a secondary concern. Efficacy complements
legitimacy: unless Congress is able to fulfill the ex-
pectation that its participation in foreign policy is
positive in impact, and helps the nation achieve its
foreign goals, then the legitimacy of Congress’ in-
volvement in foreign policy will be open to question.
A much more limited definition of the proper level and
kind of congressional involvement in foreign affairs is
likely to result. Those who prefer a high degree of
congressional participation in foreign policy must be
the first to be concerned about the effectiveness of
that participation.

In the postwar period, the foreign policy chal-
lenges faced by the United States helped to consolidate
the predominance of the executive branch over the Con-
gress . Whereas the concentration of power m the exec-
utive had typically been dismantled in the wake of a
war, afte'r World War II it was decided that America’s
new world role would not allow a reversion to type,
with the attendant danger of a return to interwar iso-
lationism. The Cold War served to justify the mainten-
ance of a President who alone could respond to crises
in a period, by definition, of permanent threat to an
America transformed into a global superpower. For ex-
ample, it became part of the conventional wisdom that
the nuclear age rendered anachronistic that part of the

17

Constitution that requires a declaration of wat by Con-
gress. A diverse body of 535 sen and women, however
well organized, could not be expected to act with the
clarity of purpose and efficiency of a single individu-
al, the President The assumption that, by definition,
the President is better equipped to make foreign policy
has persisted even after the consensus on the wisdom of
an American global role has evaporated

Standards for Evaluation

Hew has foreign policy been judged? Standards for
judging foreign policy have often been implicit rather
than explicit, and are not usually treated systemat-
ically. For example, scholars and journalists often
cite the need for leadership in foreign affairs, but
rarely seek to analyze systematically either the nature
of leadership or the circumstances which permit its
successful exercise H However, themes recur in anal-
yses Of foreign policy that provide some basis for
evaluating the president's foreign policy performance.

Firat , the need for leadership is always stressed —
the need to have a clearly defined policy, articu-
lated unambiguously and implemented efficiently. In
foreign policy even more than in domestic policy,
•there is no substitute for a capable, determined, and
knowledgeable President

In principle, the need for leadership is difficult
to challenge Particularly in foreign affairs, where
so much is beyond the direct control of any single
government, the need for clarity of purpose and con-
sistency of action is unarguable The problem with
leadership is less one of principle than of practice
In fact, for much of the last 20 years presidenta have
been unable to perform this foreign policy function
well. With Lyndon Johnson and Richard Mixon, the
nation had strong leaders. But Johnson was increas-
ingly a leader without followers, persisting in the
Vietnam War long after it would have been politically
expedient for him to abandon the struggle. Nixon had
relatively well-defined foreign policy goals, but he
used his foreign policy to justify abuses of executive
power in the name of •national security." The American
people elected Jimmy Carter in part because he was not
a •Washingtonian,* but when he continued to behave as
an outsider even after four years in the White House,
his ability tc lead the country was called into ques-
tion. Confusion in his foreign policy contributed to
this perception Surprisingly, the Reagan Administra-
tion quickly followed the pattern of its predecessor,
with foreign policy zig-zags that robbed the Reagan
foreign policy of much coherence beyond rhetorical
anti-communism With recent experience in mind, the

18

assumption that the president is, and should be, the
central source of an effective foreign policy is open
to question. Leadership in contemporary American pol-
itics is more of a problem that a policy panacea.

A second standard that is used to measure foreign
policy performance is the degree to which the policy
implements some recognizable national interest, a no-
toriously slippery concept. In principle, the Presi-
dent has a structural advantage over the Congress in
defining national interest because he alone has a na-
tional constituency, whereas all other political au-
thorities have much more limited geographical constit-
uencies. A national constituency should incline the
President to a national view of problems, just as the
more limited constituencies of members of Congress
should make them more prone to parochialism and to in-
fluence by special Interests. With different terms of
office as well as different constituencies, the polit-
ical needs of the legislative and executive branches
may often be at odds. 17

The degree to which theory and practice corresponds
with respect to the national interest is not clear.
There are examples of presidents behaving in a manner
consistent with a broad definition of national interest
in foreign affairs in the face of parochial pressures
from Congress (e.g., Nixon's 1974 Trade Act): there
are as well examples of presidents bowing to parochial
interests (Reagan's lifting of the grain embargo on
Russia in 1981). Special interests and lobbies for
foreign governments impact on the executive branch as
well as the legislative branch.

It could be argued that the collective judgment of
either or both of the two Houses is as representative
of the U.S. national interest as the judgment of the
President and a handful of advisors. Certainly, as
long as the President is a politician he will be af-
fected by electoral considerations. With a four-year
term, presidents may be expected to be less craven than
representatives with two-year terms but more than sen-
ators with six-year terms. For example. President
Carter proposed to increase defense spending in order
to improve the prospects for Senate approval of the
SALT II Treaty. Having termed SALT "tragically flawed"
in the campaign, in office, President Reagan chose to
abide by the terms of the SALT II Treaty but not to
ratify it. Politics, rather than the national in-
terest, dictated presidential policy in both these
examples .

A third standard for judging foreign policy per-
formance is organizational competence — i.e., whether or
not the institutional infrastructure is adequate to
formulating and conducting an effective foreign pol-
icy. 3 - 8 Here, the executives' centralization and hier-
archical structure are supposed to be great advantages

19

over the relatively decentralized and often anarchic
environment on Capitol Rill But here, too, there are
considerations that call into question the executives’
supposed foreign policy effectiveness. first, the
executive tareign policy bureaucracy is both enormous
and complex, and often operates very differently from a
hierarchical flov-chart. The State Department and De-
fense Department arc both independent entities report-
ing directly to the Fresident on foreign policy nat-
ter* . formally, the intelligence coau-unity is supposed
to report through the Presidents national security ad-
visor, but in fact both civilian and military intelli-
gence agencies have fairly independent rolea in the
policy community The complexity of the executive for-
eign policy apparatus is such that there are more than
ID executive agencies with representatives abroad in
major American erbassiea; apparently, whatever central-
ization there la does not extend to overseas opera-
tions Furthermore, the interplay ot the executive
agencies to influence policy ie often described in
terras of the “bureaucratic politics model" in which in-
ternal procedures and Institutional rivalries may pre-
dominate in determining policy outcome* that have no
necessary relationship to rationally derived •policy,*
much less the “national interest “ On the whole, what
emerges is a foreign policy establishment that differs
more in degree than in kind from Congress' foreign pol-
icy organization.

A fourth standard for Judging foreign policy per-
formance 1 3 the level of information and expertise that
is brought to bear on a problem 19 In terms of infor-
mation, the President has a natural advantage because
he Is at the center of a worldwide network. Host mem-
bers of Congress have competing demands on their time
and few incentives lor deep or sustained involvement in
foreign policy Issues The mil stafl explosion has
reduced the gap between the Information that Congress
can process, as opposed to the executive, but even this
cannot compensate for tne volume and quality of foreign
policy expertise at the disposal of the president In-
deed, much of the foreign policy information available
to Congress continues to come from executive branch
sources.

Nevertheless, information must bo analyzed and put
to use in order to have a policy impact rn the ease
of Iran, for example, the intelligence and diplomatic
establishments did not anticipate the Shah's downfall,
pot vejff ttey pr*scl9 n t regard i ny t\? Zi.ti.re ci £V
country in the hands of the mullahs This kind of pol-
icy failure may reflect the pattern at the State
Department whereby the important decisions are taken bj
the political appointees on the seventh floor, vhtle
the people with the practical experience and county
expertise on the fifth and sixth lloora are not always

included in the deliberations. Depth of knowledge in
foreign policy has varied widely in the White House in
recent years. Especially in the Reagan Administration,
a lack of substantive knowledge or experience in for-
eign affairs has not been a bar to top foreign policy
positions. William Clark was made Deputy Secretary of
State in spite of his foreign policy ignorance and then
served as National Security Advisor to the President
because of his skill as a bureaucratic actor and close
relationship with the President. Clearly, a lack of
foreign policy expertise is not an exclusively congres-
sional shortcoming.

It is necessary to articulate better, more system-
atic standards for judging the foreign policy perform-
ance of the President. The gap between the informal
standards that are often used and presidential perform-
ance over the last decade raises the question whether
the standards are unrealistic and, therefore, of ques-
tionable relevance if we are to describe accurately or
prescribe presidential behavior. The observed short-
comings of the executive in the performance of his for-
eign policy responsibilities cannot excuse Congress'
own shortcomings in this field. Rather, this discus-
sion suggests that to use a presidential set of stan-
dards for evaluating Congress' performance may be mis-
leading, first because the executive branch itself does
not in practice live up to these standards, and second
because the standards are intrinsic to executives and,
by definition, could never be satisfactorily attained
by a legislative body. What is needed is a set of
standards that is both realistic, descriptively accu-
rate of Congress' performance at its best, and appro-
priate to a legislative body. In other words, it we
are to judge Congress, we need congressional standards
for doing so.

Reflection on the peculiar demands of making for-
eign policy and on the particular circumstances of con-
temporary American politics suggests' at least five
standards for judging Congress' exercise of its foreign
policy responsibilities.

1 ) Legitimacy . Both the role Congress plays in
foreign policy and the manner in which the role is
played should be a logical extension of Congress' con-
stitutional responsibilities — to declare war, raise
armies, approve treaties, confirm ambassadors, and more
generally oversee the implementation of laws by the
executive .

2 ) Interest articulation and public information .
Congress should bring the views and interests of vari-
ous groups in society to bear on foreign policy ques-
tions. Congress' consideration of an issue should
raise the level of public debate on foreign affairs,
helping to educate the public and to shape public
opinion.

21

3) Expeditious consideration Congress' partici-
pation in foreign policy should he neither hasty nor
dilatory- Circumstances will dictate the degree of
dispatch that is appropriate In a particular case, but
generally congressional action should not be so time
consuming as to damage substantial national interests
Different standards would apply to an International
"crisis" than would apply to a more routine foreign
policy situation,

<1 Coherence The effect of Congress' participa-
tion should be greater coherence and consistency in
B S. foreign policy, not greater confusion There are
two dimensions to the coherence standard — between the
two branches and within Congress Executive/legisla-
tive coherence exists when the President and Congress
agree on a foreign policy issue j agreement on the ob-
jective to be pursued but disagreement on the proper
means might still preserve the semblance of coherence.
Where there ore fundamental differences between Con-
gress and the President over both means and ends, then
praparly Congress’ should be responsive to public opin-
ion, contributing to a basis for a coherent policy when
and if the executive changes course Internal coher-
ence exists when the Senate and the House agree on a
foreign policy Issue Disagreement between the two
Houses of Congress breeds policy confusion

5) Effectiveness. The impact of Congress' actions
on US foreign policy should achieve the intended pur-
pose and not be counterproductive While judging ef-
fectiveness can be highly subjective and speculative,
It la nonetheless a standard that must be considered.

Using these standards to evaluate Congress 1 foreign
policy performance in the policy studies in this volume
will provide a bettor basis for understanding U.5. for-
eign-policy making, and will provide a relevant basis
for prescriptive assessments as to what Congress should
and should not do In the foreign policy field

NOTES

1 Arthur Schleslnger, Jr,, The Imperial Presi -
dency (Boatont Houghton Mifflin, TT73TT"and Richard
Haase, Congressional Power i Implications for American
Security . Adeipar Papers, no. 153. 1979

2. BaylesB Manning, "Congress, the Executive, and
Intermestlc Affairs," Foreign Affairs 55, January 1977,

3. I. H Destler, 'Trade Consensus and SALT
Stalemate" in Norman Ornsteln and Thomas Mann, eds ,
The New Congreas (Washington! American Enterprise
Institute , 19B1), p 332

Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Texas at Austin,

August 1983.

15. Spanier, pp.xxvii-xxx; Nogee, pp. 190-193;

Destler in Ornstein and Mann, pp. 354-55.

16. Nogee, p.199.

17. Destler, in Mann, Ornstein, pp. 300-302?

Spanier, pp.xxii-xxiii.

18. Sundquist, pp. 362-364; Destler, in Dodd and
Oppenheimer , pp. 310-12.

19. Spanier, pp.xxvi-xxviii.

3

Tracing the Congressional Role:
U.S. Foreign Policy and Turkey

Hoyt Purvis

On March 12, 1917, President Harry Trunan addressed
a joint session of Congress to recommend assistance to
Greece and Turkey under what fcecane known o> the Truman
Doctrine The President spoke in grave terms about the
threat to freedom m the two countries and described
the matter as urgent because British officials had
recently notified the United States that Britain could
no longer fulfill its traditional commitments in Greece
and Turkey

Beginning with the Truaan Doctrine and the immedi-
ate poat-world War II era, Turkey haa held a koy posi-
tion In the U.S. foreign policy perspective/ with Its
strategic location giving It particular importance.
The changing patterns of congressional involvement in
foreign policy can be traced through U S. policies
toward Turkey Indeed, focusing on Turkey provides a
particularly instructive paradigm for examining the
evolution of U.S. foreign policy since World War II,
and the congressional role during that period

Congress and the Truman Doctrine

President Truman, In his appeal to Congress, said,
“As in the case of Greece, If Turkey Is to have the as-
sistance it needs, the United Staten must supply it,
We are the only country able to provide that help. 1
am fully aware of the broad Implications involved if
the United States extends assistance to Greece and
Turkey ,"1

In his address, Truman noted that one of the prl-
J5f *T dikAreClvetf of u ff, foreign policy was 'the crea-
tion of conditions In which vc and other nations will
be able to work out a way of life tree from coercion. *2
Although the clear implication of Truman's message was
that Turkey and Greece were threatened with the pros-
pect of Soviet/ communist domination, he did not make any

23

specific references to the Soviet Union. However, he
was more explicit when he later recalled, m his mem-
oirs, the factors that led to the U.S. commitment to
Greece and Turkey:

...The alternative was the loss of Greece
and the extension of the Iron Curtain across
the eastern Mediterranean. If Greece was
lost, Turkey would become an untenable outpost
in a sea of communism. Similarly, if Turkey
yielded to Soviet demands, the position of
Greece would be endangered. . .Greece and Turkey
were still free countries being challenged by
communist threats both from within and with-
out. These free people were now engaged in a
valiant struggle to preserve their liberties
and independence.

America could not, and should not, let
these free countries stand unaided. . .The
ideals and the traditions of our nation de-
manded that we come to the aid of Greece and
Turkey and that we put .the world on notice
that it would be our policy to support the
cause of freedom wherever it was threatened. 3

This was a ma;jor point of demarcation in American
foreign policy, and one that has met with substantial
criticism. The Truman Doctrine has been seen by some
critics as having made the Cold War inevitable. Sena-
tor J. W. Fulbright, long a leading foreign policy fig-
ure in Congress, termed the doctrine a seminal develop-
ment. Fulbright said this was true because President
Truman based his appeal to Congress for support of
Greece and Turkey not primarily on specific circum-
stances of those two countries at that time, but on
sweeping ideological (anti-communist J grounds. Actual-
ly, Truman did focus on specific circumstances Of
Greece and Turkey, while acknowledging that broader im-
plications were involved. Fulbright, who voted for the
original Greek-Turkish aid package, concedes that the
Truman Doctrine "may have made sense for its time and
place," 4 but says that it "came to be recognized as the
basic rationale, from the American standpoint, for the
Cold War. According to Fulbright, regardless of the
original merit of the Truman Doctrine, it served as the
charter for 25 years of "global ideological warfare"
and it was this "subsequent universal application" of
the Truman Doctrine that Fulbright and others criti-
cized.® Some of Truman's phraseology might have easi-
ly fit into a speech on Vietnam by American presidents
in the 1960s.

. Fulbright has written, "Sustained by an inert Con-
gress, the policymakers of the forties, fifties, and
early sixties were never compelled to re-examine the

premises of the Truman Doctrine, or even to defend them
in constructive adversary proceedings."?

Since the Creek-Turkiah aid program and the Truman
Doctrina were decisive turning points in OS foreign
policy ard aet the tone for two decades— a period dur-
ing which many viewed the congressional role as rela-
tively minor — what role did Congress play in establish-
ing the doctrine?

White House Initiative

On February 21, 1947, the British Government offic-
ially notified the United States that London could not
provide the support needed by Greece and Turkey On
February 27, congressional leaders were summoned to the
White Bouse to be briefed on the matter by President
Truman and Secretary of state Ceexge Marshall. Truman
realized that with Republican control of Congress "the
situation was sore precarious than It would have been
with a preponderantly Democratic Congress," and said it
seemed desirable "to advise the congressional leadership
as soon aa possible of the gravity of the situation .."8
AIbo present at the meeting was Under Secretary of
State Dean Aeheson Never noted for his modesty,
Acheaon later offered his recollection of that historic
session?

When we convened.. .in the White House to
open the subject with our congressional twis-
ters, I knew we were met at Armageddon. We
faced the ‘leaders of Congress'— all the
majority and minority potentates except Sena-
tor Taft, an accidental omission to which
Senator Vandenberg swiftly drew the Presi-
dent's attention. 3

Although Marshall had described the situation in
stark terms, Acheaon felt that the Secretary had
"flubbed" hia opening statement. Acheaon recalled?

In desperation I whispered to Mm a re-
quest to speak. This waa my crisis For a
week I had nurtured it These congressmen had
no conception of what challenged them? it was
my task to bring it home ..Never have 1 spoken
under auch a pressing sense that the issue was
up to ete alo?te No time waa left for measured
appraisal In the past IB months, J said,
Soviet pressure on the Straits, on Iran, and
on northern Greece had brought the Balkans to
the point where a highly possible Soviet
breakthrough might open three continents to
Soviet penetration ..The Soviet Union was

26

playing one of the greatest gambles in history
at minimal cost...Ke and we alone were in a
position to break up the play.* 0

According to Acheson' s account, subsequently re-
peated by a number of authors, a long silence followed
his remarks. Then, according to Acheson, Senator
Arthur Vandenberg said solemnly, "Mr. President, if you
will say that to the Congress and the country, I will
support you and I believe that most of its members will
do the same. “H In his differing description of the
meeting, Vandenberg said of the reaction of the con-
gressional leadership, "We all made general -comments
but no commitments. This was the extent of the 'bi-
partisan technique* in this instance. But it must be
remembered that the whole thing was precipitated upon
our government ,so suddenly that there really was very
little opportunity for preliminary consultations and
studies. "i*

Joseph Jones, who 'was a State Department official
at the time, and who later wrote The Fifteen Weeks , a
respected chronicle of this decisive period in U.S.
foreign policy, offered this account:

Slowly and with gravity, Vandenberg said
that he had been greatly impressed, even shak-
en by what he had heard... He felt that it was
absolutely necessary that any request of Con-
gress for funds authority to aid Greece and
Turkey should be accompanied by a message to
Congress, and an explanation to the American
people, in which the grim facts of the larger
situation should be laid publicly on the line
as they had been at their meeting there that
day . . .

Vandenberg wrote some time later that no
commitments were made at this meeting. That
is true. None had been asked. But the very
definite impression was gained, and was con-
veyed to the State Department staff the next

day that the congressional leaders would

support whatever measures were necessary to
save Greece and Turkey, on the condition , made
by Senator Vandenberg and supported by others
present, that the President should, in a mes-
sage to Congress and in a radio address to the
American people, explain the issue in the same
frank terms and broad context in which it had
been laid before them.

However, Jones also makes clear that most of those
in the State Department, led by Acheson, were from the
beginning strong advocates of a tough approach on this
issue. in working on the Greek-Turkish aid program.

27

they "found release from the professional frustration
of years." According to Jones "there was little dis-
sent in the Department or anywhere in the government
from the view that the boldest kind of confrontation
was necessary "* 4

At a State Department meeting on February 24, 1947

--three days before the first meeting with congres-
sional leaders — John BlcXerscn of the Office of Euro-
pean Affairs, had urged that the new program be pres-
ented to Congress *in such a fashion as to electrify
the American people. "35

A number of later accounts of the White Rouse meet-
ing on February 27 state that Senator Vandenberg told
Truman that to gain approval for the proposal, he would
ha’.e to "scare hell* out of the country This is fre-
quently cited as a reason for the strong tone of
Truman's subsequent appeal to Congress However, this
rendition considerably overstates the accounts of the
principals in their memoirs, certainly Vandenberg's own
account, and is perhaps apocryphal There are ample
indications that the tone of Truman's approach may have
owed as much or more to sentiments within the executive
branch and views of key figures in the executive as to
what would be necessary to gain public and congression-
al support than to the urging of Vandenberg or others
in Congress

l One of the earliest examples of this statement
being attributed to Vandenberg is found In Eric F
Goldman's The Crucial Decade— And After, America, 1945-
1960 (19561 Goldman wrote, ‘As Vandenberg left, he

remarked to Truman: 'Mr. President, If that's what you
want, there's only one way to get it That la to make
a personal appearance before Congress and scare hell
out of the country " tp 59?. There Is no documenta-
tion of the comment attributed to Vandenberg Alexan-
der DeConde in A History of American Foreign Policy
(1963) used the same quote and the footnote said,
"Quoted in Goldman, Crucial Decade " (p. 669, 2nd
ed.) In America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1966
(1968), Walter Lafebcr wrote, "Truman and his advisors
went to some length to oversell the doctrine ideo-
logically. As Vandenberg advised, the President
'scared hell out of the American people,' by painting
in dark hues the 'totalitarian regimes' which threat-
ened to snuff out freedom everywhere (p 45) There
Is no documentation of the comment attributed to
Vandenberg For similar accounts see: Arthur M,

Schlesinger, Jr., The Imperial Presidency (1973), p
128: "He (Truman) also paid a price: to get the pol-
icy he had to over col or tho crisis. Thus Senator Van-
denberg told him that, if he wanted to enlist Congress
behind aid to Greece and Turkey, he would have to scare
hell out of the country Truman therefore elevated a
reasonable and limited program into a transcendent

OMVEB'iTY CENTRAL LIBRAE/
(JODHPUR.)

principle."; also, Schlesinger ' s introduction to The
Dynamics of World Power — A Documentary History of
United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1973 (1973) p.xxxv:
"But, recalling the hard fight for a British loan ‘in

1946, Truman feared that a conventional request for aid
would not pass the Congress. Accordingly he' accepted
the counsel of Senator Vandenberg that he had to scare
the hell out of the country."? Robert A. Divine, For-
eign Policy and U.S. Presidential Elections, 1940-1948
(1974), p. 170: "Urged by Senator Arthur Vandenberg to
'scare hell out of the American people,' the President
justified his proposals by sketching out a struggle
between the forces of good and evil..."; Dewey w.
Grantham, The United States Since 1945: The Ordeal of
Power (1976), p. 20; "Senator Vandenberg was later
quoted as saying. . ."Mr. President, if that's what you
want, there's only one way to get it. That is to make
a personal appearance before Congress and scare hell
out of the country."; also Garry Wills in excerpts from
his book, The Kennedy Imprisonment , in The Atlantic
Monthly , February 1982, p. 63; “Yet, in an extraordin-
ary series, of moves. President Truman followed Senator
Vandenberg' s advice and scared hell out of the coun-
try. Solidifying new prerogatives from this sense of
crisis, he instituted the security system, established
the CIA, and opened a campaign to avoid 'losing' Turkey
and Greece as we were losing China." None of these
accounts provide ' any documentation of the statement
attributed to Vandenberg. )

Republican Vandenberg was a key congressional
figure, although he had been Chairman of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee only since the beginning of

1947, when the Republicans gained a Senate majority for
the first time since 1932. (Republicans also took
control of the Rouse in 1947, the. first time since
1930.) Until World War II, Vandenberg had been a
leader of the isolationists in Congress. But, by the
end of the war, Vandenberg was a delegate, along with
Democratic Senator Tom Connally, to the early United
Nations and European peace conferences . By February
1947, Vandenberg had become "a veteran in bipartisan
internationalism — strong, dependable, indispensable to
the conduct of foreign relations.

Vandenberg had known nothing of the Greek-Turkish
crisis until he was called to the White House. But he
was inclined to go along with the Administration's
request, having been impressed by Marshall's comment
that the American choice was "between acting with ener-
gy or losing by default. Nonetheless, Vandenberg
had some doubts about both the process and aspects of
•the policy being proposed. In his diary, Vandenberg
expressed his misgivings about the way the problem had
been raised;

29

The trouble is that the 'crises' never
reach Congress until they have developed to a
point vhete congressional discretion is pa-
thetically restricted When things finally
reach a point where a President asks us to
'declare var* there la usually nothing left to
do except to 'declare var * In the present
Instance, the overriding fact is that the
President has made a long-delayed statement
regarding communism on-the-march which must be
supported it there is any hope of ever Impres-
sing Hoscov with the necessity of paying any
sort of peaceful attention to us whatever If
we turned the President down— after his speech
to the joint congressional session— we might
as well either resign ourselves to a complete
communist encirclement and infiltration or
else get ready for World War No Three 18

The Congressional PI letmna

Later, in opening Senate debate on the issue,
Vandenberg emphasized this concern “It is regrettable
that policies of such magnitude could not have had more
time for consideration I Knew nothing of this matter
until we were called to the White House on February 27
I repeat, it is unfortunate when such important decis-
ions have to be made on a crisis basis *

"Congress does not have an unprejudiced chance to
exercise truly independent and objective judgments in
Buch circumstances as we here confront," said
Vandenberg He cited the dilemma which Congress often
faces because of the nature of its role in foreign pol-
icy "Congress does not enjoy original jurisdiction in
foreign relations That is the prerogative of the
Chief Executive We come in, usually, only at the
eleventh hour, when our choice is the lesser ot two
evils— ns in this instance, when we must decide which
Is the wiser 'calculated risk* for us "

As Vandenberg said, ■ .the fact ia that by the
time these issues reach us for ultimate conclusions, we
are heavily precommitted by the very fact of the presi-
dential request I do hot for an Instant mean to say
that among the paramount factors to which we dare not
deny due weight is this To repudiate the President of
the United States at such an hour could display a divi-
sive weakness vnich might involve far greater jeopardy
that an sturdy display of united strength He are not
free to Ignore the price of noncompliance * 19

Vandenberg s statement summarized the predicament
in which Congress frequently finds itself < wanting to
exercise independent judgment, but, at the same time,

30

being careful not to undercut the authority of the
President and the position of the United States in the
world. Vandenberg's misgivings about the congressional
role when the executive confronted it with a "crisis"
situation were similar to those felt by congressional
leaders on other occasions. Fulbright, for example,
objected to such meetings at the White House being
called "consultations," when they were often merely
briefings to inform members of Congress about predeter-
mined courses of action. The meetings were essentially
pro forma and, in Fulbright's view were on occasion in
the nature of "cheerleading" sessions to build support
for presidential policies. Fulbright noted that fre-
quently the major decisions had already been reached
before the congressional leaders were summoned to the
White House, sometimes based on information that had
not been available to congressional leaders. 20 And
sometimes there were questions about whether a "crisis"
was real, or whether a crisis atmosphere was created in
order to make it difficult to oppose predetermined
presidential policies.

Congressional leaders are nomally reluctant to take
issue with executive decisions on "crisis" matters.
After President Truman's message to Congress on March
12, Vandenberg told the press, "In such a critical mo-
ment the President's hands must be upheld. Any other
course would be dangerously misunderstood. But Con-
gress must carefully determine the methods and explore
the details in so momentous a departure from our pre-
vious policies. 1,21

Congress grappled with this problem of executive-
legislative roles in the early 1970s in considering the
War Powers resolution. As finally enacted, over Presi-
dent Nixon's veto in 1973, Congress did establish a
procedural formula for a codeterminative role, but
still left broad leeway to the President, particularly
in the early stages of a crisis.

Bipartisanship

The executive can make effective use of appeals to
bipartisanship in cases of international crisis or po-
tential crisis. And, although Vandenberg's name was to
become identified with the concept of bipartisanship,
Vandenberg wrote, "There is a great deal of misunder-
standing. . .regarding this whole subject of ‘bipartisan
foreign policy. ' Many people seem to think that I act
as sort of a Co-secretary, of State in connection with
foreign policy decisions. This of course is totally
erroneous ... Our 'bipartisan foreign policy' has been
quite definitely confined (1) to the evolution of the
United Nations and (2) to the peace treaties in
Europe. " 22

31

Truman considered the Greek-Turkiah aid package to
be a notable example of bipartisan policy, a policy
that he traced back to his own tenure in the Senate

during World War II, when Cordell Hull was Secretary of

State 23 And Vandenberg did become a staunch defender
ot bipartisanship, or nonpartisanship as he sometimes

preferred, although always insisting that bipartisan-
ship should not be presumed to cower all foreign policy
issues Vandenberg would later refer to the Creek-

Turkish aid as having been a bipartisan action, and he
said such bipartisan policy ■permits our democracy to
speak with a great degree ot unity at moments when
switt decision 1 b vital and when we face totalitarian
opponents who can command their own Instant unity by
degree ’ 2 *

Vandenberg also understood that If actions on for-
eign policy were perceived to be partisan, they could
backfire politically A 'responsible' opposition usu-
ally seeks to Bteer a course between backing the Presi-
dent on critical foreign policy issues and avoiding
what Vandenberg referred to as a slavish “me too’ par-
roting of the Administration on foreign policy issues 2J

More than 30 years later, another key Republican
Benator, Howard Baker, perhaps Justifying his attacks
on President Jimmy Carter, said, "The bipartisan for-
eign policy of World War 21 and the postwar era has
been replaced by the rhetoric of human rights and the
passivity of an unwilling actor on the world scene.* 26
Baker strongly attacked Carter on the SALT II Treaty
and other issues, yet backed the President on the
Panama canal Treaties and lifting the embargo on arms
to Turkey in 197B

A3 Vandenberg noted, bipartisanship becomes more
simple when one party controls the executive and
another controls the legislative branch, as wait the
case in 1947 ’There has to be cooperation under such
circumstances or America would be devoid of any foreign
policy at all,’ Vandenberg said, 27

In appealing for bipartisanship a President can
make those who question his proposals or actions appear
almost unpatriotic For example, in 19B1, President
Ronald Reagan, advocating sale of Airborne Warning and
Control Systems (AWACSJ planes to Saudi Arabia, said
those senators who opposed the sale “are not doing
their coentry a service," 20

Winning Congressional Approval

The Truman Administration, keenly aware of the need
for bipartisan support, went to great lengths to give
the appearance of congressional involvement, but to
leave Congress little option to reject or redirect the
Creek-Turklsh policy. In her study of Truman and the

32

80th Congress, Susan Hartmann wrote, “In deciding not
to involve Republicans in the - decision-making process,
the President may have chosen to avoid a premature re-
buff by confronting legislative leaders with the sit-
uation in such a way that they could not resist going
along. In any case, Truman had already made his de-
cision when he called congressional leaders to the
White House on February 27 . "29 This was a pattern that
would be frequently repeated in executive-legislative
relations.

After the February 27 meeting, the Administration
set out to win congressional approval, creating and
capitalizing on a crisis atmosphere. The primary focus
was on the President's planned March 12 speech to Con-
gress. According to Acheson, "Like all presidential
messages, this one stimulated controversy within the
government. George Kennan thought it too strong, since
it took the line I had taken with the legislative
group, and feared that it might provoke the Soviet
Union to aggressive action. "20

Several key figures in the Administration expressed
concern about the tone and ideological emphasis of the
speech drafts. Secretary Marshall, who was traveling
in Europe when he received the proposed text, thought
that there was "a little too much flamboyant anti-
communism in the speech.” 33 - Marshall cabled back to
Washington, expressing his view that the case was being
overstated. He received a reply stating that it was
the opinion of the executive branch, including the
President, that the Senate would not approve the doc-
trine without the emphasis on the communist danger. 32
Kennan objected to the "sweeping nature" ot the Admin-
istration’s proposal and “the commitments which it im-
plied." 33 Kennan’ s reaction was somewhat ironic, since
he is often regarded as the mastermind of the policy of
containment. It was Kennan who, as the pseudonymous
Mr. X, authored an article titled "The Sources of
Soviet Conduct," in the July, 1947, Foreign Affairs .
The article has been viewed as the blueprint for
American Cold War policy, the intellectual/philosophi-
cal rationale for the Truman Doctrine.

Kennan' s article has been subjected to a variety of
interpretations, and Kennan himself has expressed re-
gret about some of the interpretations that were at-
tached to the article, and particularly its linkage to
the Truman Doctrine. 34 The article was an 'outgrowth of
a cable (which became known as the "Long Telegram”)
which Kennan sent to Washington in February, 1946,
while serving as charge d'affaires in Moscow. In the
x-Article, Kennan depicted Soviet policy as relentless-
ly expansionist, governed by Marxist evangelists who
saw communism in pseudoreligious terms and were spurred
by a long distrust of the West. According to Kennan,
the U.S. should engage in a "long-term, patient but

33

firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive
tendencies.* There oust be "adroit and vigilant ap-
plication of counter-force at a series of constantly
shifting geographical and political points * This
vould ’increase enormously the attains under which
Soviet policy must operate,* and encourage changes
within Russia leading to "either the breakup or the
gradual mellowing of Soviet power. ‘35

tater, in hia memoirs, Rennan said perhaps the moat
serious of several deficiencies in the X-Artlcle was
the failure to make clear that his notion of the con-
tainment of Soviet power "was not the containment by
military means of a military threat, but the political
containment of a political threat * 36 It was rennan's
view that the V S should not resort to bluster and ex-
cessive reliance on military force in meeting the
Soviet challenge Indeed, Kennan was opposed to pro-
viding military aid to Turkey in 1947, and. In tact, the
aid to Turkey was primarily military, not economic
Xennan said that he suspected *whst had really happened
was that the Pentagon had exploited a favorr'ile set of
circumstances in order to infiltrate a military aid
program for Turkey Into what was supposed to be primar-
ily a political and economic aid program for Greece." 37

Joseph JoncB, who was involved in drafting Truman's
Speech, has acknowledged that "the treatment of Turkey
and the strategic importance of the Middle Eaat In the
President's message was something less than the 'foil
and frank’ presentation that Senator Vandenberg had
wanted. “ 3 8 Jones said that the strategic significance
of Turkey ranked high in discussions with congressional
leaders, but this was consciously played down in public
discussion "Too much emphasis upon supplying military
aid to Turkey Bight have been alarming to the point of
defeating the proposed action.* 39 Another concern vaa
that supplying military aid to a country on the Soviet
border might result in a Soviet reaction, and would
lead to charges of provocation and encirclement by the
Soviets So, as Jones noted, "Military aid to Turkey
was not concealed; but it was not emphasised. “ 4U

In hia speech, Truman simply asked Congress "to
provide authority for assistance to Greece and Turkey
in the amount of 5400 million for the period ending
June 30, 1948," without being specific about the allo-
cation or purpose of those iunds. 4 ! Indeed, a careful
reading of the speech leaves the Impression that tha
aid to Turkey was for economic purposes Truman said,
"The British Government has informed us that ..it can
no longer extend financial or economic aid to Turkey.
As in the case of Greece, if Turkey is to have the
assistance it needs, the United States must supply
it “ Truman did say that, in addition to funds, he was
asking Congress to authorize sending American civilian
and military personnel to Greece and Turkey to assiot

34

in reconstruction, and to supervise the use of finan-
cial and material assistance. 42

The aid to Turkey was really the beginning of the
modern D.S. security assistance program. However,
whereas the Truman Administration was reluctant to
"sell" military’ assistance to a war-weary Congress in
1947, subsequent administrations found that "security"
assistance (even if it was primarily economic aid) was
easier to sell to Congress than pure economic assis-
tance, which was viewed by many in Congress as the
politically unpopular "foreign aid."

The Truman Administration's argument that aid to
Turkey would enable that country to strengthen its
security forces without overburdening its economy would
be repeated by the Carter and Reagan Administrations
more than 30 years later.

As work continued on President Truman's speech to
Congress, the congressional leaders were invited to the
White House again on March 10. However, Acheson said
that the congressional group, > despite Vandenberg's
"earlier assurance," was cool and silent. Acheson
wrote of the meeting: "In his matter-of-fact way, the
President laid out the need for action and the action
proposed. . .Vandenberg reiterated his insistence that
the President put the crisis before Congress in its
broadest setting. No one else said much. No commit-
ments were made." 43

Given the congressional role in foreign policy, and
the frequent necessity to build public support for, for-
eign policy initiatives, policy statements from the
executive are often made with an eye on the politics of
Congress. It is clear that when Truman went to Capitol
Hill on March 12, his speech and the Administration's
overall approach had been designed in a manner thought
certain to win congressional support. Some, such as
Ri'chard Freeland, have suggested that the primary pur-
pose of the speech was not to enunciate American for-
eign policy, but to assure congressional approval of
the Greek-Turkish aid program. "In these terms," said
Freeland, "the speech was a complete success, for its
mere delivery made congressional rejection of the aid
program impossible." 44

The message confronted Congress with what author
Susan Hartmann called "an inflexible either-or situa-
tion." By presenting its proposal as the only solution
to a crisis, the Administration offered Congress "the
choice of either approving it or repudiating the Pres-
ident and thereby crippling the United States inter-
nationally. " 43

Daniel Yergin, author of The Shattered Peace , which
examines the origin of the Cold War, believes Truman's
speech reflected the anticommunistic consensus that had
emerged within the executive branch. "The Doctrine was
not a cynical maneuver, as some writers have since

35

argued But It was deliberately written aa a 'sales
job. "* 6

•The Administration exaggerated the extent of the
crisis and bluntly portrayed ltB proposals In bold,
crusading. Ideological terns," Hartmann wrote. "In
part, thla endeavor was necessary to win approval from
the Republican-controlled Congress. The anti -communist
tone... would delight Republicans who hod been pressing
the Administration for a tougher approach to Russia.
The crisis atmosphere might convince economy-oriented
legislators that financial sacrifices were necessary.
But the tone fo the proposal also faithfully portrayed
the way in which moat policy makers viewed the
situation * 47

Congressional Consideration

After Truman's speech, Congress moved quickly to
begin Its consideration of the proposal On the morn-
ing of March 13, 1947, Vandenborg convened an executive
session of the Foreign Relations Committee in the com-
mittee room in the Capitol. However, there was resist-
ance— as there frequently Is in Congress— to a deadline
Imposed by the executive. The first matter to come up
in the committee's meeting was an objection to the
Administration's March 31 deadline for action on the
program Vandenberg said, “ . 1 am afraid that all of
the detailed implications involved In Implementing the
President’s programs are going to create such a
division and debate in Congress, particularly in the
Senate, that It may be Just physically Impossible to do
business by March 31 . particularly in view of the
other congestion on the Senate calendar The Admin-
istration probably recognized that the ■'deadline" was
not realistic, especially for the Senate. (House rules
often allow it to move more speedily ) The "deadline*
may simply have been a tactic to help create a sense of
urgency and maintain the crisi9 atmosphere. Part of
the problem for those involved In foreign policy in the
executive branch Is that they sometimes forget that the
congressional agenda contains many time-consuming
domestic matters as well

Among those representing the Administration at that
executive session of the Foreign Relations Committee
were Acheson, Secretary of War Robert Patterson, and
SecwCery of the tavy to FerrestaZ Like AcVjo",
Porrestal had been a key figure within the Administra-
tion in moving toward the policies embodied in the
Truman Doctrine. It was Forrestal who had done the
most to call attention to Kennan's original "Long
Telegram* from Moscow, distributing copies to others in
Washington It was at Forrestal'fl request that Kennan
wrote a follow-up paper that eventually became the

X-Article. 4 ^ Forrestal became the first Secretary of
Defense when that position was established later in
1947. 50

The Administration representatives encountered some
initial skepticism from the committee members. Senator
H. Alexander Smith, New Jersey Republican, commented,
"Everybody who has talked to me about this has said,
‘We are just going to give a blank check without know-
ing what the check is for. ’"51 That comment would be
echoed at numerous congressional hearings through the
years, as members of Congress expressed doubts about
granting broad authority to the executive ' without
having more specific information about how funds were
going to be utilized. In later years Congress would
often be more insistent about having such information.

Acheson told the committee that because of military
requirements, there was "a very great strain on the
Turkish economy" and that the Turkish Army was high in
manpower and low in equipment. 52 These too were com-
ments that would be repeated numerous times over the
years at congressional hearings on requests for assist-
ance to Turkey.

Chairman Vandenberg and Senator Smith raised a
question that would come up often during congressional
consideration of the Greek-Turkish . aid program: Why
wasn't the U.S. working through the united Nations to
deal with the problem? But, Senator Walter 'George
seemed to reflect the recognition by the committee that
the U.N. would not be a productive channel for achiev-
ing Truman's aims. George said, "I do not see how you
are ever going to get anywhere through the United
Nations. I do not see how the President's speech... can
be characterized as a mere plea for assistance to
Greece and Turkey. If it were mere economic assistance
it would be one thing, and easily done. But he put
this nation squarely on the line against certain
ideologies. 1,53

Vandenberg said he had no illusions about the pros-
pects for early United Nations action, but that he
thought it important for the American people to under-
stand that the U.N. did not have "any power that it
could use in this situation.” 54 Vandenberg' s comments
offered insight into his concept of the role of con-
gressional hearings and the need to build public under-
standing: "I do not think they (the American people)
understand it this morning much better than they did
before the President delivered his message, and I think
one of our major jobs is to make them understand it,
and I do not believe they ever will unless we dramatize
this thing in every possible way.” 55

During the hearings a number of senators expressed
concern about the U.S. giving the impression that it
was circumventing the U.N. and thus establishing a
precedent in regard to the fledgling organization.

Senator Claude pepper ID-Plorida), who van not a For-
eign Relations Committee member, appeared before the
committee and said, “Let us take the lead in . trying
to solve it through the United Nations. Then, it they
fail or it they refuse, we have clear justification
before our citizenry and the world in going in and
giving relief ..“ 5b

[Pepper had previously been a Foreign Relations
member, 1937-1946, but was dropped from the committee
due to the reduction in the number of members, as pro-
vided in the Legislative Reorganization Act ot 1946
Pepper returned when Democrats regained control of the
Senate in 1949 He was defeated for re-election in
1950, but later served a long tenure In the House,
beginning in 1962 )

Pepper referred to a Callup poll which he said
Indicated that the public generally approved Truman*B
policy, but with the majority expressing regret that
the problem was not put to the United Nations in the
beginning Also, the poll reported that the country
was opposed to any military Involvement or sending
American military advisers to train the Creek and
Turkish armies 57

Senator Edwin Johnson of Colorado proposed amend-
ments to the committee that would have reaffirmed D.S
policy “to bring before the United Nations all., condi-
tions which may endanger the peace of the world" and
not to take unilateral action or intervene in the
internal affairs of foreign countries Johnson also

proposed to strike all assistance to Turkey from the
bill because he was opposed to the military nature of
the aid, 58 Altogether, 22 amendments were considered
by the Senate committee, which conducted lengthy hear-
ings, with testimony from executive branch witnesses,
senators who had Introduced amendments, and 33 non-
governmental witnesses. Chairman Vandenberg invited
all senators to submit questions they might have with
respect to Greek-Turklsh aid. More than 400 such
questions were received, and then consolidated so as to
avoid duplication, with a questionnaire of 110 items
ultimately submitted to the State Department Both
questions and answers were published in what was at the
time a unique legislative document Zt was a precedent
tor the extensive background information which Congress
would come to expect In considering later foreign pol-
icy programs.

The committee approved five amendments, but none of
them seriously altered the original proposal One

required that the chief of any mission appointed by the
president to head the assistance program to Greece or
Turkey must receive Senate confirmation — the Senate
protecting its role in confirming major presidential
appointments. Two of the amendments dealt with the
United Nations One, sponsored by Vandenberg and

Connally , inserted a long preamble designed to identify
the Greek-Turkish aid more closely with the U.N. pro-
gram and purposes. The second/ offered by Vandenberg,
was the key amendment. It indicated the willingness of
the U.S. to withdraw its aid program if the U.N. Gener-
al Assembly found that action taken by the U.N. would
make the continnation of such assistance unnecessary or
undesirable. The U.S. would waive its right of veto in
such a case.

Amendment Strategy

Neither of Johnson's amendments were approved, al-
though portions of his U.N. amendment were incorporated
in the Vandenberg amendment. Vandenberg pushed hard
for his amendment, which was discussed at length by the
committee. Having played an active irole in helping to
launch the U.N., and having led congressional support
for U.S. participation, Vandenberg was particularly
concerned about the Administration's neglect of the
U.N. on this issue. He saw this as the one major flaw
in Truman's plan. Vandenberg regarded the U.N. as "our
first reliance and our prime concern" and believed this
defect in Truman's plan must be corrected. 59

The Administration initially resisted Vandenberg' s
amendment, but, after much discussion and some compro-
mises on the language, the State Department "reluctant-
ly agreed’ 1 to accept the amendment. 60 "It was a cheap
price for Vandenberg's patronage," according to
Acheson, and the amendment "won over the bulk of the
doubters. " 6 1

To some extent, Vandenberg and administration
leaders were acting out roles in what came to, be an
understood but unstated , strategy. As Acheson later
described the process: "One of Vandenberg's stratagems
was to enact publicly his conversion to a proposal, his
change of attitude, a kind of political tran substanti-
ation. The method was to go through a period of public
doubt and skepticism; then find a comparatively minor
flaw in the proposal, pounce on it, and make much of
it; in due course a proposed change, always the
Vandenberg amendment. Then, and only then, could it be
given to his followers as a true doctrine worthy of all
men to be received." 6 ^ As Acheson noted, Vandenberg
did this not only in connection with the Greek-Turkish
proposal, but with other major foreign policy initia-
tives, including the Marshall Plan. However, Acheson
acknowledged that the strength of this stratagem lay in
the genuineness of Vandenberg's belief in each step.

Through the years, other congressional leaders
utilized similar techniques. During his term as Senate
Majority Leader (1977-1980), Robert Byrd was a master
of this form of minuet. On- a numbar of major foreign

39

policy Issues Byrd ottered amendments or extracted
pledges from the Carter Administration that in Byrd's
view strengthened various proposals and nado them more
acceptable to Congress This approach allowed the Sen-
ate to put Its stamp on various foreign policy actions/
andr often, in return for support of Byrd and other key
congressional figures, the Administration was willing
to share credit. A notable example of this process
occurred during Senate consideration of the Panama
Canal Treaties in 1977, when the 'leadership amend-
ments" introduced by Byrd end Minority Leader Howard
Baker were instrumental In Senate passage of the
treaties (See Chapter 4 / When the Senate voted to
lift the arms embargo on Turkey in 1978, Byrd added a
provision requiring the President to report to the Sen-
ate on progress toward settlement of the Cyprus issue,
and this helped the measure pass, Just as Vandenberg's
amendment was a key clement in congressional passage of
the original Creek-Turklsh aid package

Tho Congressional Debate

After the Foreign Relations Committee reported the
bill to the Sonate, with amendments, on April 3, 1947,
debate began in the Senate Even If the outcome seemed
preordained, it was not a pro forma debate There was
a spirited and wide-ranging discussion centering on the
proper congressional role In foreign policy, ns well as
conflict over the implications or the program Congress
was being asked to approve Criticism focused on these
points (1) bypassing the United Nations} (21 the un-
known costs of the venture the U S was undertaking;
(3) a precipitant and possibly irreversible worsening
of the strained relationship with Russia, an ally only
a short time before) [4| the setting of a dramatic new
course in U S. foreign policy without thorough consid-
eration of the ramifications.

Opponents tended to be clustered on the left or the
right, but even some of those who supported the legis-
lation raised some fundamental questions Senator Homer
Capehart, an Indiana Republican, chided the Truman Ad-
ministration for being so slow to condem the Soviet
Union, which formerly was viewed as ’that great liber-
ty-loving ally of ourB." 6 ^ Capehart also questioned
whether the V S. had raised the Greek-Turkish issue
directly with the Soviets Ironically, while the Sen-
ate debate was taking place. Secretary of State Marshall
was in Moscow for a meeting of the Council of Foreign
Ministers — yet Congress was debating what one senator,
Democrat Johnson of Colorado, referred to as an "un-
declared declaration of war" on Russia 6*

Because Marshall was in Hobcov, and not in Washing-
ton lobbying for the bill, there were suggestions that

he was not a strong supporter. Indeed, after Vanden-
berg expressed his concern to Acheson about this prob-
lem, the Acting Secretary sent a telegram to Marshall
in Moscow April 18:

I have just talked to Vandenberg who
tells me that there has for some days been a
whispering campaign to the effect that the
Greek-Turkish aid program was formulated in
your absence and you have not expressed your-
selt on it. Vandenberg says this campaign
today came into the open in the introduction
of a resolution by Senator Wiley to the effect
that action on the bill should be deferred un-
til you return and the Senate has had the
benefit of your views. This resolution will
be referred to the Foreign Relations Committee
where it will be defeated but Vandenberg would
like very much to close the debate. . .with a
brief statement from you endorsing the bill in
strong terms... 65

Marshall responded by sending Vandenberg a strong
statement of support, stating that he attached the
"highest order of urgency to immediate passage of the
Greek-Turkish aid legislation. 1,66 Vandenberg made ef-
fective use of Marshall's message during the debate.

Capehart wound up supporting the aid, as did Sena-
tor Homer Ferguson, Vandenberg* s Republican colleague
from Michigan, who said he viewed "the loan to Greece
and Turkey... as a stopgap while the United Nations is
being strengthened to take over the permanent job." 67
Senator Robert Taft (R-Ohlo) also referred to the
"Greek and Turkish loans," although they were not real-
ly loans. Taft, known as "Mr. Conservative" in the
Senate, said he was in accord with the Vandenberg
amendment, and that the U.S. should "in any event with-
draw as soon as normal economic conditions are re-
stored." 68 And Vandenberg insisted that, by enacting
the legislation, the U.S. would be "holding the line"
for the U.N. "until such times as the United Nations
can progressively take over these responsibilities--and
evolution which we not only crave but openly invite." 69

However, Senator Harry Byrd, a conservative Vir-
ginia Democrat, said the "attempts to justify our by-
passing of the United Nations" were "merely window
dressing, a lot of pious words without effect or legal
validity." 78 Byrd was also critical of efforts "to
cloak the passage of this legislation with an atmos-
phere of a great impending crisis” while "nobody knows
the cost of such a program." 71

Another Republican, George Malone of Nevada, was
similarly critical, saying, "I object on principle to a
policy which seekd to stampede us into further huge

41

loans and gifts and actions which all agree will in all
probability result in establishing a definite policy
trend for this nation, about which no opportunity tor
the thorough investigation which Is certainly
justified . " '2

Foreshadowing some future criticism of US pol-
icies, Malone said, "If our action is, indeed, dictated
by the danger of communism, then we must consider that
any state which will shout this danger is in a position
effective to blackmail the United States into supplying
money and arms, even if such a state were fascist in
character and devoted to objectives contrary to the
entire spirit of freedom “ 73

Senator Kenneth Wherry of Nebraska posed the issue
in dramatic terms when he said, “Never in the history
of our nation have the American people and the United
States Senate faced an issue more grave and far-reach-
ing than confronts us here today in the proposed Greek
and Turkish so-called loan In making this statement Z
am not unmindful of the decisions leading up to the
Civil War." 74

“Thfs is no financial arrangement or relief proj-
ect," Wherry said "It is a military adventure. This
is a commitment to an entirely new foreign policy of
such magnitude and potentialities that every honest
American man and woman is compelled to the deepest
soul-searching in its consideration • Citing the warn-
ings of Washington and Jefferson that America should
"remain free from foreign entanglements"— warnings of-
ten recalled by those branded as congressional “Isola-
tionists*— Wherry said the Creek-Turklsh aid request
was only the "first of what will be many demands upon
the United States Treasury " 7 *

Wherry said such a policy would ultimately have a
tremendous negative impact on the domestic economy, and
would cause the U s. "to employ imperialistic meth-
ods." He told his Senate colleagues, "If we Intend by
this method to stop the march of communism, let us say
so frankly to the American people * Prophetically, he
said that the public should understand that the 5400
million was merely the first installment of billions of
dollars to follow "If we are going to organize and
finance the world for American ideals and freedom, let
us face frankly and realistically what the cost will
bej what the potential dangers arej how we may become
involved? and what may happen to us in the process.
Let us not do it blindly or by subterfuge. “ 7 ®

Wherry repeatedly referred to Vandenberg’s comments
that Congress did not have “an unprejudiced chance to
exercise truly independent and objective judgments" be-
cause it had been forced to deal with the issue on a
crisis basis “ 77 "The basic implication of the Truman
Doctrine," said Wherry, "is that It will compel the re-
turn to and the perpetuatfon of wartime conditions and

42

controls." He cited the experience of U.S. entry into
the two World Wars when "we abandon our democratic
processes f we set up the presidency as a virtual dicta-
torship." He likened the Truman Doctrine to "requests
for declarations of war" and said it would lead to "a
perpetual state of war emergency and government by con-
trol and crisis.”* 78

Fulbright and the Congressional Role

Fulbright was a Senate member in 1947, and he also
referred to the decision on Greek-Turkish aid as "one
of the most important* decisions Congress had faced in
the nation's history. 70 in announcing his support,
Fulbright noted that the principal criticism of the
proposal had been allayed to a great extent by the
Vandenberg amendment. He said the amendment negated
the charge of imperialism "as well as the charge that
we would, by this unilateral action, scrap the United
Nations.” Indeed, said Fulbright, in giving the organ-
ization "the right to disapprove our actions, I think
we would strengthen the United Nations." 80 Fulbright
shared Vandenberg' s strong support for the U.N. In
1943, as a first-term member of the House of Represen-
tatives (where he served one term before being elected
to the Senate ), Fulbright introduced a resolution which
laid the groundwork for U.S. participation in the
United Nations.** The Fulbright Resolution, as it
became known, was overwhelmingly approved by the House,
and a similar resolution by Senator Connelly was ap-
proved by the Senate.

In his statement backing Greek-Turkish aid Fulbright

*Wherry later was to argue that President Truman
should have sought a declaration of war for the Korean
conflict (which. Wherry believed, Congress would have
granted). In 1951, Wherry touched off a "great debate"
with his Senate resolution seeking to force the Pres-
ident to secure the consent of Congress before sending
any more American troops to Europe. Instead, the Sen-
ate passed an innocuous substitute.

**The Fulbright Resolution was introduced April 31 1
1943, and passed by a 360-29 vote on September 21,
1943. The resolution said: "Resolved, The the House
of Representatives hereby expresses itself as favoring
the creation of appropriate international machinery
with power adequate to establish and to maintain a just
and lasting peace among the nations of the world, and
as favoring participation df the United States therein
through its constitutional processes."

said, "With the Information I now have, it is ay Inten-
tion to support the President's proposal * Re com-
mented, 'Under our system of government, the President
has a particular responsibility in our foreign rela-
tions Ha has access to information which, in the
nature o£ things, ve cannot have, and he is in constant
touch with the members of the State Department who are
directly charged with conducting our affairs with for-
eign nations The Judgment of these men, and of the
President should prevail. In the absense of clear proof
to the contrary.'® 1

In later years, Pulbrlght would take a differing
view of legislative-executive relations. It is inter-
esting to notice the echoes of some of Wherry's 1947
comments in a Fulbrlght statement made 24 years later*

Thirty years of war, cold war, and crisis
have propelled the American political system
fax along the road to an executive despotism,
at least in the conduct of forefgn relations
So far has the process of expanding presiden-
tial power advanced that, in the publicly

recorded view of the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations, *it is no longer accurate
to character ire our government, in matters of
foreign relations, as one of separated powers
checked ard balanced against each other 182

Fulbrlght also became critical of what he called the
•cult of experts* and ’tyranny of secret information,*
suggesting chat the executive used these to preclude
Congress from Involvement in major foreign policy
decisions when, in fact, the executive had no monopoly
on truth or wisdom Fulbrlght liked to point to a
statement made by George Reedy, who served as President
Johnson's press secretary and special assistant* "On
sweeping policy decisions, which are, after all, rela-
tively few, a President makes up his mind on the basis
of the same kind of information that is available to
the average citizen.* 83

The belief that Congress was at a disadvantage in
obtaining and analyzing information became a major fac-
tor In the congressional push to expand Its staff and
resources in the 1970s, concurrent with the congres-
sional drive to play a more active and independent role
in foreign policy. Fulbrlght was one of those who led
the effort for that stronger role, but he always main-
tained that it had to be kept in perspective He be-
lieved ijbat Congress must pwaxd o pains t abuses by the
executive, and in cases where legislators viewed execu-
tive actions as strongly misguided, it was their re-
sponsibility to oppose them, Speaking not long before
the Greek -Turkish aid legislation was enacted,
Fulbrlght saidt

44

Many Americans are impatient at the lack
of vision and initiative of the Congress, but
they should not forget that it is the Congress
that stands between their liberties and the
voracious instinct for power of the executive
bureaucracy. . .An important responsibility of
the legislature is to provide a check upon the
tendency of the executive power of the state
to become arbitrary and oppressive. 84

Twenty-five years later, Fulbright said he felt
confirmed in his earlier judgment. In a 1971 speech,
Fulbright added, "Out of a well-intentioned but miscon-
ceived notion of what patriotism and responsibility re-
quire in the time of world crisis, Congress permittee!
the President to take over the two vital foreign policy
powers which the Constitution vested in Congress: the
power to initiate war and. the Senate’s power to consent
or withhold consent from significant foreign commit-
ments."®^ Indeed, Fulbright, who was at the center of
the executive-legislative conflict over foreign policy,
particularly during the Vietnam years, said that "the
United States has joined the global mainstream; we have
become, for purposes of foreign policy — especially for
purposes of making war — a presidential dictatorship." 86

In 1961, Fulbright made a speech in which he said,
"It seems clear to me that in foreign affairs, a Senate
cannot initiate or force large events, or substitute
its judgment for that of the President, without seri-
ously jeopardizing the ability of the nation to act
consistently, and also without confusing the image and
purpose of this country in the eyes of others.’’ 87

Fulbright critics would later recall the 1961
speech and contrast those views with his subsequent and
seemingly contradictory views on the role of the Pres-
ident and the Senate. But, in a broad sense, Fulbright
maintained that the 1961 speech was an accurate reflec-
tion of how he thought the system should work. In that
speech, Fulbright commented, "The role of the Senate is
also influenced by the nature of foreign policy as it
exists at any given time." He added, "Today, the abil-
ity of the government to conduct its external affairs
depends to a great extent upon its success in develop-
ing a consensus among the people regarding our purposes
and responsibilities in the foreign field. While only
the President can act, only the people can arm him to
do so. 1 ' 88

In the 1961 speech, Fulbright emphasized that his
contention that the Senate should normally play a
supporting and not an initiating role in foreign policy
"does not mean that the role of the Senate is confined
to one of blind obeisance." To underline this point,
he said, "When Vandenberg was cooperating with Truman
and Acheson, neither he, nor his committee, nor the

45

Senate were without influence upon the course of events.
He and hi* colleagues, by persuasion and by their ex-
ample, exercised great influence upon the other members
of the Senate as well as the executive. They were max-
ing judgments, essentially political, as to the 'art o£
the possible'— what could be done and how it could be
done — but, always, I believe, from the standpoint of
what had to be done. The determination of this last
they left, pretty much, in the hands of the executive.
Vandenberg and his colleagues found ways to do what had
to be done ” 83

Although, as noted earlier, Fulbright would become
critical of the pattern of foreign policy which had
been set in motion by the Truman Doctrlhe, he Bupported
the original concept ns he understood it He believed
that the emphasis upon ’freedom" at the time of the
Greek-Turklsh aid request later gave way to an entirely
different emphasis — anticommunism 30

hooking back, Fulbright aays, "The Truman Doctrine
with Its universal implications did create a climate
conducive to intervention in later years Aid just to
Turkey and Greece would not have had the sane eifect
At the time, 1 was not cn the Foreign Relations Commit-
tee and had no thoughts about Its long-term signifi-
cance Zt took me several years and many bills before
I recognised the danger of intervening all around the
world on a bilateral basis.’ 31

Senate Dissenters

Fulbright, often a Senate dissenter two decades
later, vaa in the majority in supporting aid to Turkey
and Greece in 1947. Dissent has, in principle at
least, long been respected in the Senate, with its
traditions of extended debate and discussion Democrat
Kike Mansfield, who aerved as Majority Deader, 1961-
1976, said in 1968 that the right of dissent is "a
right which I will uphold, as long as it la construc-
tive, for every member of the Senate and for every
American, because... it is the stuff ot which democracy
is made." 3 *

Senator Albert Gore, a Tennessee Democrat and
Foreign Relations Committee member, also speaking in
1968, said that a senator not only has a right to
express dissent "but a duty to do so." Gore said, "It
will b© a lamentable day. Indeed, when U.S Senators
refrain from criticising or questioning - tire poiietas
our government because of the fear that to do so will
bring upon them the opprobrium, the accusation, the
insinuation, .of being unpatriotic * 93

Many ot the opponents ot the Greek-Turfcish aid
believed that it was an extremely important Issue and
saw It their duty to speak out Wherry was one of

those who criticized from the right, while Pepper was a
major spokesman for the left, and kept returning to the
United Nations issue.

However, once the Vandenberg amendment had been
accepted, according to one analyst, those who still
charged that the U.S. was dealing a blow at the United
Nations "such as Senators Pepper and Taylor in the Con-
gress and Henry Wallace* outside of it'' found them-
selves in the company of Soviet representatives Andrei
Gromyko, who had little support at the U.N.^ 4 Some-
times congressional action can be influenced as much by
who is against a proposal as by who favors it. As John
Campbell wrote, “Intelligent criticism of the Truman
proposals suffered from the reaction provoked by
Wallace's reckless charges of 'ruthless American imper-
ialism' and his picturing the Greek communists as ster-
ling Democrats. When, early in April, he carried his
campaign to Europe and denounced the Truman Doctrine...
any remaining doubt that the Greek-Turkish aid bill
would pass both Houses by thumping majorities was
removed . " 95

Pepper said that although the Vandenberg amendment
improved the bill, "I charge that this unilateral
action on our part is a breach of our solemn covenant
assumed to the United Nations organization."^ on the
final day of the debate, April 22, Pepper told the Sen-
ate he had wanted to support the bill, but he had been
moved by a speech he had heard by a young World War II
veteran, Cord Meyer. Pepper said Meyer spoke "of the
necessity of preventing war by strengthening the United
Nations organization." Pepper added, "I became con-
vinced in my heart... that young man was pointing to the
future, and that those who were advocating this measure
were pointing to the past, to the old wavs and to the
old wars. "97

Interestingly, Meyer later became a high-ranking
official of the Central Intelligence Agency. Imme-
diately after World War II, Meyer had been active in
the American Veterans Committee and the United World

*Henry Wallace served as Vice President under
Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1941-1945. He was replaced on
the Democratic ticket in 1944 by Truman. He then
served as Secretary of Commerce, until he was removed
from that post after Truman became President. Wallace
launched a "progressive" political movement. Among
their goals , the Progressives favored accomodation with
the Soviet Union, and they tolerated communists within
their membership. Wallace was the Progressive Party
presidential candidate in 1948, gaining 2.4 percent of
the popular vote, slightly less than the total of
States Rights candidate Strom Thurmond, who later
served in the Senate.

4 ?

Federalists, two groups with the stated goals of sup-
porting international cooperation and world peace. But
Heyer became disillusioned because of communist efforts
to dominate the AVC and other organizations, and even-
tually joined the CIA in Z950 •

The McCarthy Era

Meanwhile, Pepper was defeated for re-election in
1950, at least partially because of his ‘international-
ist" views He lost in the Florida Democratic primary
to George Smathers, who had earlier been a Pepper
ally. Pepper was accused of being ‘soft* on communism,
and much was made of a 1945 trip he made to Moscow,
where he met with Joseph Stalin, the Soviet dicta-
tor 9U By 1950, McCarthy ism was becoming a strong
force in the country, and accusations of being sympa-
thetic to communism — or not sufficiently anti -communis-
tic— could be highly damaging to public figures, even
if the charges were unsubstanciated Senator Joseph
McCarthy, who had remained on tne sidelines during the
1947 Truman Doctrine debate {although voting in favor
of Greek-Turklsh aid), launched his attack on alleged
pro-communists in the U S early in 1950a. It was a
difficult time tor disscnterB, and McCarthylam fed on
the tears generated by the Cold War conflict between
the U S. end the Soviet Union

In California a heated battle for election to the
Senate was waged in 1950 by two House members— Republi-
can Richard Mixon, who had supported Crcefc-Ttirkish aid
in 1947 and Democrat Helen Gahagan Douglas, who had
opposed the aid. Nixon played no role in the House
debate on Greek-Turkish aid, but Mrs Douglas took an
active role and made several efforts to amend the
bill. One of her unsuccessful amendments would have
prohibited aid to Turkey until the President had first
requested United Nations action on any threat to
Turkey's rational integrity If the U ff failed to act
within one year, U 6 aid could then be provided. She
aald her amendment w as motivated by her conviction that
military assistance to Turkey was a problem for the
U.N. and "not for the consideration of any single coun-
try or group of countries however unselfish and benevo-
lent their intentions Douglas added, "Russia has no

•Jo another .ironic rwlriv while Meyer woo serving
in the CIA in 1953, the FBI told the CIA they could not
give Meyer a security clearance. Meyer was suspended
from his duties, but successfully fought for reinstate-
ment, overcoming the flimsy FBI charges See Thomas
Powers, The Man Who Kept the Secrets t Richard Helms
and the CIA , New Yorki Knopf", 1979, pp 61-63-

right to bring the kind of pressure against Turkey to
maintain an army she cannot afford. If she is doing so
she should be called to account. And she should be
called to account for her actions before the nations of
the world. 1,1 00

The proposed Douglas amendment gave way to a sub-
stitute amendment by Representative Jacob Javits of New
York. Republican Javits, who would later become a
leading member of the Senate Foreign Relations Commit-
tee, offered a harmless amendment that would simply re-
quire the president to bring to the attention of the
O.N. any situation which threatened the territorial
integrity of Turkey or other countries. 101

In the 1950 California Democratic primary, Mrs.
Douglas, although she had a strong record of opposition
to communism, and had fought against Henry Wallace's
Progressive Party, was accused of having given "comfort
to the Soviet tyranny by voting against aid to Greece
and Turkey, " 10 2 As Pepper was called "Red" in the cam-
paign against him, she was dubbed the “Pink Lady." In
the general election campaign Nixon said her record in
Congress "discloses the truth about her soft attitude
toward communism." 105

Some critics maintain that it was the Truman Doc-
trine that set the stage for the Cold War and for
McCarthyism. John Gaddis wrote, "By portraying the
Soviet-American conflict as a clash between mutually
irreconcilable ideologies, the president and his ad-
visors managed to shock Congress and the public into
providing the support necessary to implement a tough
policy. But in the process they trapped themselves in
a new cycle of rhetoric and response which in years to
come would significantly restrict the administration's
flexibility in dealing with Moscow." 104

Richard Freeland in The Truman Doctrine and the
Origins of McCarthyism develops the theme that the
Truman Administration exaggerated the crisis nature of
the Greek-Turkish aid request and over-emphasised the
communist threat in order to gain support for the pro-
posal. Freeland maintains that Truman Administration
policies created an atmosphere which encouraged McCar-
thyism. "In fact, in 1947-1988 Truman and his advisors
employed all the political and programmatic techniques
that in later years were to become associated with the
broad phenomenon of McCarthyism. It was the Truman
Administration that developed the association of dis-
sent with disloyalty and communism, which became a cen-
tral element of McCarthyism.* 105

Robert Divine has written, “To some extent, the
Truman Administration. . .was to blame for the hysteria
over subversives. The overblown rhetoric that Truman
and Acheson used to describe the nature of the commun-
ist threat abroad created the feeling that the United
States was engaged in a crusade against evil." 106

49

But a Truman defender, reacting to suggestions that
the President's speech on Creek-TurXi sh aid gave rise
to McCarthy lam, argues that the virulent anticommunism
vas more related to 'such non-Truman-connected occur-
rences* as developments in China, Korea, Soviet spies
In the U.S., and "Senator McCarthy’s rare gifts for in-
vention and invective m *07

McCarthylso plagued the Truman Administration
through its final years in office Even Acheson, who
clearly played an important role in formulating the
tough tone of the Truman Doctrine speech, came under
attach, ss did George Marshall, Richard Rovere wrote
of McCarthy, "He was by no means the first man to use
senatorial immunity or the investigative powers of Con-
gress for selfish and unworthy ends, but he was surely
the cleverest.’ 108 McCarthy continued to rail against
vhat he called "appeasement* and a "cowardly" foreign
policy, but by 1954, during the ElBenhower Administra-
tion, McCarthy had badly overplayed his hand and was
rapidly losing credibility In December 1954 the Sen-
ate voted to censure the Wisconsin Senator

Despite the excesses which may have resulted from
the Truman Doctrine, and despite the warnings—sooe of
which seem to have been justified — by congressional
opponents, the prevailing view was that the Truman Doc-
trine, beginning with aid to Turkey and Greece, was a
reasonable and necessary response to challenging condi-
tions There was strong conviction in Congress that
the U.S had a responsibility to act

Congressional Approval

The Senate passed the bill on April 22 by a €7-23
vote, with 35 Republicans and 32 Democrats in favor; 16
Republicans and 7 Democrats opposed. The Johnson
amendment — to remove the military provisions — was de-
feated 68-22

The legislation vas considered tor only three days
on the House floor but the debate was intense One of
the strongest speeches in support of Creek-Turkieh aid
was delivered by House Democratic leader Sam Rayburn of
Texas. Rayburn, who served as House Majority Leader,
1940-1945, and 1949-1961, did rot speak often on the
House floor. But on this occasion he spoke in stirring
fashion, and said, "I trust that in our considerations
hero .that this thing called isolationism may not
again crawl out of the shadows and defeat the hopes of
men and again break the heart of the world.

Opposing amendments to the bill, Rayburn said, "If
Greece and Turkey need help, they need it now If we
do not accept our responsibility, If we do not move
forward and extend a helping hand to people who need
and want help, who are democracies or want to be, who

50

do not want to be smothered by communism; it we do
not... assume our place, God help us; God help this
world. "HO

On May 9, the House passed a bill substantially
similar to the Senate bill by a 287-108 vote, with 127
Republicans and 160 Democrats m tavor. Among the sup-
porters were Representatives Nixon, Lyndon B. Johnson,
and the 29-year-old John F. Kennedy. It was opposed by
94 Republicans, 13 Democrats, and 1 independent. A
conference committee quickly reconciled the differences
between the House and Senate versions, and both Houses
agreed to the conference report by voice votes on May
15. President Truman signed the bill into law on May
22, some 10 weeks after his speech to Congress.

Although the bill authorized the aid to Greece and
Turkey, the second stage of the congressional funding
process, appropriations, had to be completed as well,
and on July 26, 1947, a supplemental appropriations
bill which included $400 million for Greece and Turkey
was enacted.

Within a short time after Congress completed action
on Greek-Turkish aid, the administration was proposing
the Marshall Plan and in 1948 Congress gave its approv-
al to the first installation of the multi-billion dol-
lar European Recovery Program.

The Truman Doctrine was a landmark in the history
of u.S. foreign policy, it was also the beginning in
the post-war era of a congressional habit of placing
broad, vaguely limited powers in the hands of the exec-
utive branch, which often made full use of that author-
ity. In the case of Greek-Turkish aid. Congress had
taken some steps to assert a congressional role, but at
the same time it had essentially yielded broad power to
the executive, where it would largely remain for more
than 20 years, a period when Congress frequently played
a relatively minor role in foreign policy.

Through the years, Turkey has continued to be an
important element in the governing perception of United
States security interests. It became a member of NATO
in 1952. Along with its Mediterranean neighbor and co-
beneficiary of Truman Doctrine aid, Turkey has held up
the southern flank of NATO. However, Greece and Turkey
have often been at odds. Turkey's strategic location-
bordering the Soviet Union and astride the U.S.S.R.'s
maritime route from the Black Sea to the Mediterran-
ean — has given it particular importance.

Turkey has been a leading recipient of U.S. assis-
tance, especially in terms of military aid, which began
in 1947,. but also as the eighth-largest beneficiary of
Public Law 480 (Food for Peace) aid. I 11 Direct U.S.
military aid between 1950 and 1974 averaged about $165
million annually and in the 1980s Turkey has again
become a major recipient ot U.S. aid. Since 1947,
total U.S. military assistance to Turkey has amounted

SI

to substantially more that §4 billion in equipment,
supplies, facilities, and training, l-* 2

NATO and Turkey

Before Turkey and Greece were admitted to NATO, the
Department of State consulted infernally with members
of tne Senate Foreign Relations Committee on tneir
attitudes about the proposed admission. This was dis-
cussed in an executive session of the committee on Sep-
tember 17, 1951, and is an example of the long-standing

practice of informal consultations between the State
Department and the committee In this case, the com-
mittee members discussed the proposal among themselves
and agreed that the committee staff should "communicate
to the State Department our offhand informal attitude*
In favor of admission ^ In seeking this informal
opinion, Chairman Tom Connally told his colleagues,
"They Ithe Administration ) wart to know our attitude
before they act, because If they find a lot of opposi-
tion here there Id no point in their acting " 114

Senator Theodore F Green said the U S representa-
tives at a NATO meeting in Ottawa did not want to advo-
cate admission "and be repudiated when they come
h one -115 Senator Fulbright had conferred with State
Department officials about the matter and they had
asked him to help determine "whether the committee
thought it was a good Idea or not."*** Fulbright said
he favored the plan, as did Republican Henry Cabot
Lodge, Jr., who said, "I think the Turks and Greeks are
two of the best bets we have had I think Greek and
Turkish aid legislation has paid for itself many times
over. - 117

At the Ottawa meeting, the North Atlantic Council
Invited Greece and Turkey to join NATO This regulred
amendment of the North Atlantic Troaty and needed Sen-
ate approval The Senate had approved the treaty in
1949 after lengthy consideration In between the pro-
longed debate over the Treaty of Versailles in 1919-
1920 and the Panama Canal Trestles in 1978, the NATO
Treaty was probably the most protracted treaty debate

Once again on the NATO Treaty, as in the case of
Greek-TurkUh aid and the Far shall Plan, Vardenberg
played a key role, rn June 1948, the Senate passed the
Vandenberg Resolution, which sanctioned U.s, participa-
tion Jjo b regional aecurit,y .tact. The resolution was a
"sense of the Senate’ resolution — not binding, but ex-
pressing the will of the Senate. It cleared the way
for U.S participation in the North Atlantic negotia-
tions During the negotiations, Vandenberg and
Connally "were in fairly close touch with negotiations"
through consultations with the State Department,
During this period Vandenberg and Connally insisted

52

upon two changes in the treaty "before isolationist
senators had an opportunity to use them as rallying
points for opposition to the treaty." 11 ®

The NATO Treaty was submitted to the Senate early
in 1949. The Foreign Relations Committee conducted 16
days of hearings, although committee support had al-
ready been assured during the consultation process.
The hearings were important in educating the public and
in giving opponents an opportunity to be heard, but in
this case the committee was already committed. 120

A group of Republican senators, headed by Taft and
Wherry, objected to the treaty, opponents raised ques-
tions about foreign entanglements, loss of freedom of
action, a threat to the Senate's war-declaring power,
and the costs of implied defense expenditures. But the
North Atlantic pact was approved by an 82-13 vote-far
more than the necessary two-thirds — in July 1949. Some
suggest that this series of major foreign policy ac-
tions — Greek-Turkish aid, the Marshall plan, President
Truman's Point Pour aid program to developing coun-
tries, and NATO — marked the end ot a period of colla-
boration between executive and legislative policy-
makers. Over the following 20 years congressional in-
fluence in foreign relations declined. 121

Certainly the Senate's consideration of the Greek-
Turkish amendment to the NATO Treaty in 1951 was rela-
tively minimal. Republicans did raise the issue of
whether Congress might be losing control over actions
that could lead to war. But, with only six members
present, the Senate first approved the protocol on
January 21, 1951, by a voice vote. Democratic Majority
Leader Ernest McFarland (the Democrats regained control
of Congress in the 1948 elections} said it had been a
mistake to act with so few members present, and the
Senate asked the President to return the treaty. When
it was reconsidered on February 7 , Senator Arthur Wat-
kins, a Utah Republican, proposed a reservation to the
treaty to the effect that D.S. forces in NATO should
not be used "in a manner which would necessarily in-
volve the United States in war, unless the Congress by
act or joint resolution so provides." But Senator
George assured Watkins that "all the provisions of the
treaty must be implemented by the Congress,” and Wat-
kins withdrew his proposal. 122 The Senate then ap-
proved the protocol adding Turkey and Greece to NATO by
a 73-2 vote.

The 1950s

The 1950s have been referred to as the "golden era”
in O.S. -Turkish relations. Turkey proved to be a valu-
able ally of the U.S. during the Korean conflict. Tur-
key also cooperated in a variety of joint strategic

53

arrangements engineered by Secretary of State John
Foster Dulles

In 19 56 i the Senate voted to create a Special Com-
mittee to Study the Foreign Aid Program, charged with
studying the extent to which foreign assistance 'serves,
can be made to serve, or does rot serve, the national
interest.* 123 In addition to members of the Foreign
Relations Committee, the chairmen and ranking minority
members of the Appropriations and Armed Services Com-
mittees — both of those committees having obvious in-
volvement in foreign policy matters — also served on the
Special Committee. An analysis of military assistance
programs up to that point called Turkey a bright spot
’in a military sense.* The report said, ‘Communist
infiltration is insignificant and the Turkish cititenry
are aware of the dangers of Russian agression. At the
present time, Turkey is in the throes of severe eco-
nomic difficulties, and defense support fi.e., economic
aid designed to strengthen a country's defense capa-
bility) promises to play an important role in helping
Turkey overcome it * 12 * The statement about Turkey's
economic difficulties — first heard when the Truman Doc-
trine was launched — was a portent of even greater prob-
lems to come, as was the report's comment that Greek-
Turkish problems over Cyprus had 'strained relations"
between the two NATO members

The 1960s

By the 1960s, numerous problems plagued 0 S -
Turkish relations There was a shift in Turkish atti-
tudes toward the Soviet Onion, due at least in part to
fallout from the Coban missile crisis V S willing-
ness to remove its Jupiter missiles from Turkey, in ex-
change for Soviet removal of missiles from Cuba in the
1962 showdown, was seen by some Turkish leaders as evi-
dence that the C.S placed its security interests above
those of its allies. Once again Turkey became in-
volved, through the missile pullout, in a major episode
in u S foreign policy. (Although there were lengthy
discussions within a small group in the executive
branch about how to handle the missile crisis. Congress
was not involved Arthur Schlesinger, Jr , wrotei
•Congress played no role at all. .It was only after he
had made his decision that Kennedy called in the con-
gressional leaders The object waa not to conault them
but to inform them." 12 * Fulbright later said, 'Presi-
dent Kennedy's actions proved to be effective and re-
sponsible Nonetheless the episode served to underline
the inadequacy of executive 'consultation' with the
legislative branch during crisis situations, a problem
that was greatly heightened during the following
years,' 126

54

Late in the 1960s , Turkey began to place some re-
strictions on U.S. military facilities in the country.
Economic cooperation with the Soviet Union gradually
increased, and Turkey experienced a brief period of
prosperity, which contributed to a more independent
attitude.

The Cyprus Problem

One issue has consistently haunted the triangular
relationship between the U.S., Turkey, and Greece: the
problem of Cyprus. The troubled history of that small
island nations stems from its strategic location be-
tween Europe and Asia, and the sharp difference between
two communities — Greek and Turkish — which constitute
almost the totality of the population, currently esti-
mated at about 630,000.

Cyprus is only 40 miles south of Turkey, and about
600 miles southeast of Greece. With 3,572 square
miles, it is about three times the size of Rhode
Island. About 80 percent of the population are Greek-
speaking; 18 percent are Turkish. Cyprus became an
independent republic in 1960, after 82 years of British
rule. This followed a civil war between the Greek and
Turkish communities, which was finally concluded by an
agreement between Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, and Britain,
known as the Zurich Settlement.

There has been a continuing movement among elements
of the Greek community for enosis , or union with
Greece. However, when Cyprus became independent, it
agreed "not to participate, in whole or part, in any
political or economic union with any state whatso-
ever." But independence and the Zurich Settlement did
not bring an end to the internal conflict. Civil war
broke out again in 1963-1964, and a United Nations
force had to be stationed in Cyprus. Strife was re-
newed in 1967-1968. Hatters grew even worse in 1974.
The Cypriot National Guard, led by Greek officers,
overthrew the Cyprus government, which had long been
headed by Archbishop Makarios. Turkey sought unsuc-
cessfully to get British action to end the crisis; the
British were supposed to be the guarantor of the 1960
Zurich accord. The D.S. made an attempt to negotiate a
settlement, but could not hold off the threatened Tur-
kish military intervention.

On July 20, 1974, the Turkish forces launched a sea
and airborne operation against the island. There was
heavy fighting, broken by several temporary cease-
fires. The U.S. Ambassador, Roger Davies, and his
secretary were killed during mob violence against the
embassy in the capital of Nicosia. When the fighting
finally ended, many Greek Cypriots had been driven from
their homes, and, in addition to the social upheaval

55

and economic stagnation) there were serious political
repercussions.

Congressional Response

The Turkish action on Cyprus set off a furor in
Congress. Turkey was, of course, a major recipient of
U S military assistance, and Turkey's use of U.S -
supplied equipment for other than defensive purposes
was in contravention of U S. arms transfer policies
(The issue of whether recipient nations use U S.-
supplied equipment for non-defensive purposes has been
a subject of recurring controversy and congressional
committee Inquiries )

Following the 1974 Turkish move on Cyprus, Repre-
sentative John Brademas introduced legislation in the
House to cut off military aid to Turkey in the Senate
John Tunney, an ambitious first-term Democrat from
California, did the same Brademas, from Indiana, was
of Creek heritage, and other members of Congress of
Greek origin, or with large Greek constituencies,
joined in standing ademantly against furthep aid to
Turkey They had strong support from men such as
Benjamin Rosenthal in the House and Thomas Eagleton in
the Senate. However, the congressional leadership
stood almost completely united against an embargo on
arms to Turkey. Indeed, at an early stage in the
controversy, Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield
assured Secretary of State Henry Xisalnger that there
was no substantial support in the Senate for such an
embargo

Mansfield was able to manage a brief delay ir Sen-
ate action He even arranged for Kissinger to speak to
a meeting of the Senate Democratic caucus, an extraor-
dinary occurence, particularly for a Republican Secre-
tary Of State At a tense session behind the closed
doors of Room S-207* of the Capitol, Senator Eagleton
challenged the legality of continuing aid to Turkey
Kissinger, although making a strong case for continued
aid, was unable to directly refute Eagleton 's conten-
tion that further aid would be a violation of existing
law.

In previous years the combined support of the
administration and the congressional leadership would
normally have been sufficient to beat back almost any
challenge But, in this case, the leadership could not
dalivnj— eve* for a cony^r twine proposal. This was in-
dicative of a significant change within Congress, and a

•Room S-207 was later renamed the Mansfield Room in
honor of the man who served as Senate Majority Leader
from 1961 through 1976

trend frequently in evidence in subsequent years.
Younger and less-experienced members, and members with
no committee responsibilities in the foreign affairs
area, were increasingly willing to speak out and play
active roles on international questions, and to diverge
from party leadership positions.

Secretary Kissinger was critical of what he con-
sidered to be an improper congressional intrusion into
the foreign policy process and a violation of what he
deemed to be the proper relationship between executive
and legislative functions. But, as Lawrence Stern
wrote in The Wrong Horse ; "Brilliant as he was in the
practice of private diplomacy and bureaucratic poli-
tics, Kissinger seriously misapprehended the temper of
Congress on the Cyprus issue. He sought to deal
through the traditional brokers of congressional con-
sensus, the senior chairmen who held the established
political franchises on Capitol Hill." 127

The White House and Kissinger were slow to recog-
nize the new realities in Congress. Congress was in an
assertive mood, emboldened by the weakened presidency
in the aftermath of Watergate, and it refused to go
along with the Administration's pleadings. After twice
votoing legislation which would have cut off military
aid to Turkey, on December 30, 1974 President Ford
signed into law the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974,
requiring suspension of military assistance to Turkey
until the president certified that "substantial prog-
ress" toward a Cyprus settlement had occurred. The
embargo took effect on February 5, 1975.

Subsequently, some steps were taken to partially
lift the embargo, but President Ford and Secretary
Kissinger were unsuccessful in their continuing efforts
to have it dropped altogether. Meanwhile, resentment
built in Turkey, where the embargo was viewed as a hu-
miliating slap at an old friend and as representing a
pro-Greek bias. Kissinger, warning Congress that re-
fusal to lift the embargo would have "disastrous" con-
sequences for the U.S., blasted the "Greek Lobby" in
Washington, which he credited for successfully pressing
for continuation of the embargo. Turkey retaliated, as
Kissinger predicted, by closing 26 U.S. installations
in the country, including four key electronic-surveil-
lance stations. Kissinger referred to this as a "Greek
tragedy. ” 12 ®

Ethnic Politics

Later , looking back on these events , Senator
Charles McC. Mathias, Jr., noted that "45,000 Americans
of Turkish origin, most of them recent arrivals and not
yet politically acculturated, were heavily outgunned by
organizations claiming the support of three million

s?

Greek Americans * As Mathias pointed out, "the Gtet*k-
American organisations, spearheaded by the newly formed
and largely foreign-supported American Hellenic Insti-
tute (MU), worked a&sidicusly and successfully for the
arms embargo "US

This was one of the most obvious examples of ethnic
politics influencing American foreign policy. As
Mathias correctly atateB, "But for the activities of
Creek-AmericanB we might have overlooked) for larger
strategic reasons, the injustices suffered by the Greek
population of Cyprus. "I 30

Another Republican senator, John Tower of Texas,
citing the example of the arms embargo, said, "In a so-
ciety such as ours, with its heterogeneous mix of var-
ious national and ethnic groups, strong lobbies are in-
evitable * But, in Tower’s view, to submit American
foreign policy to undue Influence by these groups—
"often emotionally charged" — can impair a President's
ability to carry out a policy which reflects the over-
all national interest 131

Despite the strong role in support of the embargo,
however, the "Greek Lobby" la, as Mathias notes, "by
any objective measure of power and influence 'Number
Two,' and a fairly distant second" behind the Israeli
lobby in Washington 132

After the embargo on anas to Turkey was Imposed,
and as continuing efforts were made to lift the embar-
go, "a Greek professional lobby emerged in Washington
somewhat oclf-consciously modeled on AIPAC " i33 (AZPAC
is the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, a
highly successful lobbying operation founded in
1951 }* For lobbying purposes, Greek business and
civic leaders established the American Hellenic Insti-
tute Public Affairs Committee IAHIPAC) The Greek lob-
by depended heavily on tho network of American Hellenic
Educational Progressive Association <AHEPAf chapters
across the country.

Such lobbying groups can mobilize letters, phone
calls, or visits to members of Congress They concen-
trate on senators and representatives with sizeable
blocs of ethnic voters In their constiuencies Such
groups can also make important financial contributions
to campaigns. The Washington-based organizations keep
a close watch on congressional activities and maintain
contact with key staff members as well as members of
Congress.

Lifting the Embargo

When President Carter succeeded Pord In 1977, he
too determined that the embargo was not a wise policy.

•See Chapter 5 for core on the role of AIPAC

"w-mrcanaL uaiwn

(JODupuaj

58

and set about to end it. At the same time that Carter
took officer Robert Byrd became the Democratic Majority
Leader in the Senate. He was a strong ally of Carter
on this and other major foreign policy issues, although
he also spoke out against his party's President in some
cases. Byrd had voted for the embargo in 1974, while
serving as Senate Democratic Whip*, and was one of the
few in leadership to do so. But he was convinced that
the embargo had become counter-productive and had not
contributed to progress in Cyprus.

Turkey was the linchpin of NATO's southern flank.
Its strategic location between the Soviet Union and the
Middle East had become all the more vital because of
the importance and volatility of the Middle East. Yet
the condition of the Turkish military, including NATO's
second-largest contingent of ground troops, had badly
deteriorated, and the economy was in even worse shape.
The serious instability in Turkey made it ripe for ter-
rorism and radicalism.

Early in the summer of 1978, Byrd traveled to West-
ern Europe and met with European leaders and NATO offi-
cials. He reported back to his colleagues: "There was
unanimity from everyone I met with in the NATO coun-
tries that the embargo on arms to Turkey should be
lifted as soon as possible. The European leaders left
no doubt about the overriding importance they attach to
this matter." 134

Senate Forces

The strong European sentiment increased Byrd's de-
termination to see the embargo repealed. However, this
meant overcoming the opposition of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, which had already voted, on May
11, 1978, against lifting the embargo. Even in the era
of reduced committee power, it is not often that com-
mittee votes are reversed on the floor. Opposition
within the committee was led by Senator Paul Sarbanes,
who, as a House member, had been an important figure in
the successful effort to impose the embargo in 1974.
Sarbanes argued that the Administration was seeking to
put "law and the question of human rights and principle
... on the back burner" by lifting the embargo. 135 A
representative of the American Hellenic Institute Pub-
lic Affairs Committee {the Greek-American organization
designed on the model of AIPACJ told the Foreign Rela-
tions Committee that Turkey should not receive "one
dime of assistance" until Turkey "is in compliance with
our laws and there is an agreed settlement on
Cyprus." 136

*The Whip is the party's assistant leader.

in the Senate, where actions are often Influenced
by personalities and personal relationships, Byrd was
reluctant to oppose Sarbanes, a respected young member
of his own party. Byrd and Sarbanes had only recently
collaborated on the successful fight for the Panama
Canal Treaties. Likewise, Senator Javits had recently
traveled in the Mediterranean area and had concluded
that the Turkish ban should be repealed. However, he
was also reluctant to oppose Sarbanes, because of the
prominent role Sarbanes had played in opposing the sale
of jet aircraft to Saudi Arabia, a matter on which he
had been allied with Javits

Senator George McGovern also favored ending the em-
bargo, and had so voted within the Foreign Relations
Committee. When the security assistance bill was taken
up on the Senate floor, McGovern planned to offer an
amendment to repeal the embargo However, Byrd ar-
ranged a meeting with McGovern, and when the South
Dakotan learned of Byrd's plans for an amendment,
McGovern deferred to the majority leader, recognizing
that Byrd might be able to draw broader support Byrd
and McGovern were joined by Democrat Lloyd Bentsen
[Texas) and Republican John Chafee (Rhode Island) in a
disparate coalition sponsoring the amendment. Although
the primary intent of the amendment was to end the em-
bargo, it contained provisions for presidential report-
ing to Congress on progress toward resolution of the
Cyprus Issue, and provided equal amounts of military
sales credit for Turkey and Greece

Byrd and hia co-sponsors made personal appeals to
their colleagues, and Byrd organized a series of meet-
ings in which members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
top administration officials briefed senators and an-
swered questions. He concentrated on newer members who
had not been in Congress at the time of the earlier
battles over Turkey Meetings and briefings for staff
members were also organized Byrd repeatedly empha-
sized that his efforts were not anti-Greece or pro-
Turkey, but in the best interests of both countries, of
the U.S., NATO, and U S friends in the Middle East.
After fierce debate, the Byrd amendment carried, 51-42
The debate was even more difficult in the Bouse,
where the decisive vote to drop the embargo — on an
amendment proposed by House Majority Leader Jim Wright
— was by a narrow 2UB-205 margin.

More Battles on Turkey

The same issues tend to come up over and over in
Congress, and such has been the case with Turkey
Although the embargo had been lifted, major fights over
Turkish aid were still to come Late in 197 B, Byrd
traveled to Turkey in his capacity as majority leader

6D

and also as a special emissary of President Carter.
The visit to Turkey was part of a lengthy Byrd trip to
the Middle East and Iran. The trip was evidence of the
active role congressional leaders were playing in for-
eign policy and the importance the Administration at-
tached to Byrd”s role.

Upon his return/ Byrd reported that there had been
a revitalization of U.S. -Turkish relations and noted
that Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit had allowed
reopening ot the four U.S. intelligence monitoring
posts in Turkey. These facilities, which helped moni-
tor Soviet military activities and weapons testing,
increased in importance early in 1979, following the
fall of the Shah and the loss of key monitoring facil-
ities in Iran. While noting the improved U.S. -Turkish
relations, Byrd said, "After having visited Turkey... I
concluded that there has not been sufficient recogni-
tion of the scope and urgency of Turkey's economic and
military needs." 137

Because of Turkey's severe economic difficulties,
and as part of a broader Western effort to assist Tur-
key, President Carter, in April 1979, asked Congress to
approve $50 million in military grants and $100 million
in economic grants for Turkey. This was a special re-
quest in addition to the $301.2 million for Turkey the
Administration had already requested, and the $227.5
million approved the previous year.

Once again the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
proved to be a stumbling block for the Administration.
The committee, led by Sarbanes, disapproved the mili-
tary grant proposal, substituting $50 million in for-
eign military sales (FMS) credits instead, and adding
$42 million in FMS credits for Greece. Nonetheless,
the fact that the committee was willing to approve the
credits and the rest of the package was a substantial
change from previous years. Initially, the Administra-
tion was inclined to accept the committee's alternative
rather than wage still another battle over Turkish aid.
However, in early May 1979, Deputy Secretary of State
Warren Christopher visited Turkey to meet with Prime
Minister Ecevit. The Turkish leader, citing his coun-
try's economic woes, pushed hard for more aid. Be
insisted that Turkey needed some grant assistance.
Credits — loans which can be used to - purchase military
equipment from the U.S. — would merely add to Turkey's
debt burden. Evecit used the U.S. intelligence instal-
lations as leverage, recognizing that with the Carter
Administration soon to be pushing for the SALT II
Treaty, the U.S. needed Turkey's cooperation in moni-
toring Soviet treaty compliance.

Christopher returned to Washington convinced of the
importance of the grant aid. He recognized that in
addition to its actual value, the grant aid was a mat-
ter of prestige and symbolic significance for the

beleaguered Turkish military, and the military leaders
were an Important element in the uncertain Turkish
political equation For the Turkish military, it was
also a matter of equity, since Greece had received
grant funds the previous year and Turkey had not
Finally, the Turkish military officials pointed out
that aa a grant recipient, Turkey would be able to pur-
chase excess D.S, military equipment at nominal cost.

One of Christopher’s firBt stops upon his return
was Eyrd's office. Byrd had been awaiting word from
the Administration on whether an effort should be made
to restore the grant funds. Byrd was prepared to lead
the fight again, but not without the Administration 'a
backing. In their meeting on Hay 11, Christopher left
Byrd with no doubt that the Carter Administration
wanted to eeo the grant funds Included in the bill

Building Senate Support

Byrd went to work immediately, using the same tac-
tics and Btrategy he had successfully applied in lift-
ing the embargo and had subsequently refined in other
foreign policy battles Quickly he was joined by John
Chatoe on the Republican side Byrd and Chafes then
put together an impressive bipartisan coalition of co-
sponsors: Democrats Bentsen, Sam Nunn, and Edmund
Kuskle, and Republicans Ted Stevens I the Minority
Whip), John Tower, and Henry Bellmon.

Cn May 16, this group circulated a "Dear Colleague"
letter to other senators, asking for support of the
amendment The next day, a group including Sarbanes
and Claiborne Pell ol the Foreign Relations Committee,
plus four other Democrats— Eagleton, Edward Kennedy,
Paul Tsongas, and Donald Riegle— circulated their own
"Dear Colleague" letter Their letter said, "In the
belief that enouqh Is enough, we ask you to oppose
further revisions In the committee's recommendations.'
The authors of this letter said, *We think that 5fSl
million In aid this year and $678 million over two
years is generous help for an ally whose record of co-
operation with NATO, on Cyprus, and with the United
States is seriously flawed. "136

The Byrd-Chafee group met In the Majority leader's
office and went down the Senate roll call list, divid-
ing responsibility among themselves for contacting col-
leagues personally and urging support for the amend-
ment. In some cases, key Administration officials were
asked by the group to contact specific senators, on
Kay 17, Byrd hosted a luncheon in the Lyndon B Johnson
Room in the Capitol, with Deputy Secretary Christopher,
Air Force Cnief of Staff Lewis Allen, and other Admini-
stration heavyweights joining Byrd in making a strong
pitch to a group of senators. Allen wag particularly

effective in speaking about Turkey's defense needs. A
similar luncheon was held in the Capitol's John P.
Kennedy Room on May 21, with Defense Secretary Harold
Brown among those in attendence. Byrd also emphasized
the importance of the amendment at his weekly press
conference on May 10, and the story received major
attention .

Meanwhile, the Administration provided information
packets to Senate offices and worked closely with the
Byrd group in building support. Ede Intan International
Corporation, a public relations firm hired by the Turk-
ish Embassy, also provided information to Senate of-
fices, including a copy of a May 14 column by Rowland
Evans and Robert Novak, which appeared in The Washing-
ton Post . The columnists wrote that Turkey's impor-
tance to the U.S. had reached new heights because of
the events in Iran, but that Moscow believed that Tur-
key was "ripe for destabilization." Evans and Novak
said the Soviets were using propaganda “to finish the
work insensibly started by the U.S. Congress with its
arms embargo and systematically reduce American ties
with Turkey." 139

Paralleling 'the efforts of the Byrd-Chafee group
among senators was a similar operation at the staff
level. Staff members from the Senate Democratic Policy
Committee, which Byrd headed, canvassed the staff net-
work and kept in close touch with the White House and
the State Department congressional liaison operations.

On May 22, the Senate took up the amendment. An
editorial in that morning's New York Times made a stong
case for the Byrd-Chafee amendment. Entitled, "Turkey
Needs a Hand, Not a Rod," the Times editorial supported
the grant funds! "There is no good reason to insist on
commercial loan terms except to revive the policy of
punishment. Senators who favor the Greek position on
Cyprus oppose the aid in that spirit." 140

Going into the Senate debate, Byrd felt confident
of victory. His tally showed that he had 40 certain
votes, with only 18 definitely against. He counted at
least 16 senators leaning for the amendment. But Byrd
held these figures close . to the vest and kept his
forces hard at work up to the time of the vote. The
Carter Administration lobbyists who worked with Byrd
were not sure as late as the night before the vote that
they had the votes to best the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee, the pro-Greek lobby, and others who opposed the
outright grant. The final vote was 64-32 for the
amendment, overriding the recommendation of the Foreign
Relations Committee.

As the Washington Post reported, "The question pro-
duced a rare example of intensely argued Senate debate
in which friends of Greece and austerity- conscious con-
servatives opposed the grant to Turkey while a biparti-
san coalition of senators defended it as a necessary

63

symbol of concern for a troubled NATO ally.* 141

House Resentment

Although the Carter Administration had again won
the Senate battle on Turkey, the House presented an
even more formidable problem. On June 21, the House,
by a lopsided 303-107 margin, voted to instruct its
conferees in tne House-Senate conference on the secur-
ity assistance bill to insist on disagreement with the
Senate amendment. It is a relatively rare occurrence
for conferees to be so instructed Conferees usually
hove the flexibility to negotiate

In this case, more than opposition to the gear t aid
to Turkey was involved Institutional pride and the
belief that House prerogatives were being usurped un-
doubtedly Influenced the House vote As Representative
Edward Dervinski IR-Illlnola) noted when introducing
his motion to instruct, the Carter Administration pre-
sented tne request lor additional Turkish aid, includ-
ing the military grant, after the House had already
completed action on the security assistance bill. "The
Administration has thereby completely bypassed the
House, alleging that an up-or-down vote on an eventual
conference report is sufficient Involvement far the
House in this matter," Dervinski said 142

Representative Paul Pindley, another Illinois Re-
publican, argued vainly that Dervinski ‘s motion "would
not be a constructive development . it would be a need-
less and unfortunate slap at Turkey " 141 ""

There has often been resentment in the House ot the
more prominent role the Senate plays in foreign af-
fairs, and in this case the White House tactic ot re-
questing the additional aid after the House acted on
the security assistance bill backfired Contributing
to the particularly Intense House feelings about its
proper role was the fact that earlier on the same day
that the House had concluded its lengthy and highly
contentious debate on legislation to implement the
Panama Canal Treaties. The House had no role in con-
sidering the actual treaties, the advise and consent
role being a Senate responsibility.

Many members of the House, including some who
supported the treaties, believed that President Carter
had circumvented the Constitution when he failed to
seek House approval for the treaty-mandated transfers
of property to Panama l See Chapter 4.) During the
debate on the implementing legislation which preceded
the debate on Dervinski *s motion on Turkish aid, Rep-
resentative Don Clausen, a California Republican, said,
"There is a growing body of opinion that the American
people wanted and, Indeed, expected the full Congress —
both the House and the Senate— to be involved in the

64

Panama issue. The American people resent an inter-
national negotiating process that relegates the U.S.
House of Representatives to a followup role of having
to vote to 'pay the bill' for a vital economic and
national security package which was drafted by others
and in which the House had no opportunity to
participate.

It was in this atmosphere of indignation about de-
nial of the House's "rightful role" that consideration
of the Derwinski motion occurred, and it undoubtedly
contributed to the strong vote to instruct the con-
ferees. That vote almost guaranteed a lengthy and dif-
ficult conference on the security assistance bill, and
that is exactly what occurred.

Conference Deadlock

The deadlock lasted for more than three months.
Meanwhile, the Administration was attempting to negoti-
ate a Defense Cooperation Agreement with the troubled
Turkish government. Such an agreement would govern the
U.S, military and intelligence installations in Turkey,
which were operating under a temporary agreement.

Initially, the conferees hoped to have the confer-
ence concluded by the July 4 recess, but neither side
budged on the Turkey issue. The Senate conferees were
anxious to finish the conference, because on July 9 the
Foreign Relations Committee would begin its lengthy
SALT II hearings. Chairman Frank Church and Jacob
Javits, the ranking Republican on the Senate Committee,
had voted for the credits rather than the grant; in-
deed, Javits had proposed the alternative. But Church
and Javits had pledged Majority Leader Byrd to stand
firmly behind the Senate position in favor of the grant.

Soon the conferees reached agreement on all items
in the . security assistance bill except Turkish aid.
The House conferees would not agree to any grant mili-
tary aid. The Administration signaled that it would
hold firm in support of grant funds. With all other is-
sues in the bill resolved, and with the Senate members
of the conference committee preoccupied with SALT II,
the conferees ceased to meet. Responsible staff mem-
bers from Senate Foreign Relations, House Foreign Af-
fairs, and the Senate Democratic Policy Committees met
periodically to consider means of breaking the stale-
mate. Such a meeting occurred on August 1, when the
staff group met with Matthew Niroetz, State Department
Counselor, representing the administration. The House
staff reported an unyielding attitude on the part of
key figures in the House. Byrd insisted on holding out
for some direct military aid to Turkey. One proposal
considered was to grant Turkey a $50 million FMS loan,
with the provision that the president could determine

55

the terms— and the president might decide to mate the
loan on a 'forgiveness* basis* as had been the case
with some loans to Israel. This approach would also
have allowed Turkey special access to excess defense
articles But, like several others, this proposal did
rot prove acceptable to all the major actors.

On September 5, Byrd met with Turkish Ambassador
Sufcru Elekdag to discuss the issue. Elekdag stressed
the importance to the Turkish military of grant funds.
Byrd had seen a copy of a State Department cable re-
porting that Prime Minister Ecevlt had told Represents-
tive Steven Solarz of Hew rork, who had been in Turkey
during the August recess, that ha might be able to con-
vince the military to go along with a compromise Such
a compromise would make the 550 million an economic
rather than a military grant, and would have specific
provision making Turkey eligible for excess military
equipment But Elekdag gave no indication of a changed
attitude in Turkey, simply emphasizing that Turkey was
in desperate need for both economic and military aid
Meanwhile, the political situation in Turkey was grow-
ing more precarious

The next development in the effort to find a solu-
tion to the conference stalemate was a proposal put
forward by Deputy Secretary Christopher in mld-Septem-
cer. He visited all the key figures to suggest a com-
promise which would have replaced the S50 million mili-
tary grant with 530 million in economic grants and 520
million in grants for excess defense articles at cur-
rent market rates Even though this would not have in-
volved any direct military grants to Turkey, the prin-
cipal figures in the House balked Part of their oppo-
sition may have been related to Christopher personally
lie was seen by some of the House activists on the issue
as having become too closely identified with Turkey

Byrd and the Senate conferees were operating at a
disadvantage. If a conference committee is arable to
reach agreement on a funding issue, then the normal
procedure is to allow programs to operate under a "con-
tinuing resolution" with funding authorized at the same
levels for the previous year In that case, Turkey
v</uXwf have received much less than under the 1 919
proposals

Reaching Agreement

Finally, on September 19, a meeting occurred in
Byrd's office in room s-208 in the Capitol that set the
stage for an agreement House Foreign Affairs Commit-
tee Chairman Clement Zablocki made the trip across the
Capitol to meet the Senate Majority Leader. Capitol
Hill often attaches great importance to such gestures,
and Zablocki’s gesture in going to Byrd was important

66

In this case, it made it easier for Byrd to give some
ground on the Senate position. Zablocki was genuinely
concerned about Turkey: He favored increased aid.
However, he knew that he had an adamant group of House
members to deal with and that restricted his
flexibility.

Representing the Administration was Brian Atwood,
Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Rela-
tions, who had worked with top staff aides to Byrd and
Zablocki to arrange the meeting. 14 ^ Atwood's presence
was ironic because in 1974, as an aide to Senate Thomas
Gagleton, he had played a key role in helping to impose
the embargo. Now he was working hard in favor of aid
to Turkey.

In an atmosphere thick with cigar smoke, Zablocki
and Byrd reached agreement. The two were old acquaint-
ances, having served together in the House when Byrd
was a representative, and these personal ties counted.
Both wanted to see the issue resolved, and in a short
time they arrived at an acceptable compromise. Turkey
would receive 5250 million in FMS credits; of this, 550
million would be on special repayment terms, similar to
terms of loans to Egypt and Israel. As a recipient of
FMS credits, Turkey would be eligible to purchase ex-
cess U.S. defense articles at fair market value — a mat-
ter of great importance from the Turkish viewpoint. Of
the 5198 million in economic aid, 575 million would be
in grant form. There would also be a 52 million mili-
tary training grant. The overall total of 5450 million -
would make Turkey the third largest recipient of U.S. ^
assistance, after Israel and Egypt. Therefore, al-
though there was not direct military assistance grant
in the package, the Senate could take some satisfaction
an- having obtained a 575 million economic grant and the
5450 million total.

As Byrd said later, "If there had been another card
in the deck, we could have played for Turkey in this
conference. I would have been for playing it. But
there would have been nothing left." 14 6

With Byrd and Zablocki having sealed the deal, the
conference committee officially approved it on Septem-
ber 26, ending the three-month deadlock. On OctoE^fl'^,
1979, more than four and one-half months after the^Sen-
ate had acted on Turkish aid, the Senate took up the
conference report. Byrd, Javits, and Chafee spoke in
support of it. Byrd said the aid package for Turkey
"while not fully satisfactory. . .would nonetheless pro-
vide substantial aid." 147

More Hurdles

Ironically, after the , long struggle to gain ap-
proval for the authorization of aid to Turkey, the

6?

proponents of such aid were partially thwarted once
more when Congress failed to enact a foreign aid appro-
priations bill Aid legislation had become so complex
and bo politically unpopular# with very few members
willing to tare the lead in supporting it, that aid
appropriations ■ were allowed to languish. (When Con-
gress passed a Sll S-bllllon foreign aid bill In Decem-
ber 1981, it was the first foreign ala appropriations
bill in three years The aid bill passed during the
Heagan Administration's first year in office, and with
a strong push from the Administration, despite the fact
that many Reagan supporters In Congress had previously
been among those nest critical of aid programs But ty
the next year aid was once again funded through a con-
tinuing resolution >

Congress had authorized 8250 million In FMS credits
for fiscal year 1980 for Turkey and nearly $2 million
for military education and training as part of the
overall aid package However, as Secretary of State
Edmund Huskle informed Byrd in September i960, "In the
absence of appropriations legislation, we shall be able
to disburse only 5200 million and 51 4 million respect-
ively " Muskle said, “Our inability to provide the
full authorized amount has been a major disappointment
to the Turks, because of their critical need and be-
cause the 5250 million FMS amount was Been by them as
good faith by the Administration and the authorizing
committees to meet our commitment under the new Defense
and Economic Cooperation Agreerent "KB Muskie re-
ferred to the agreement between Turkey and the United
States which was Bigred on March 29, 19B0 The five-
year agreement clearly would not have been possible
without the congressional action to end the arms embar-
go and to approve the 1979 aid authorization

When a state Department official testified at a
hearing on the agreement before House Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle EaBt In May I960,
Subcommittee Chairman Leo Hamilton opened the question-
ing this wayt "The first question is how much Is it
going to cost us7* Hamilton said he wanted to explore
'the linkage between the agreement and the money,

The subcommittee was told that, although it was an
•executive agreement,' containing no pledge of specific
economic or military assistance, the U S pledged to
continue to try to provide assistance in the range of
5450 million per year for Turkey, with possible larger
amounts in future years. In return, the U S received
Ju tlt&el cat Jan ts mintatet faeces and carry ant aiittacf
activities at specified installations in Turkey, in-
cluding three intelligence-gathering installations.

Congress accepted the “executive agreement," not
requiring formal congressional approval, without much
fuss. This could be seen as evidence of both a more
relaxed congressional attitude toward the executive

than had been the case in the 1970s, and a recognition
that Congress still controlled the purse strings — the
funding being an integral if unstated part of the
agreement.

A Library of Congress study for the House Foreign
Affairs Committee in 1980 said, "In view of the signi-
ficant problems facing Turkey, it seems clear that, for
the foreseeable future, Congress will be confronted
with requests for substantial economic and military as-
sistance to help restore Turkey's military readiness
and economic viability. . .The position that Congress
takes on aid requests is likely to have a profound ef-
fect on further United States-Turkish relations and
U.S. interests in the eastern Mediterranean."! 50

A staff report issued by the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee in March 1980 said, "Turkey's political
situation is critical. More than 10 years of coalition
governments, political polarization, urban terrorism,
renewed Kurdish nationalism, and fundamental socio-
economic problems give rise to a threat of anarchy or
military rule." 151 The detailed staff report was one
of a number of such reports issued by the foreign
affairs committees in recent years. Until Chairman
Fulbright of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
began dispatching staff members to conduct overseas
studies and investigations in the late sixties and
early seventies, such reports had been rare. But the
increase in congressional staff and the more active
role of the congressional committees made such reports
more possible and more in demand. It gave the commit-
tees some Independent sources of information and made
them less reliant on the executive for information,
even though the assistance of executive branch offi-
cials was often essential to the success of such stu-
dies and investigations. In the case of the 1980 re-
port to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Chair-
man Frank Church asked staff members Hans Binnendijk
and Alfred Friendly, Jr., to visit the region and pre-
pare the report to assist the committee in its consid-
eration of aid requests from the executive branch. The
report proved to be on the mark in several important
respects.

Turkey's Problems

On September 6, 1980 the Turkish military took over,
the government in an attempt to bring order to the
highly troubled nation. The military leaders promised
to restore democracy after bringing the nation's tur-
moil under control. • But the Turks found themselves
still in conflict with Greece within the NATO alliance,
and the European members of NATO criticized Turkey for
failing to restore democracy quickly. The Council of

Europe pressured the military government to end its
banning of political parties, “human rights viola-
tions,* and muzzling of the press This estrangement
from its European allies served to push Turkey closer
to the U.S., where little had been heard In Congress in
criticism of the military rule In December 1961,
Secretary of Defense Caspar Weiberger said the U.S« and
Turkey had agreed to establish a high-level ;Joint de-
fense group to “enlarge and Improve defense cooperation
between the two nations."* 52

Parlimentary elections were held in November 1983,
although only certain parties and candidates were al-
lowed to participate Even though the military did not
back the winning party, former General Kenan Evren
remained as president as a result of Turkey's new
military-sponsored constitution, approved in 19B2

Under the Reagan Administration, Turkey continued
to rank high among the u s aid recipients In recent
years, it has been at congressional insistence that a
7 ID ratio has been maintained in V £ military
assistance to Greece and Turkey While executive
branch officials have tried to steer away from such
formula. Congress has adamantly retained the ratio,
tying aid to Greece and Turkey For fiscal year 1984,
for example, with a 6trong push from supporters o£
Greece, congressional committees cut proposed aid to
Turkey, and helped bring up the amount to Greece so as
to maintain the 7 '10 ratio

A Focal Point

Turkey continues to be an important factor in
United States foreign policy and international security
arrangements Even though Turkey might seem to many
Americana to be at the periphery of American Interests,
it has, during the period since World War II, frequent-
ly figured in important United States foreign policy
trends and developments,

looking at U S relations with Turkey and U S pol-
icies toward that country during the post-World War II
period provides a panoramic view of the evolution of
American foreign policy, beginning with the Greek-
Turkish old program end the Truman Doctrine The
Truman Doctrine set the pattern for subsequent American
policy and for the American outlook on the world It
bad important implications at bone too. Turkey managed
to figure in a number of other key events in US in-
ternational relations — the building ot the NATO alli-
ance, the Korean War, and the Cuban missile crisis, in
which the V S. agreed to remove missiles from Turkey
after the Soviets removed their missiles from Cuba

70

Tracing the Congressional Role

If the position of Turkey in the U.S. foreign pol-
icy perspective is a useful way to examine the evolu-
tion of U.S. policy, it is also a means of examining
the evolution of the congressional role during that
same period. Congress played a relatively active role
in considering Greek-Turkish aid in 1947, but it was
also beginning a pattern of allowing broad discretion
to the executive when a "crisis" was invoked.

Turkey was also at the center of events when Con-
gress, during a particularly tumultuous period in its
relations with the executive in the 1970s, reasserted
itself in foreign policy. U.S. relations with Turkey
became entangled in this congressional reassertion. In
addition to being a case of Congress playing a decisive
role on ma^or foreign policy issue, the recent history
of congressional action on Turkey provides notable
examples of intra-congressional as well as congres-
sional-executive struggles over foreign policy. It
also illustrates the changing nature and influence of
congressional leadership, the role of committees, and
the importance of procedure and personalities in con-
gressional action — this last factor being one that is
too often overlooked in analyses of the congressional
role. Finally, congressional consideration of U.S.
policies toward Turkey (and its neighbor, Greece) pro-
vides a vivid demonstration of the role of ethnic poli-
tics and ethnic lobbies in influencing U.S. foreign
policy.

There are many positive features to a more active
congressional role in foreign policy, but there can be
dangerous consequences, particularly if Congress tends
to overlook the longer-term and strategic consequences
of its actions and takes steps that, although perhaps
politically popular at home, can be counterproductive
'to overall U.S. foreign policy interests and coher-
ence. Recent everts have shown Congress in what would
appear to be a more responsible and balanced role in
acting on policy toward Turkey, but a role that re-
flects congressional determination to remain actively
involved in foreign policy.

71

NOTES

1 "Address of the President of the United States

—Greece, Turkey, and the Kiddle East," Congressional
Record , Bouse, Karch 12, 194?, p 1961 (Also, "Recom-
mendations on Greece and Turkey," message of the Presi-
dent to the 80th Cong., 1st sees , March 12, 1947, U S

department of State, Bulletin, supplement of Hay 4,
1947, p 832; "Recommendation for Assistance to Greece
and Turkey," Address of the President of the United
States, March 12, 1947, 0 5 House of Representatives,
80th Cong., 1st sess , Doc 171; "Recommendations on
Greece and Turkey," Message of the President to Con-
gress, Karch 12, 1947, A Decade of American Foreign

Policy, Basic Documents, 1941-1949 , U £ Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, Washington, 1950, p 1255

2 Ibid

3 Harry S Truman, Memoirs, Volume Hi Years of
Trial and Rope (Garden Citjt Doubleday, 1956), p p
100-101

4 J William Fulbright, The Crippled Giant (New
York i Random House, 1972), p 22.

5. Ibid , p 17

6. Ibid , p 19.

7 Ibid

8 Truman, Memoirs, vol.XX, pp 103

9 Dean Achcson, president at the Creation (New
Yorkt Norton, 2969), p.219

10. Ibid

11 Ibid

12 Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr., cd , The Private

Papers of Senator Vandenberq (Boston Houghton
Mifflin," l'9'5i)',

13 Joseph K. Jones, The Fifteen Weeks (New York
Viking, 1955), p.142.

14 Ibid , p 149

15 U.S. Department of State, Poreign Relations of
the United States, 1947, Volume V» The Near East and
Africa' l Washington « Government Printing Office - , 19Tlf,
p 47

16 Jones, The Fifteen Weeks , pp 123-124

17. VanflenbergT Trivet e Papers , p.339.

IB. Ibid. , p.342

19. U.S Senate, Congressional Record , April 8,
1947, p.3198.

20. See Fulbright' s comments, Conqreaaional
Record , December 10, 1973, pp 403S2-40354

2T Vandenberg. Private Papers , p 343

22 Ibid., p 339

23. Ibid., p 558 (letter from President Harry
Truman to Vandenberg, March 12, 1949).

24. Ibid , pp 450-451

25. Ibid , p.550.

72

26. Howard Baker, No Margin for Error (Hew York:

Times Books, 1979), p.155. •

27. Vandenberg, Private Papers , p.562.

28. Dallas Times Herald , October 25, 1981.

29. Susan Hartmann, Truman and the 80th Congress
(Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1971), p.57.

30. Acheson, President at the Creation , p.221.
For a detailed account of the drafting of the Truman
Doctrine, see Jones, The Fifteen Weeks , pp. 14 8-170.

31. Charles E. Bohlen, Witness to History , 1929-
1969 (Hew York: Norton, 1973), p.261.

32. Ibid.

33. George F. Kennan, Memoirs, 1925-1950 (Boston:
Little, Brown, 1967), pp. 319-320.

34. Ibid,, pp. 357-367.

35. X, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign
Affairs 25, July 1947, pp. 575-576, 582.

36. Kennan, Memoirs , p.358.

37. Ibid., p.317.

38. Jones, Fifteen Days , p.162.

39. Ibid.

40. Ibid.

41. Message of the President to the Congress,
March 12, 1947, Basic Documents , p.1256.

42. Ibid., p. 1257.

43. Acheson, Present at the Creation , pp. 221-222.

44. Richard M. Freeland, The Truman Doctrine and
the Origins of McCarthyism (New York: Knopf, 1972), p.
1 02 .

45. Hartmann, Truman and the 80th Congress , p.60.

46. Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1977), p.283.

47. Hartmann, Truman and the 8Uth Congress , p.58.

48. U.S. Congress, Senate. Legislative Origins of

the Truman Doctrine , Hearings Held in Executive Session
on S.938, 80th Cong., 1st sess. , 1947. Historical

Series, 1973, pp.1-2.

49. Kennan, Memoirs , pp. 354-355.

50. Forrestal resigned as Secretary of Defense in
1949. Suffering from severe depression and fatigue, he
plunged to his death at Bethesda Naval Hospital two
months later.

51. Legislative Origins , Hearings, p.6.

52. Ibid., p. 9.

53. Ibid., p.15.

54. Ibid.

55. Ibid.

56. Ibid., p.115.

57. Ibid., p.107.

58. Ibid., p.101.

59. Vandenberg, Private Papers , p.345.

60. Foreign Relations , 1947, p.137.

61. Acheson, Present at the Creation , p.224.

62. Ibid . r p.222.

63 Congressional Record , Senate, April 21, 1947,

p.372?

64. Ibid,, pp 3752 (April 21, 1947} and 3773
(April 22, 1947),

65, Foreign Relations , 1947, p 147,

66 Ibid , p 146

67 Congressional Record , Senate, April 21, 1947,

p 3728

68 Ibid , April 22, 1947, p 3786

69 Ibid., p.3773

70. rbid , p 3777.

71 Ibid , p 3773.

72. Ibid , April 21, 1947, p 3729

73. Ibid., p.3730.

74. Ibid , p.37J7

75 Ibid

76. Ibid . pp 3737-3738

77. Ibid , p 3838

78 Ibid

79 Ibid , April 7, 1947, p 3137

80 Ibid

81 Ibid

82 J William Fulbrlght and John C Stennis, Tbe
Role pf Congress In Porelgn Policy (Washington: Ameri-
can Enterprise Institute, 19711, pp 35-36; see also,
0 S Congress, Senate, National Commitments , Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, Senate Report No 129, 91et
Cong , 1st ness , 1969, p 7

83 Fulbrlght, The Crippled Giant , p 213, see also
Congressional Record, Senate, vol 117, no 51, 9Znd

April 14, 1971, S4784 j and George

(Washington; Luce, 196j>, p 248

85 “Presidential Dictatorship," Congressional

Record , Senate, February 5, 1967,

66. Ibid

87. J William Pulbright, “American Foreign Policy

in tbe 20tb Century under an 38th Century Constitu-
tion," 47 Cornell Law Quarterly , no 1, pp 1-13 (an ad-
dress delivered at Cornell University, May 5, 1961);

see also Meyer, Fulbrlght oi Arkansas , p 268

88. Meyer, Fulbrlght ot ArKansas , p 269

89 Ibid. , p.268

90 handwritten memorandum, J . William Fulbrlght
to author, 1973.

91. tetter, J. William Tulbright to author, April
1, 1982.

74

92. Congressional Record , Senate, March 7, 1968,

p.5660.

93. Ibid., p.5666.

94. John C. Campbell (Council on Foreign Rela-
tions), The United States in World Affairs , 1947-1948
(New York: Harper, 1948), p.46.

95. Ibid.

96. Congressional Record , Senate, April 22, 1947,

p.3786.

97. Ibid.

98. See Donald R. Mattews, U.S. Senators and Their

World (New York: Random House, Vintage (paper), 1960),
p.70: Robert Sherrill, Gothic Politics in the Deep
South (New York: Ballantine (paper), 1969), p.I62;

Marjorie Hunter, "At 77, Florida's Pepper, a New Deal
Veteran, Is Still Going Like '38," The New York Times ,
September 9, 1977.

99. Congressional Record , House, May 8, 1947,

p.4809.

100. Ibid.

101. Ibid., p.4810.

102. Bari Mazo, Richard Nixon: A Political and

Personal Portrait (New York: Harper, 1959), p.75.

103. Ibid., p.79.

104. John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the
Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947 (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1972), pp. 317-318.

105. Freeland, The Truman Doctrine and the Origins
of McCarthyism , p.35^1

106~ Robert A. Divine, Since 1945 — Politics and
Diplomacy in Recent American History (New York: Wiley,
1975), p. 31 .

107. Robert H. Ferrell, "Truman Foreign Policy — A
Traditionalist View," in Richard S. Kirkendall, ed.,
The Truman Period as a Research Field (Columbia:
University of Missouri Press, 1974), p.42.

108. Richard Rovere, Senator Joe McCarthy (London:
Methuen, 1959), p.15.

109. Congressional Record , House, May 7, 1947,

p.4741.

110. Ibid., p.4742.

111. Soviet Policy and the United States Response
in the Third World , report prepared for the Committee
on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, 97th
Cong., 1st sess., by the Congressional Research Ser-
vice, Library of Congress, March 1981, pp. 175-176.

112. Turkey, Greece, and NATO: The Strained Alli-
ance , staff report to the Committee on Foreign Affairs,
U.S. House of Representatives, 96th Cong., 2d sess.,
March 1980, p.17; Soviet Policy and the United States
Response , pp. 216-218; "Basic Information on Turkey,"
document prepared by American Embassy, Ankara, Turkey,
December 1978, p.10.

75

113. US Congress, Senate, Executive Sessions of

the Senate Foreltn Relations "committee . Historical
Series, volXIll part l,' 82r.d Cong , 1st seas , 1951,

published 1976, p 360.

114, Ibid.

115 Ibid.

116 Ibid., p 377

117 Ibid , p 378.

118 Vandenberg, Private Papers , p 476

119 Ibid

120 D3vid N Farnsworth, The Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations (Brbana University of iTlTrJoTs
Press, 1961) , pp 75-76

121 Cecil V Cratb, Jr , and Pat H Holt, Invita-

tion to Struggle Congress the President and Foreign
Policy (Washingtons Congressional Quarterly PresaT

6oT,PP 33-34

122 Congress and the Nation— 1945-1964 , vol 1

(Washington Congressional Quarterly, 1965), p 10B

123 Foreign Aid Program , compilation of studies
and surveys prepared under the direction of the Special
Committee to Study the Foreign Aid Program, U.S Sen-
ate, 85th Cong , 1st scss , July 1957, p iv

124 Ibid , p 1008

125 Arthur M Schlesinger, Jr , The Imperial Pres-
idency (Boston i Houghton Mifflin, 1973), pp 174-175

126 Congressiona l Record , Senate, December 10,
1973, p 40353

127. Lawrence Stern, The Wrong Horse (Hew Yorkj
limes Books , 1977), p 142

12B "Turkey Blind Spots," Newsweek, August 11,
1975, p 37

129. Charles MeC Mathias, Jr , "Ethnic Croups and
Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs 49, summer 1981, p 988

130 Ibid , p.996

131. John C Tower, "Congress Versus the Presi-
dent The Formulation and Implementation of American
Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs 60, winter 1981/82,
p 237

132. Mathias, "Ethnic Groups and Foreign Policy,"
p 990.

133 Thomas M Franck and Edward Weis band, Foreign
policy by Congress (New York Oxford University Press,
1979), p.192

134 Congressional Record , Senate, July 20, 1978,

p.511233.

235. V.S. Congress, Sara te, Z/ttar r 'atia’ia2
Assistance Programs , Hearings before tKe Subcommittee
on - foreign Assistance , Committee on Foreign Relations,
on S. 2346, 95th Cong , 2d aess , 1978, p 186.

136. Ibid , pp. 192-205

137. Robert C. Byrd, "Turkey is the Buckle on the
Belt of Instability," Washington Star , April 8, 1979.

76

138. "Dear Colleague" letter, dated May 17, 1979,
signed by Senators Claiborne Pell, Paul Sarbanes,
Thomas Eagleton, Paul Tsongas, Edward Kennedy, and
Donald Riegle, Jr.

139. Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, "Consigning
Turkey to the Junkyard," Washington Post , May 14, 1979.

140. "Turkey Needs a Hand, Not a Rod," (editorial),
The New York Times , May 22, 1979.

141. Robert G. Kaiser, "Senate Backs Intensely De-
bated Grant to Turkey," Washington Post , May 23, 1979.

142. Congressional Record , House, June 21, 1979,

P.H490-.

143. Ibid., p.H4908.

144. Ibid., p.H4875.

145. Arranging and attending the meeting with
Zablocki and Byrd were Atwood; Jack Brady, staff
director of the House Foreign Affairs Committee; and
Hoyt Purvis, foreign/defense policy advisor to the
Majority Leader.

146. Congressional Record , Senate, October 4, 1979,

P.S14139.

147. Ibid., p. S14139.

148. Letter from Secretary of State Edmund S.
Muskie to Senate Majority Leader Robert C. Byrd,
September 2, 1980.

149. U.S. Congress, House, United States-Turkey

4

The Panama Canal Treaties.
Legislative Strategy
for Advice and Consent

/ofin Opperman

Article 2, Section 2 of the U S Constitution
states that the president has the power * by and with
the Advice ard Consent of the Senate, to sake treaties,
provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur *

The delegation of treaty responsibilities has al-
ways been the source of controversy, and subject to
interpretation Historically, the executive branch has
negotiated treaties and then submitted them to the Sen-
ate for acceptance or rejection G*er th* past 30
years, senators have occasionally been given the oppor-
tunity to participate in treaty negotiations, but the
executive branch has always maintained ultimate respon-
sibility for treaty-making 1

The congressional assertiveness since the Vietnam
War that has changed the overall relationship between
the executive and legislative branches has also ef-
fected treaty-making The Panama Canal Treaties of
1977 are a case in point. These treaties were nego-
tiated over a 13-year period by four different admin-
istrations These negotiations Included periodic con-
sultations with Congress. Yet when the negotiations
were completed in the summer of 1977, congressional and
public questioning of and opposition to the treaties
was so strong that several points in the treaties had
to be "renegotiated,* either by the Carter Administra-
tion, or, in some instances, by direct discussions be-
tween Panamanian leaders and members of the Senate.

Background

The original 1903 Panama Canal Treaty had long been
considered inadequate in the context of United States-
Fanamanian relations Certain aspects of that treaty
were renegotiated in 1936 and 19S5, but the central
question of Panamanian sovereignty over the canal
remained unresolved The presence of the U S military

77

78

in the Canal Zone and U.S. control of Panama’s najcr
economic resource were factors that kept the issue
alive over decades.

The Panamanian "flag riots" of 1964 resulted in a
temporary break in relations between the U.S. and Pan-
ama. Part of’ the agreement to normalize relations be-
tween the two countries thereafter was the reopening of
negotiations for a new canal treaty. Draft treaties
were completed as early as 1967, but domestic consider-
ations in both countries prevented submission for rati-
fication. After seven additional years of inconclusive
negotiations, a significant breakthrough was made in
February 1974 with the signing of a statement of agreed
principles by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and
Panamanian Foreign Minister Juan Antonio Tack. This
statement reiterated the commitment of both nations to
negotiate a new agreement, but no significant progress
was to occur until 1977. Growing concern about the
vulnerability of the canal, considered vital to U.S.
economic and security interests, gave impetus to the
U.S. willingness to pursue the negotiations. There was
particular concern about the difficulty of protecting
and defending the canal if Panama was hostile and un-
friendly to the U.S.

On January 12, 1977, President-elect Jimmy Carter
and Secretary cf State-designate Cyrus Vance officially
committed the new administration to pursuing negotia-
tions for a new Panama Canal Treaty. President Carter
indicated a desire to resolve the remaining issues
promptly, and noted his expectation that a new treaty
might be completed as early as June 1977. 2

Negotiations by the Carter Administration proceeded
well, although the June deadline was not met — duo at
least in part to congressional concerns. The How Pana-
ma Canal Treaties were finally completed in August, and
officially signed by President Carter and Panamanian
leader General Omar Torrijos on September 7, 1977.

Two treaties were actually negotiated. The first,
the Canal Treaty, provided for U.S. control and the
right to defend the canal until the year 2000. On the
effective date of the treaty, Panama would assume ter-
ritorial jurisdiction over the Canal Zone, would use
parts of the areas not needed for operation or defence
of the canal, and would receive up to S70 million a
year from canal revenues.

Under a separate treaty (Treaty Concerning the Per-
manent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal!,
the U.S. would have the right to insure the neutrality
of the canal from any threat for an indefinite period.

Pre-Debate Period — The White House

The Carter Administration considered ratification

79

of the Panama Canal Treaties its first major foreign
policy test in dealing with the Congress Some Admini-
stration officials believed that too much political
capital would be spent to secure ratification of the
treaties. Nevertheless, President Carter considered
the treaties a major foreign policy objective, and
pressed forward The Administration thought that ap-
proval of the treaties would have a major impact on
gaining congressional support for other foreign policy
initiatives on such issues as human rights, southern
Africa* and SALT, 3 The President had already drawn
strong criticism from Republicans for an "incompetent
and incoherent" foreign policy, and failure to get Sen-
ate approval for the Panama Canal Treaties would defin-
itely embolden opposition to Administration policies

Encouraged by the progress of the negotiations,
treaty negotiators Ellsworth Bunker and Sol Linowitz
net with congressional leaders in late Hay 1977 to map
out the legislative strategy The Administration's
plan was to submit the treaties by the August recess
and have them acted upon before the fall adjournment
The White House hoped to avoid carrying the vote over
into the spring since 1978 was an election year

Pressjres on General Torrljos by Panamanian left-
ists and nationalists and J S congressional concerns
over some of the details of the treaties threatened to
prolong negotiations President Carter sent a confi-
dential letter to Torrijos in August acknowledging that
the terms agreed to so far "may be lean than you ex-
pected or wished, but I hope you will understand that
they represent the most we could undertake to do, based
on our consultations with Congress * 4

The following week. President Carter notified all
members of Congress by telegram that negotiations would
soon be completed, and asked that they reserve judgment
until they had read the treaties The White House

strategy began to unfold soon thereafter After solid-
ifying support of members of the Cabinet and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, a campaign to inform the public was to
commmence It was vital for the treaties to be seen as
a bipartisan issue As a result, the White House

pushed hard for support from Republican officials, in
and out of office These efforts received a big boast
in mid-August when former President Gerald Ford and
former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger publicly an-
nounced support far the treaties. Republican Senators
Mark Hatfield of Oregon and Lowell ffelclcer of Connecti-
cut chimed in with their support

The White House campaign maintained a brisk pace
through the final weeks of August President Carter
met with political and business leaders from various
states at the White House to brief them on the import-
ance of the treaties. General George Brown, Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, met with a group of

retired generals and admirals to explain the Joint
Chiefs' support. House Majority Leader Jim Wright (D-
Texas) notified each member of the House that he sup-
ported the treaties, and asked that they keep an "open
mind" on the issue. 5 m addition, President Carter
announced the formation of a special task force to be
headed by presidential advisor Hamilton Jordan that
would be responsible for obtaining congressional and
public approval for the treaties.

Although the Administration had hoped for Senate
approval of the treaties before the fall adjournment,
Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd (D-West Virginia)
warned that public opinion was not ready for it.
Senator Byrd also cited the need to clear energy legis-
lation through the Senate before the treaty debate
could begin. After discussing the treaty problems with
Byrd, President Carter decided to let the Majority
Leader handle the timetable for the treaties.® The
President showed great confidence in Byrd, considering
that the senator was uncommitted on the treaties at the
time.

The September 7 signing ceremony at the Organiza-
tion of American States (OAS) headquarters in Washing-
ton, D.C., was also part of the strategy to generate
support for the treaties. The guests included 26 West-
ern Hemisphere leaders as well as scores of prominent
Americans. Carter had breakfast with business leaders
that morning to explain the pacts, then finished the
day with a state dinner for Western Hemisphere leaders
and 25 senators. The next day former President Ford
lobbied Republican congressional leaders for support.

Following the hoopla of the signing ceremony, the
White House involvement in the treaty campaign dimin-
ished considerably. Part of the strategy was to have
State Department officials take the lead in briefing
members of Congress, while the President continued to
meet informally with political and business leaders
from many states at the White House. However, through
September and October the President became increasingly
preoccupied with the problems of his Budget Director,
Bert Lance. (Lance ultimately had to resign because of
personal financial problems and the failure to fully
inform the Senate about those problems.) As a result
of the White House preoccupation with the Lance affair,
much of the momentum that had been gained up through
the signing ceremony was beginning to dwindle. ?

On October 11, Carter, Vance, and National security
Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski met with eight prominent
senators, including Byrd and Senate Minority Leader
Howard Baker (R-Tennesee) , to clarify some of the
points of the treaties. Many senators had expressed
concern that the treaty was ambiguous with respect to
D.S. rights to protect the neutrality of the canal, and
the right of U.S. ships to "go to the head of the line"

81

during- an emergency The group of senators warned the
President that chances for approval of the treaties
seemed remote without some clarifications. As a result
of this session, President Carter arranged to meet with
General Torrijoa a few days later to discuss the sena-
tors' concerns Carter and Torrijos then agreed to a
Statement of Understanding which clarified the inter-
pretations of the U.S right of intervention and "head-
of-the-line- priority The language in this statement
had been cleared with Majority Leader Byrd, but Byrd
remained uncommitted on the treaties even though he
favored the principles of the statement.® Although the
Statement of Understanding was made public, neither
leader signed it, presumably because of the political
repercussions that Torrijos might encounter for assur-
ing such rights for the United States

The Statement of Understanding helped the White
House regain some of the momentum that had been lost.
Senator Byrd then told the White House that the treat-
ies would be the first major item of business when Con-
gress reconvened in January 197B. Indeed, Byrd warned
White House officials that delaying the treaties beyond
that time could kill them because of the 1978 congres-
sional elections.

The final stage of the Administration's pre-debate
strategy was an all-out effort to garner the greatest
momentum possible going into the Senate floor debate.
Public opinion polls wore showing less opposition by
late December, and it was believed that the final push
for treaty support could make a big difference for
those senators who were uncommitted or leaning toward
approval. This final push became known as the "January
blitz * The key elements of the ■blitz" were a speak-
ing tour by Secretary of State Vance and a "fireside
chat" by President Carter Vance made appearances in
West Virginia, Kentucky, and Louisiana, all states with
critical Senate votes Carter appealed to the national
television audience to support the treaties, saying
that when the full terms of the agreement are
known, most people are convinced that the national
interests of our country will be best served by ratify-
ing the treaties

Senate Leadership

It is safe to any that passage of the Panama Canal
treaties would not have been possible had it not been
for the support and effective leadership of the Senate
Majority Leader Byrd and Minority Leader Baker Al-
though both Byrd and Baker remained uncommitted
throughout most of the pre-debate period, both made
significant contributions to securing passage of the
treaties. In previous years, both of the Senate

82

leaders had supported resolutions offered by Senator
Strom Thurmond (R-South Carolina) that recommended that
no treaty with Panama include "surrendering U.S. sov-
ereignty" over the canal. But when confronted with an
actual treaty in 1977 , both Baker and Byrd discounted
the Thurmond resolution as a "spring ritual" that real-
ly did not mean anything in the face of a new negoti-
ated treaty.

As far as the White House was concerned, the key
aetpr in building support for the treaties in the Sen-
ate would ultimately have to be Senator Byrd. As a
member of the President's party and the Senate leader,
his support was essential. Although Byrd was uncommit-
ted on the treaties at the outset r he still worked
closely with Administration officials in mapping out
the strategy for ratification. Byrd may have been
leaning toward supporting the treaties from the begin-
ning, but he did have serious questions about certain
passages in the treaties. He discussed these issues
with Administration officials on several occasions, and
then publicly announced in late September that he ex-
pected that some reservations and understandings would
have to be added to the pacts. Up to that point, the
State Department had maintained the position that no
alterations of the treaties should be made since that
might require reopening the negotiations. 11 Neverthe-
less, President Carter admitted the following week that
ratification was in doubt, and heeded advice given by
Senate leaders on October 11 to secure the Statement of
Understanding with General Torrijos.

On November 9 Senator Byrd and six other Democratic
senators embarked on a four-day fact-finding tour of
Panama. This trip played an important role in convinc-
ing Byrd that the treaties were indeed in the best
interests of the United States. During the tour the
senators engaged in frank discussions with General
Torrijos regarding issues of particular concern. Host
importantly, they wanted to be assured of the General s
commitment to, and the Panamanian poeple's interpreta-
tion of, the principles of the Statement of Understand-
ing. But much of the discussion also centered around
the internal affairs of Panama. Among the issues dis-
cussed were the human rights situation,, the right of
due process, freedom of the press, and Panama's rela -
tions with Cuba and the Soviet Union. 12 Torngcs

pledged to the senators that he would take action to
improve human rights conditions and press freedom, and
Byrd termed this "a positive step." On December 3,
Torrijos wrote to Byrd informing him that action na
been taken to restore constitutional guarantees on due
process and strengthen press freedom. He concluded his
message to Byrd by saying, "I am keeping my word.
Please convey this to your colleagues..." 13

Another important factor in influencing . c

83

senators was a tour of the canal Itself with tt Gen-
eral Dennis McAuliffe, Commander in Chief of the U S
Southern Command { SOUTHcO.M ) , headquartered in Panama
General McAuliffe pointed out the difficulties in de-
fending the canal against terrorist acts and the extent
of manpower needed to protect it. Hrs point was that
if the treaties were not ratified, defending the canal
vcule be more difficult than if they were.

Following the trip, three of the senators announced
support for the treaties, and two others offered quali-
fied support Only Senator James Sasser (D-Tennessee)
and Byrd remained uncommitted

The week after the Panama trip. Senator Byrd noted
that the chances for ratification had improved signifi-
cantly He believed the most influential factors for
improved prospects were the White House public informa-
tion campaign, increased editorial support, and General
Torrijos' agreement to the Statement o£ Understanding i*
Byrd finally announced his own support for the
treaties in the midst of the ‘January blitt ‘ Byrd
said that he would wort hard for ratification, but only
If the principles of the Statement of Understanding
were somehow incorporated in the treaties

During those final days prior to the Senate debate,
Byrd was instrumental in two developments that played a
major part in securing Senate approval The first of
these resulted from discussions between Byrd and mem-
bers of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee The
committee had held hearings on the canal pacts since
September, and was expected to report out the treaties
in late January Normally, the committee would have
reported the treaty with what ever amendments or reser-
vations Its members thought appropriate However, in
this case Byrd intervened to ask the committee not to
take any formal action on changes in the treaty, Byrd
was convinced that there were only a fqw amendments
that could be approved without endangering treaty rati-
fication These few beneficial arendments would draw
widespread support from senators, and Byrd believed
that more political mileage could be gained by giving
all senators the opportunity to co-sponsor such amend-
ments, rather than just having a vote to approve or
disapprove actions already taken in committee. Thus,
in an exceptional move, the Foreign Relations Committee
agreed to Byrd's request and made only recommendations
on amendments and reservations rather than taking form-
al action within the committee

The second and related action engineered by Byrd
was to incorporate the Statement of Understanding into
the pacts. The two principles embodied in the state-
ment [right of U.S to guarantee the neutrality of the
canal and ‘head-of-the-line* passage during crises)
were among those few beneficial provisions that could
be added to the treaties without threatening

ratification.

This strategy was originally considered in discus-
sions among staff members from the Foreign Relations
Committee and Senate Democratic Policy Committee.
Robert Dockery of the Foreign Relations staff suggested
it as a means of helping to satisfy Senate concerns
without jeopardizing the treaty. Staff members then
refined the proposal and presented it to the Majority
and Minority Leaders. Discussions between Byrd and
Baker led to the recommendations that the principles of
the Statement of Understanding be the basis for amend-
ing Articles IV and VI of the Neutrality Treaty. Upon
agreement of Senators John Sparkman (D-Alabama) and
Clifford Case (R-New Jersey), ranking members of the
Foreign Relations Committee, all senators would be
given the opportunity to co-sponsor these "leadership
amendments." Thus senators were able to put their
names on amendments that improved the treaties, and
this would perhaps make it easier for uncommitted sena-
tors to vote for the treaties. Senators Byrd and Baker
sent letters to all senators on February 2, 1978, ex-
plaining the proposed amendments and inviting co-spon-
sorship, and 76 senators agreed to co-sponsor the
amendments. 1 5

Although Minority Leader Baker was not as visible
in the pre-debate strategy as Senator Byrd, Baker's
role was nonetheless critical to the success of the
treaties. As Republican leader in the Senate, Baker
was in a particularly difficult political position.
Several prominent Republican spokesmen and the Republi-
can National Committee had come out strongly against
the treaties. Since Senator Baker was considered a
presidential hopeful in 1980, it was difficult for him
to cross blades with treaty opponents. Baker remained
uncommitted until just prior to the opening of the
floor debate, and in the interim was under constant
pressure from opponents of the treaties. He was a
special target of conservative political action groups
that saturated his home state of Tennessee with anti-
treaty advertising. These groups pointed to the signi-
ficance of Baker's role by telling his constiuents that
he alone could decide the fate of the treaties. 16
Meanwhile, Senators Robert Dole (R-Kansas) and Paul
Laxalt (R-Nevada) warned Baker that no Republican
voting for the treaties could expect to win the 1980
presidential nomination. 1 ^

As in the case of Senator Byrd, Baker was heavily
influenced by a trip to Panama. In early January 1978,
Baker traveled to Panama with Senators Jake Garn (R-
Utah), a treaty opponent, and John Chafee {R-Rhode Is-
land), a treaty supporter. As in the Byrd expedition,
it was frank discussions with General Torrijos that
influenced Baker most. Prior to the trip, Baker and
Byrd had discussed with President Carter the importance

65

of including the Statement of Understanding in the
treaty. iS Rather than discuss this proposal with the
Panamanians through Administration channels, Carter
chose to allow Baker to carry this message to Torrijoa
directly In this way Tcrrijoa would be confronted
head-on with the problems In the Senate; in addition.
Senator Baker, an influential leader in the Senate,
would be ploying an active role in improving the treat-
ies. president Carter's decision to handle the affair
in this manner proved beneficial in that Torrijos ac-
ceded to Baker's proposals, and Baker ultimately de-
cided to vote for the treaties.

Another significant move on which Baker and Byrd
collaborated was the decision to have the Senate con-
sider the Neutrality Treaty first, ahead of the Panama
Canal Treaty. This did not violate Senate treaty pro-
cedure but was unusual because, technically, the Panama
Canal Treaty was negotiated and submitted first. (In
fact, the two treaties were submitted to the Senate
BiBultanaously J The general assumption had been that
the Panama Canal Treaty would be taken up first But
Byrd believed reversing the order to be vital, given
the significance of the ‘leadership amendments,* and
the fact that these amendments applied to the Neutral-
ity Treaty Such strategic moves in regard to timing
and order of consideration can be critical in congres-
sional debate The ability of a majority leader to
control such matters is a major source of his power
within the Senate

By taking up the Neutrality Treaty first, the lead-
ership amendments could be considered early, thus pro-
viding a strong start toward Senate approval With
approval of the Neutrality Treaty, proponents could
argue that protection of the canal waa assured

Senate Committees

The primary responsibility for treaties among Sen-
ate committees belongs to the Foreign Relations Commit-
tee. In the case of the Panama Canal Treaties, several
jurisdictional disputes developed among committees
Initially, the major dispute involved committees in the
Rouse of Representatives which claimed the authority to
determine the transfer of 0 S property (as outlined in
Article IV, Section 3 of the U.S. Constitution). How-
ever, the Administration followed normal treaty proce-
dure by submitting the treaties for advice and consent
of the Senate a/rcf lesvia^ vistas by tfw SOvse tv Aw?
decided by the courts, which ultimately ruled in favor
of the Administration. (Cnee the treaties were ap-
proved by the Senate, both Rouses of Congress had to
pasa legislation to inplecent various aspects of the
treaties. )

With the treaties submitted to the Senate, Senator
Strom Thurmond pushed for joint jurisdiction by the
Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees. Mem-
bers of the Foreign Relations Committee and the Senate
leadership strongly opposed such an arrangement, and
committee responsibility for the treaties remained with
Foreign Relations. However, while Foreign Relations
prepared for treaty hearings, the Armed Services and
Judiciary Committees took the opportunity to get in on
the action. The day after. the Carter-Torri jos signing
ceremony at the OAS, treaty opponent Ronald Reagan ap-
peared before the Judiciary Subcommittee on Separation
of Powers . Senator James Allen ( D-Alabama ] , a treaty
opponent, chaired this subcommittee. Allen had called
hearings to consider the legality of transferring U.S.
property by treaty, but the lineup of witnesses sug-
gested that it was more a partisan effort to have the
voices of treaty opponents heard. The Armed Services
Committee also began a series of hearings, focusing on
the military-defense and economic aspects of the
treaties .

Foreign Relations held the most comprehensive hear-
ings on the pacts. The first series of witnesses were
Administration representatives who explained the con-
tent of the treaties and the importance of ratifica-
tion. These witnesses included officials from the
Departments of State, Defense, Justice, and Transport-
ation. The second series of witnesses included nongov-
ernment officials with political, religious, and
academic backgrounds. The final series of hearings
included historians, legal scholars, and business
leaders. Although a number of treaty opponents ap-
peared, the preponderance of witnesses were treaty
supporters. This was in line with the strategy of
Administration and Senate leaders, who saw the hearings
as an important part of the public education process.

An appearance by Majority Leader Byrd in support of
the treaties — with the principles of the Statement of
Understanding incorporated — completed the Foreign Rela-
tions hearings, and the markup process began. The ori-
ginal plan was that the principles of the Statement of
Understanding would be included as a separate article
at the end of the Neutrality Treaty. The committee ap-
proved this proposal by a 13-1 vote. Although General
Torrijos had agreed to include these principles in the
treaty, there had been no determination made as to how
this should be done. The Panamanian leaders exhibited
great concern over the committee's plan. General Tor-
rijos expressed this concern to a group of senators who
were visiting Panama at the time. Torrijos warned that
such an addition to the treaty would require a second
Panamanian plebiscite. Senator Alan Cranston {D-Cali-
fornia), one of the senators visiting Panama forwarded
that message to Senate colleagues. The result was a

87

reversal of the original committee decision a new
proposal was made to anend the existing language in
Articles TV and VI of the Neutrality treaty to include
the principles of the Statement of Understanding. 20
Then, according to the procedure recommended by Byrd,
the Foreign Relations Committee referred the amendments
to the entire Senate so that a large number of senators
would have the opportunity for co-sponsorship

Opposition

Opporents of any new Panama Canal treaty had found
ways to make their presence felt since the early
1960s In the Senate, Senator Strom Thurmond's •rit-
ual* of proposing that the government be prohibited
from "surrendering" the canal to Panama was typical of
efforts to mobilize opposition However, these propo-
sals received little public attention, and were not
taken too seriously by most senators

Tho first significant step to generate public oppo-
sition to a new treaty occurred in the 1976 presiden-
tial primaries Ronald Reagan, then a candidate for
the Republican nomination, brought up the issue and
found strong public opposition to the suggestion that
the U S might sign a new treaty turning over the canal
to panama Reagan admitted later that even he was
surprised by the reaction, as his campaign advisors had
not considered the Panama Canal to be an issue 21
Nevertheless, Reagan was able to gain significant
political mileage from it

After President Carter announced that a new canal
treaty would be forthcoming, the initial opposition was
led by Senators Strom Thurmond and Jesse Helms Public
reaction to these two Southern conservatives was not
appreciable. As a result, the two senators looked to
alternative means of stopping the treaties. It was be-
lieved that treaty opposition was much stronger in the
House than ih the Senate and some House members re-
sented not having a voice in the treaty debate Thur-
mond and Heins, working with a group of House members,
sought to have any transfer of the canal be made sub-
ject to approval by both the House and the Senate
Part of this effort was a lawsuit brought by Thurmond
and Helms to stop the transfer of the canal by treaty
The two senators also sent a letter to President Carter
in June 1977 that was signed by four former Chiefs of
Naval Operations encouraging the President to insure
that any new treaty "retain full sovereign control for
the U S aver the Panama Canal and the U S. Canal
Zone *22

A month-and-a-half later, after Carter had
announced that a new treaty had been negotiated, Thur-
mond and Helms traveled to Panama on a fact-finding

88

mission. Upon their return, the two appeared on NBC’s
"Meet the Press" declaring their opposition to the
treaties. They predicted that the treaties would be
defeated in the Senate, by filibuster in necessary.

After treaty negotiations were completed in August
1977, Reagan began his own crusade in opposition to the
treaties, and treaty opponents quickly rallied behind
him. As the opposition began to organize, a consensus
began to develop for a strategy to defeat the treaties.
The lawsuit brought by Thurmond and Helms would be dis-
counted, since most believed it would inevitably fail.
Instead, the focus of the opponents' campaign was to be
a media blitz aimed at arousing public opposition in
key states. Since only 34 votes would be needed to de-
feat the treaties, and many senators were already com-
mitted to the opposition, only 10 to 12 additional
votes would be needed. As a result, the media blitz
was to be concentrated in the South in an effort to
swing the votes of 12 to 15 southern Democrats. This
"southern strategy" was to be coupled with efforts to
try to influence two other key senators, Clifford Case
and Edward Zorinsky (D-Nebraska) . 23 Case supported the
treaties, but Zorinsky did join the opposition.

Anti-Treaty Campaign

Another aspect of the strategy was to initate a na-
tionwide write-in campaign. The intention was to flood
the Senate and White House with anti-treaty mail. This
campaign was so successful in the early stages that
Senator Baker estimated his mail to be "about 10,000 to
6" against the treaty.

In September 1977 the Emergency Coalition to Save
the Panama Canal was formed. This coalition was made
up predominantly of a dozen conservative groups. Join-
ing these groups were the Veterans of Foreign Wars and
the American Legion. The 2.7 million member American
Legion pledged to write letters to senators who in-
tended to vote for the treaties or who were uncommit-

ted. John Wasylik,
promised to "go to
self-mutilation . " 24

national commander of the VFW,
the wall on this senseless act of

As the anti-treaty rhetoric became more inflamed,
some of the treaty opponents feared that the lack of

substantive alternatives would prove counter-productive

in the long run. Therefore, suggestions were made that
any new treaty should also include provisions to satis-
fy the Panamanians. Among the suggested alternatives
were: raising canal tolls and giving the money to
Panama, opening the Canal Zone to agricultural develop-
ment and shipyards, and placing more Panamanians into
management of the canal. 2 *

Still, emotional rhetoric dominated the campaign.

Most of the rhetoric centered around the concept of the
0 5 "giving away* the canal, and was highlighted by
Senator S. 1 Hayakava’s (R-Califcmia) statement, "ve
stole it fair ard square * This rhetoric seered to be
effective in the early Btages in generating public op-
posiiton to the treaties. The opposition was able to
raise 10 tinea as much money as the proponents the
average denotation vos $14 Afl the treaties neared
Senate debate, these contributions diminished This
was partly a reflection of a shift in public opinion
5 from 70 percent opposed in August 1977 to 42 percent
in February 1978 according to Gallup Poll figures)
However, the anti-treaty fund-raising was also dealt a
blow by a rift between Ronald Reagan and the Republican
National Committee The Committee had come out with a
solid refutation of the treaties in October 1977, and
Reagan agreed to lend his name to fund-raising efforts
conducted by the Committee for treaty opposition But
Reagan later discovered that the money was being used
to fund Republican campaigns for the 1978 elections,
and had his name withdrawn 27

The final stage of the opponents* strategy to acti-
vate public opposition involved the formation of so-
called ’truth squads * The purpose of these squads was
to counter the public information efforts of the Admin-
istration The ’truth squads’ conducted their own
blitz in an effort to head off any momentum that pro-
treaty forces might be gaining so soon before the floor
debate Led by Senator Paul Laxalt, the squads toured
states of senators who held key votes, speaking before
enthusiastic crowds of anti-treaty groups DeBpite
these efforts, however, the polls indicated a continued
decline in public opposition to the treaties

With the anti-treaty redia campaign in full swing,
the strategy for opposing the treaties On the Senate
floor was not yet developed Two senators were soar to
emerge as key actors in handling this aspect of the op-
position Senator James Allen was one of these, Allen
had initially used his chairmanship of the Judiciary
Subcommittee on Separation of Powers to promote treaty
opposition Prior to the floor debate, Allen and other
opponents of the treaties decided to forego the option
of a filibuster This was partly because treaty proce-
dures made such a maneuver questionable, and also be-
cause opponents believed they could block the treaties
in an ’up-cr-down" vote 2 ® A filibuster could have led
to charges that the opponents were afraid to let the
treaties come to a vote

Allen and the opponents planned to defeat the
treaties through the introduction and acceptance of
"killer amendments." The intention was to add amend-
ments that would substantively change the treaties,
thereby resulting in rejection by the Administration
and/or Panama This was similar to the strategy thLt

90

some senators used during the prolonged consideration
of the Treaty of Versailles following World War I, in
that case the Senate and President Woodrow Wilson be-
came bogged down in controversy over Senate-approved
reservations and the treaty never received the necess-
sary two-thirds approval.

Another treaty opponent who played a key role was
Robert Dole. Ironically, Dole was originally considered
a possible treaty supporter by the Administration. The
reasoning was that Dole had been President Ford's Vice-
Presidential running mate in the 1976 election, and had
supported Ford's policies. However, Dole soon let the
Administration know in not uncertain terms that he op-
posed the treaties, and he let it be known that presi-
dential ambitions for 1980 played a part in his deci-
sion. 29 Senator Dole riled Administration officials in
October 1977 by releasing a classified state Department
cable which indicated sharp differences between the U.S.
and Panama over the interpretation of intervention
rights. President Carter sought to head off the reper-
cussions from this incident by meeting with Senate lead-
ers the following week and that led to the October 14
Statement of Understanding. Dole followed this with ac-
cusations that General Torrijos' brother was involved in
drug trafficking. Attorney General Griffin Bell answered
those charges, asserting that General Torrijos had no
involvement in the drug business, and that his brother
had only been remotely involved in a single minor
incident.

Dole also offered a packet of treaty amendments to
the Foreign Relations Committee in an attempt to alter
some provisions that he considered too favorable to the
Panamanians. Although all of these amendments were re-
jected, this served as a clear indication of Dole's in-
tentions once the Senate debate began.

White House Efforts

As the Senate floor debate commenced on February 8,
the White House expressed guarded optimism for approval
of the treaties. During the "January blitz" several
previously uncommitted senators came out in support of
the treaties. The White House decided to let Majority
Leader Byrd handle the debate strategy and provide him
with whatever support was needed. As part of that sup-
port, Byrd and the White House officials agreed to es-
tablish an "operations center" in the Capitol to coor-
dinate the floor debate. The center provided senators
and staff with information on issues pertaining to the
treaties and served as a focal point for developing and
coordinating pro-treaty strategy.

The operations center was manned by officials from
the White House, and the Departments of State and

91

Defense, working moat closely with the staffs of Major-
ity Leader Byrd and the Foreign Relations Committee
Among the Administration officials. Ambler Moss and
Douglas Bonnet of the State Department coordinated in-
formation-gathering so that questions raised during the
debate could be quickly answered Mare importantly.
Moss, Bennet, Robert Eeckel, and other members of the
liaison team were available to senators throughout much
of the debate period and were able to help keep sup-
porters in line while encouraging uncommitted senators
to back the treaties

Overall, the information provided by the Admini-
stration was important in countering the arguments of
the opposition in the debate However, some tactical
errors were made in the Information process that set
back pro-treaty efforts The most prominent of these
errors occurred in the first weeks of the floor de-
bate The Administration had argued that the payments
to Panama for the canal up to the year 2000 would be
paid for by canal tolls, ahd, therefore, U S taxpayers
would pay nothing During the first week of floor de-
bate, Senator John Stennis (D-MissiEsippl ) , Chairman of
the Armed Services Committee, argued that his committee
estimated that the taxpayers’ costs could run as high
as SI 02 billion 30 Technically, the argument the Ad-
ministration was making night have been correct How-
ever, the costs of the implementing legislation and
transfer of the canal were not accounted for This was
seen by many as an effort to delude the Senate and the
public on the real costs of the treaties Byrd had
warned the Administration that this would be a trouble-
some issue, and the situation was defused only after a
thorough explanation of the costs of the treaties by
Byrd and Edmund Muskie, Chairman of the Senate Budget
Committee, on the Senate floor

As the final vote on the Neutrality Treaty neared,
the White House stepped up efforts to persuade the few
remaining uncommitted senators to support the treaties
President Carter and Deputy Secretary of State Warren
Christopher were particulery active on this front.
Treaty opponents claimed throughout the final week be-
fore the vote that the Administration was placing undue
pressure on some senators. And one treaty supporter
stated after the vote that President Carter had been
"heavy-handed" In hia dealings with senators. 31 How-
ever, other senators claimed that the President was
simply not that effective In his efforts at persuading
senators

Two key votes were those of Senators Sam Nunn and
Herman Taltnadge, both Ceorgla Democrats- Nunn was par-
ticularly important because of his influence in the Sen-
ate on defense issues. Administration officials met
with the two senators throughout the week of March 6-10
in an effort to secure theLr votes 32 Nunn and Talmadge

92

asserted at that time that they could not vote for the
treaties without some alterations. These meetings laid
the groundwork for later discussions by Senator Byrd
with Nunn and Talmadge that subsequently secured their
support.

A Critical Obstacle

The Administration pursued a similar course for win-
ning the vote of Senator Dennis DeConcini (D-Arizona).
DeConcini also believed that some alteration or improve-
ment would be necessary for his support. He met with
Christopher on several occasions to discuss a proposed
reservation to the Neutrality Treaty. DeConcini was
concerned about U.S. rights to keep the canal open in
the event of an internal crisis in Panama, e.g., a
strike. The Administration considered the proposal un-
acceptable, but felt compromise language could be de-
veloped so as not to lose the DeConcini vote. However,
no suitable language was forthcoming. The White House
decided to put' off DeConcini, a first-term senator,
thinking that he would abandon his position once the
treaty was on the line. 33

On March 15, the day before the vote on the Neu-
trality Treaty, DeConcini was still hinging his vote on
the acceptance of his proposed reservation. With the
outcome of the vote too close to call, President Carter
finally relented and approved the DeConcini reserva-
tion. 3 ’ The language of the reservation provided that
either the U.S. or Panama could independently "take
such steps as it deems necessary. . .including the use of
military force in Panama, to reopen the Canal or re-
store the operation of the Canal, as the case may be." 3 ^

When DeConcini submitted his reservation to the Sen-
ate on March 16, many senators were hesitant to support
the reservation and turned to Senator Byrd for counsel.
Byrd was preoccupied with vote counting and the floor
debate, however, and looked to the Administration for a
cue in responding to the proposal. 3 & As word circulated
that the White House had approved the reservation, con-
cern largely subsided. The reservation was then ap-
proved by a vote of 75-23. Later that evening the Sen-
ate voted 68-32 for advice and consent to ratification
of the Neutrality Treaty.

Approval of the Neutrality Treaty cleared what Ad-
ministration officials considered to be their most dif-
ficult obstacle. As long as no crisis developed or
blunders were made, approval of the Panama Canal Treaty
was well within reach. Unfortunately, a crisis did de-
velop, and the fate of the treaties once more hung in
the balance. On April 5, Panamanian Ambassador Gabriel
Lewis warned Frank Moore, Chief of Congressional Liaison
for the White House, that the White House and Senate

93

were not sufficiently avare of Panamanian dissatisfac-
tion with the DeConcini reservation. Levis urged that
the Senate take measures to mitigate the implications
of the reservation the following day General Torrijos
sent letters to Latin American heads of state and cer-
tain United Nations' officials regarding the concerns
of Panama over the DeCocini reservation 3 '

The White House seened surprised by the extent of
the Panananlan dissatisfaction. Presidential aide Ham-
ilton Jordan called General Torrijos and chided him for
distributing the letters Jordan warned the General
that Senate approval could be in danger unless an offi-
cial statement was made reiterating Panama's policy of
making no comments on the treaties until the Senate wae
finished debating 38 Torrijos, who had developed a warm
friendship with Jordan, issued such a statement later
that day

On April 8 Administration officials met with DeCon-
cini to discuss the need to alter the reservation.
DeConcini refused to budge, suggesting that the Pan-
amanians were bluffing, and later told newsmen that
Panamanian dissatisfaction was a problem for President
Carter and the State Department 39

As Panamanian reaction to the reservation grew more
antagonistic, there was concern that the stability of
the Torrijos government was threatened. The White House
considered it imperative to find a way to reassure Pana-
ma that the U S did not intend to intervene in its in-
ternal affairs, but at the some tine maintain the es-
sence of the reservation When efforts to negotiate a
compromise with DeConcini failed, the White House turned
to the Senate leadership to help resolve the problem

While the leadership worked with DeConcini, the Ad-
ministration turned its attention to Panama Accept-
ance of the DeConcini reservation had damaged the trust
established between Carter end Torrijos As a result,
Warren Christopher suggested that an intermediary might
help restore relations between U.S. and Panamanian of-
ficials to a sound footing The man Christopher had In
mind was William D. Rogers, a Washington lawyer and
former Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-toe r lean
Affairs Rogers knew Torrijos personally, and, in
fact, had already been contacted by the Panamanians for
advice on the implications cf the DeConcini reservation
In addition, Rogers had Republican connections, which
could make Senate approval of the arrangement easier.

The strategy to get a DeConcini compromise was to
have Christopher work with Senate leaders in discus-
sions with tfeCUmrini, while Rogers woriwrf with Anhassa-
dor Lewis to determine language that would be accept-
able to the Panamanians This arrangement finally suc-
ceeded with the formulation of Reservation ho. 1 to the
Panama Canal Treaty. This reservation was jointly sub-
mitted for Senate approval by nine senators, including

94

DeConcini, and was approved by a 73-27 vote. The new
language provided that any action taken by the United
States in the exercise of its treaty rights "shall be
only for the purpose of assuring that the Canal shall
remain open, neutral, secure, and accessible, and shall
not have as its purpose nor be interpreted as a right
of intervention in the internal affairs of the Republic
of Panama or interference with its political independ-
ence or sovereign integrity . " 4 ®

Last-Minute Threats

Once the DeConcini problem was taken care of, the
White House had only to wait for the debate to wind
down, or so it thought. However, going into the final
day of debate, three senators who had voted for the
Neutrality Treaty threatened to vote against the Panama
Canal Treaty. One of these, Howard Cannon (D-Nevada),
was holding out for acceptance of a proposed reserva-
tion dealing with interest payments by the Panama Canal
Commission. The reservation was a minor matter and was
subsequently approved by the Senate.

For Senators S. I. Hayakawa and James Abourezk {D-
South Dakota), the stakes were much higher. Hayakawa
complained that President Carter's foreign policy de-
cisions were making the U.S. "look like a weak nation,"
and demanded some reassurances from the White House
that that trend would not continue. The Senator
claimed later that in exchange for his vote for the
treaty, the White House agreed to consult with him on
foreign policy matters on a regular basis. This report
was denied by the White House.

Abourezk was upset not about the treaties, but
about natural gas deregulation legislation that was
under consideration by a House-Senate conference com-
mittee. It was a vivid example of how foreign policy
and domestic legislative interests can become entan-
gled. Abourezk, a strong foe of deregulation, was
incensed because the conferees were meeting behind
closed doors and he said that the conferees and the
Administration were "selling out" to the gas industry.
He threatened to vote 'no' to protest the secret
meetings. Finally, however, as one of the last
speakers in the lengthy treaty debate, Abourezk an-
nounced that he would vote for the treaty since he had
received assurances that the White House would
encourage "an open, democratic process" to resolve the
natural gas issue.

Even with Cannon, Hayakawa, and Abourezk in line,
the outcome of the Panama Canal Treaty was in suspense
until the final vote when it was approved 68-32.

95

Senate Proponents

During the week before the Senate floor debate
began. Administration officials had worked out an ar-
rangement with Majority Leader Byrd for debate strat-
egy It was agreed that any amendments to the treaties
beyond the leadership amendments could jeopardize rati-
fication Therefore, the position maintained by Sena-
tor Byrd thoughout the floor debate was that no addi-
tional amendments were acceptable Reservations and
understandings night be approved, but only after care-
ful scrutiny by Senate leaders. Administration offi-
cials, and Panamanian representatives All parties
agreed that Byrd would orchestrate the pro-treaty
strategy

The brunt of pro-treaty organization fell on the
staffs of Senator Byrd (Democratic Policy Committee)
and the foreign Relations Committee Throughout
January 197B these staff members pulled together the
staffs of other Senate Democrats and pro-treaty Repub-
licans in an effort to develop a "team approach" to the
floor debate The result was a five-point plan of pro-
treaty strategy

II To assure the presence of pro-treaty

senators on the floor during debate

1) To control or influence the course of the
debate forcing the opposition to react
rather than carry the fight

1) Because of the radio audience, pro-treaty
arguments and rebuttals to anti-treay
arguments must be readily available

4) Public and media perception would not
only be influenced by substantive points,
but also by the number and effectiveness
of individual senators

5) To track the opponents' statements to
determine who was identifiable with
certain issues

Pro-treaty forces decided that Senators Frank
Church (D-Idaho) and Paul Sarbanes (D-Maryland) of the
Foreign Relations Committee would be floor managers
during the debate. Along with Byrd, these two played
prominent roles in securing Senate approval of the
treaties They agreed that it would be most effective
to have various senators argue particular aspects of
the treaties For example, defense and security
aspects of the treaties would be debated by Senators
Clifford Case (ranking Republican on the Foreign Rela-
tions Committee] and John Glenn (a respected Democrat
on defense issues) 43 Coordinated with the staffs of

96

pro-treaty senators, this floor debate strategy proved
to be a success.

Part of the strategy to win support from uncommit-
ted senators was to allow certain reservations or
understandings to be approved that would not adversely
affect ratification. In this way senators would bo
able to say that they had improved the language or sub-
stance of the treaty. Throughout the debate Senator
Byrd worked with several senators to formulate the
necessary language for acceptable reservations. Sena-
tors Jennings Randolph (D-West Virginia) , Russell Long
(D-Louisiana) , Nunn, and Talmadge were among those who
submitted reservations in this manner and won Senate
approval.

When the debate began on February 8, the Senate
leadership counted 62 senators probably for the treat-
ies, and 28 against. Picking up the needed final five
votes proved to be difficult. On March 10, with the
vote on the Neutrality Treaty only a week a way, Sena-
tor Byrd was still short by at least 3-4 votes. In the
final days before the vote, Byrd and Warren Christopher
met several times with six uncommitted senators. This
group included Senators Nunn, Talmadge, Long, DeConci-
ni, Randolph, and Wendell Ford (D-Kentucky) . Reserva-
tions were subsequently worked out for Nunn and Tal-
madge, Long, and Randolph to win their support. But
Randolph was facing re-election in 1978 and was not
considered a "safe" vote. Senator Ford seemed the
least impressed by the arguments of Byrd and Christo-
pher, so DeConcini's vote became critical.

While Byrd was ironing out the Nunn/Talmadge reser-
vation, Senator DeConcini was trying to get White House
approval for his own reservation. Although the White
House had agreed to clear any additions to the treaty
through Byrd, approval of the DeConcini reservation ap-
peared to circumvent him. This seemed to be more a re-
sult of the pressure that the Administration and Senate
leaders were under at the time, rather than a purpose-
ful oversight.

After the Neutrality Treaty was approved, the goal
of the proponents was to hold senators in lino for the
vote on the Panama Canal Treaty, and avoid conflict as
much as possible. Trouble erupted, however, when news
broke of Torrijos letters to the United Nations. It
was evident that the impact of the DeConcini reserva-
tion in Panama had been misjudged. Initially, Senator
Byrd warned against over-reacting to the Panamanian
outcry, and suggested that it might blow over. But he
soon realized that this was not the case. Byrd worked
with Church and Sarbanes on a plan to defuse the issue
as quickly as possible. The plan was to have DeConcini
make a public statement disclaiming any U.S. intent to
interfere with Panama's internal affairs, and follow
this with a similar statement by Senators Byrd and

97

Baker on the day of the vote.^ 4 however, discussions
with Ambassador Gabriel Lewis node it clear that this
would not be sufficient to satisfy Panama.

Because of the interventionist implications of the
DeConcini reservation , several Senate libers Is threat-
ened to vote against the treaty. Senator Byrd quickly
formed a bipartisan team to keep the liberals in line
while a means of softening the DeConcini language was
found. Byrd's intent was ’to develop language that
would not be directed at the DeConcini reservation but
at the sane tine enunciate nonintervention
principles.

The Senate leadership had suggested to DeConcini
that a new reservation to the second treaty might be
submitted that would clarify the intent of his original
reservation on April 15. DeConcini presented to Byrd
a draft of a new reservation that he considered accept-
able Using this draft/ Byrd entered discussions with
Senators Church and Sarbanes. Deputy Secretary Christo-
pher, and Ambassador Lewis On Sunday, April 16. just
two days before the final vote, the language for the
new reservation was approved. It clarified U S adher-
ence to the policy of nonintervention. Ambassasor
Lewis proclaimed the measure *a dignified solution to a
difficult problem •‘* 6

Although the DeConcini problem had been resolved,
treaty proponents were unsure of its potential impact
on the final vote With the threatened defections of
Senators Cannon, Hayakawa, and Abourezk, the outcome of
the vote could not be predicted. Even Senator Byrd,
who had kept close tabB on all Senate iotea, was not
certain how it would turn out fittingly. It was Sena-
tor Robert Byrd who cast the decisive «7th vote

Senate Opponents

After public opinion became more favorable to the
treaties during January 1978, treaty opponents sought
to regain the initiative in their efforts to defeat the
treaties. Conservative political action groups contin-
ued to take the lead in persuading the public, and maes
Kail-ins remained the primary technique for exerting
outside pressure on senators

Within the Senate itself, treaty opponents began to
organize their strategy. The key opposition leader was
James Allen He had already made hla presence known by
using hia Subcommittee of the Separation of Powers as a
forum for treaty opponents His relentless role in
leading Senate opposition in the floor debate was to
make a lasting impression, a performance that fell just
short of legendary He died within weeks after the
Senate had completed the treaty debate.

Allen worked most closely with Senators Helms,

98

Thurmond , and Robert Griffin (R-Michigan ) . Their
efforts centered on the attempt to get approval of
"killer amendments." Since Majority Leader Byrd and
the Administration had made it clear that the only
amendments that would be accepted were the leadership
amendments, treaty opponents had to find a way to cir-
cumvent the leadership. The result was an effort to
amend ambiguous or controversial passages in the treat-
ies with language that senators would find difficult to
turn down.

During the first 10 days of the debate, opponents
submitted amendment after amendment. Senator Allen led
this barrage with 11 proposed amendments. But the Sen-
ate leadership succeeded in having these amendments
"tabled," rather than forcing senators to cast an "up-
or*-down" vote, on the amendments themselves. This pro-
cedure was important because it made it easier for un-
committed senators to turn down such amendments and
kept treaty proponents from having to vote against what
appeared on the surface to be very desirable amend-
ments. This practice continued throughout the floor
debate, and at one point spurred criticism from Senator
Edward Brooke (R-Massachusetts) , who was considered to
be a treaty supporter. Brooke argued that some of the
proposed amendments were "substantive" and should not
be subjected to tabling. Senator Byrd replied that he
would be willing to consider all remaining amendments
for an up-or-down vote if treaty opponents agreed to a
showdown vote on the treaties in just three days. That
offer was quickly rejected. 47

One of the first efforts by the opponents was to
have the treaties submitted for debate in the order in
which they were negotiated, i.e., the Panama Canal
Treaty first, then the Neutrality Treaty. Senator
Allen was aware of Byrd's purpose in having switched
the order, and assumed defeat of the treaties would be
easier if it were reversed. But Allen's proposal was
rejected by a vote of 67-30. This was considered the
first "test vote" on the treaties' chances of Senate
approval.

After the Neutrality Treaty was approved, the oppo-
nents ' hopes for defeating the treaties were severly
undercut. Two developments during the Panama Canal
Treaty debate, however, revived the possibility of
rejection.

The first of these was a proposed amendment by Sen-
ator Orrin Hatch (R-Utah). The Hatch amendment pro-
posed that the treaty would not enter into force until
the Congress had disposed of, or had authorized, dispo-
sition of, all D.S. property in the Canal Zone. This
would have had the effect of including the House of Re-
presentatives in the transfer of the canal to Panama.
The Senate debated the amendment for three full days,
and treaty opponents claimed they would garner at least

$9

45 votes in favor of the amendment. However, the
amendment was finally tabled by a 58-37 vote This was
a setback for treaty opponents, although Hatch noted
that the 37 "no“ votes wore three more than would be
needed to defeat the treaty 53

The second development that encouraged treaty oppo-
sition was the DeConcini controversy Treaty opponents
considered the Torrijos letter to ON officials an at-
tempt to pressure the Senate to strike the DeConcini
reservation and ratify the treaties as they were. They
also used the controversy to point to the problems of
interpretation that the treaties would create if rati-
fied. Senator Laxalt claimed that the DeConcini affair
would have enough impact to cause at leaat five sena-
tors to switch their voting position he predicted
that the Panama Canal Treaty would be defeated with as
many as 38-39 opposition votes *9 put it turned out to
be just another storm weathered by treaty proponents
On the day of the final vote, 10 amendments were pro-
posed in a last-ditch effort to kill the treaties, all
were tabled

Fxe cut ive- Legislative Interaction

Advice and consent to ratification of the Panama
Canal Treaties was formally approved on April 16, 1978,
with Senate passage of the second of the two treaties.
Securing Senate approval for the treaties was a result
of extensive executive-legislative interaction coopera-
tion. Despite that success, however, the process had
serious defects. By identifying those defects along
with the areas of success, the lessens for future
executive-legislative interaction on foreign policy
issues nay be better understood.

The Carter Administration was particularly success-
ful on two fronts. In its efforts to influence public
opinion, the Administration concentrated on persuading
•opinion-makers * This group vae made up of local
officials, editorialist, educators , labor leaders, and
political activists. Although the success In influenc-
ing public opinion was uneven at times, it proved to be
vitally important, given the emotional nature of the
Panama Canal issue.

The second area that was handled well by the Admin-
istration was tho network of cooperation established
Aftonp the White House.. the State Department^ and Senate
leadership This was especially evident during the
floor debate In particular, State Department and Sen-
ate Btaff played key roles in maintaining communication
and implementing the pre-planned strategy But it was
the ability to resolve unexpected crises (e g , cost of
treaties, DeConcini reservation) that made this effort
extraordinary.

100

The decision by President Carter to let Senator
Byrd handle the Senate debate nay well have been his
most important decision on the Canal Treaties. The
Carter White House was often seen as insensitive to the
pressure on members of the Senate, and allowing Byrd to
conduct the pro-treaty efforts helped to get around
this problem. The reliance on Byrd became more acute
as the vote on the treaties neared. It was Byrd who
played the lead role in winning support from Senators
Nunn, Talmadge, and DeConcini after the White House had
failed to do do. Senator Byrd recognized the concern
of many senators over the interpretation of some of the
ambiguous passages of the treaty. He accepted the fact
that adoption of some reservations and understandings
might be necessary. As a result, Byrd took the role of
prodding the Administration to consider the problems in
the Senate and show a willingness to compromise. Like-
wise, he worked at persuading senators to recognize the
problems faced by the Administration and Panama.

The trips to Panama by Senators Byrd and Baker were
dramatic examples of the Senate '6 active role in the
treaty process. The direct discussions and "negotia-
tions" with the Panamanians were a significant factor
in winning Senate approval. The discussions by Byrd
and Baker with Torrijos helped to impress upon him the
difficulty of securing Senate approval. At the same
time, the senators become more familiar with the
issues, which contributed to their support of the
treaties.

The opposition forces lacked the power of the White
House and the Senate leadership, but gained substantial
mileage from the emotional nature of the issue. Their
lobbying effort was concentrated at "grass-roots" lev-
els, and was dominated by well-organized conservative
groups. However, these groups tended to operate on
their own, and, as a result, the opposition movement
lacked the unity of overall organization. Neverthe-
less, treaty opponents in the Senate almost succeeded
in defeating the treaties.

Among the more serious defects cf the Canal Treaty
process was the extensive political capital that the
Carter Administration was required to expend to win
Senate approval. President Carter could not afford to
lose the ratification fight because of the encumbering
effect it would have on his ability to execute the du-
ties of his office. But the case of the Panama Canal
Treaties proved that the cost of winning can also be
high. The highly emotional Panama Canal issue rallied
political conservatives in opposition to the Carter
Presidency, and was a significant factor in advancing
the candidacy of Ronald Reagan for the 1980 election.
Even many of the treaty supporters could not be counted
on once the treaty debate was over. They had gone out
on a limb for the President, and were reluctant to do

101

so again.

ft ma lor issue during the Senate debate was whether
senators should vote in support of what they perceived
to be the national interest, even if they fcnew it was
contrary to the sentiaentfl of the Majority of their
conatLuente Senator Byrd praised the courage of his
colleagues who, in hiB view, put the national interest
above political popularity.

Support for the Canal Treaties became an issue in
many subsequent senatorial campaigns and was a contri-
buting factor in defeating some senators, partieulary
Thomas McIntyre of Hew Hampshire in 197B, and was used
against several Democratic treaty supporters who lost
in 1980, By the 1962 elections, the Issue seemed to
have diminished. Efforts to use the issue against such
treaty supporters as ayrd and tloyd Bentsen (p-Teras)
were unsuccessful in 1962

The controversy over the DeCcncinf reservation
points to an even more serious problem in the treaty
process In this cose, a junior senator with little
political clout van able to surmount the authoity of
the White House mainly because of the closeness of the
treaty vote Mishandling by the Carter Administration
may also be partly to blamo, but the point remains a
potential problem for future treaty consideration
(See Chapter 7 )

Another aspect of the DeConcinl reservation that
caused problems waB the failure of the White House, the
State Department, and the Senate to anticipate the ex-
tent of Panamanian reaction to the reservation. If the
Senate is going to alter a treaty, whether by amend-
ment, reservation, or understanding, treaty advocates
muBt be sure that the treaty will not be rejected in
the process. The PcConclni reservation was aggravated
by what General Torrijoa described as the "steady flow
of criticism" from treaty opponents This criticism,
coupled with the interventionist nature of the reserva-
tion, antagonized the Panamanians and helped to detract
from the original purpose of the treaties, i,e , better
United Stotes-Panamanlen relations.

Conclusion

The treaty process is one of the few areas of for-
eign policy in which the Constitution specifically au-
thorized the executive and legislative branches to
share responsibilities. Since the legislative branch
has played an increasingly assertive role in that
process in recent years, the executive branch must find
vayB to better accommodate this more active congres-
sional role.

In the case of the Panama Canal Treaties, it is
evident from the Senate's actions that the Senate was

102

intent on playing a major role. The Carter Administra-
tion had negotiated what it believed to be the best
possible treaty for the United States that would still
have been acceptable to Panama. nevertheless, the Sen-
ate was in a position to demand what amounted to rene-
gotiation of certain aspects of the treaties. These
Senate changes required additional concessions by
Panama. Under the circumstances, the Panamanians were
faced with accepting the Senate revisions up to a
point, or having the treaties rejected altogether. As
the experience with the DeConcini reservation clearly
indicates, there was a fine line between what was con-
sidered desirable by the U.S. domestic interests — and
what was considered acceptable to Panamanian domestic
interests .

The consultation process is one area where the ex-
ecutive branch could promote cooperation with the Con-
gress in treaty-making. For example, the Panama Canal
Treaties were negotiated over a 13-year period during
which consultation with the Congress amounted to little
more than "briefings" on the progress of the negotia-
tions. President Carter made the decision to pursue
the treaties • with Panama before he was even inaugur-
ated, and his consultations with Congress during those
early months of negotiations were not extensive. Had
the President consulted Congress more carefully, he
might have better understood the opposition the treat-
ies were facing, and some of the Senate’s objections to
certain aspects of the treaties.

In fairness to the successive administrations that
negotiated the treaties, a consistent, in-depth consul-
tation would have been difficult under any circum-
stances because of the very length of the negotiations,
and the significant anti-treaty sentiment in the Con-
gress throughout that period. As far as the Carter Ad-
ministration is concerned, even if President Carter had
been more aware of public and congressional opposition
earlier, he might have chosen to go through with the
treaties anyway, because of foreign policy considera-
tions. In any case, consultation during negotiations
might not help avoid Senate objections to aspects of a
treaty. The fact remains that there will be cases when
the Senate will want to formally put its mark on a
treaty, and a clear way of doing this is by making al-
terations. In such instances, the executive branch
will not be able to foresee all the contingencies, and
can only try to minimize any changes.

It is worth noting that developing cooperation
between the executive and legislative branches in
treaty-making is not a new problem. Indeed, even Pres-
ident George Washington was frustrated by the process.
In one instance, President Washington personally car-
ried a negotiated treaty to the Senate, and remained
through-out the debate to answer questions and make

103

clarifications. But by the time the Senate wan through
debating and making alterations, the President was so
perturbed, according to Vice-President John Mams, that
he left the Senate chamber saying, "ha would bo damned
if he ever went there again.* 51

The Panama Canal Treaties were yet another step in
developing the treaty-making process, and an experience
that could lead to a more effective, consistent, and
workable fcreaty-aakirg relationship between the execu-
tive and legislative branches The lessons of the
Panama Canal Treaties suggest that the executive branch
must expect an active Senate role on major treaties,
and that the consultation process must be used to the
fullest extent possible Even with that consultation,
the Senate may insist on putting ats nark on a treaty.

I Cecil V Crabb, Jr , and Pat m Holt, Invita-
tion to .Struggle Congress, the President, and Foreign

3 Hedrick Smith, "White Rouse Opens Drive to Win
Senate Approval of Canal Accord,* The Hew York Times ,
August 12, 1977, pi

4 Chronologies . International Relations Commit-

tee, 1977, p l«l

5 Marjorie Hunter, "White House is lobbying Un-
usually Hard on Canal Pacts,* The Hew York Times ,
September Z, 1977, p.2

6 Interview with Hoyt Purvie, former Foreign
Policy Advisor to Senator Robert Byrd, March 5, 1982.

?. Congressional Quarterly , vcl. 35, no. 30,

September 5TJ 1977, ^72033-2034; see also, "Picking Up
the Pieces," Newsweek, October 3, 1977, pp. 22-27,

B, Chronologies , International Relations Commit-

tee, 1977TpTBir

9. Congressional Quarterly , vol.36, February 4,
1978, PP 316-317.

10 Interview with Hoyt Purvis, March 5, 1982

11. *£yrd Expects Reservations to be Added to

Pacts," The New York Times , September 25, 1977, p 8

12. U.S Congress, Senate, Report of the Senator-
ial Delegation to the Republic of Panama, November

104

13. Letter from General Omar Torrijos H., Chief of
State, Panama, to Robert Byrd, Majority Leader, U.S.
Senate, December '3, 1977.

14. C. L. Sulzberger, "Panama and U.S. Policy,"
The New York Times , November 9, 1977, p.25.- '

15. Letter from Office of the Majority Leader,
U.S. Senate, to all Senators, February 2, 1978.

16. Joseph Lelyveld, "The Path to 1980," The New
York Times , October 2, 1977, p.110.

17. Adam Clymer, "Baker Says Senate Won't Approve
Canal Pacts Without Changes," The New York Times ,
January 5, 1978, p.10.

18. Interview with Hoyt Purvis, March 5, 1982.

19. Ibid.

20. Congressional Quarterly , February 4, 1978,

pp. 316-317.

21. Lelyveld, The New York Times , October 2, 1977,

p.110.

22. Chronologies , International Relations Commit-
tee, 1977, p.140.

23. Adam Clymer, "Conservatives Map Drive Against

the Canal Treaty," The New York Times , August 16, 1977,

p.7.

24. Congressional Quarterly , vol.35, September 10,
1977, pp. 1922-1923.

25. Adam Clymer, The New York Times , August 16,

1977, p.7.

26. Library of Congress, Congressional Research

Service, Panama Canal Treaties: Consideration by the

Congress , Issue Brief IB 78026, July 28, 1978, p.38.

27. Adam Clymer, The New York Times , January 5,

1978, p.10.

28. Conqressionaly Quarterly , September' 24, 1977,

pp. 2033-2034.

29. Lelyveld, The New York Times , October 2, 1977,
p.110.

30. "Carter Wins With ’Good Old Boys, 1 " Washington
Star , March 17, 197B, p.l.

31. Ibid.

32. Congressional Quarterly Almanac , 1978,

pp. 393-394.

33. Robert Kaiser, "Panama Raises Challenge to
Treaty," Washington Post , April 7, 1978, p.l.

34. Congressional Quarterly Almanac , 1978,

p.393-394.

35. Elaine Adams, ed., American Foreign Rela-
tions: 1978 , (New York: NYU Press, 1979), p.83.

36. Interview with Hoyt Purvis, April 13, 1982.

37. Chronologies , International Relations Commit-
tee, 1978, p.235.

38. "The Engineering Feat Behind the Canal
Treaties Began on a Bleak Day," Washington Post , April
24, 1978, p.l.

105

39. ‘Canal Showdown," Newsweek, April 24, L97B,

P 27

40 American Forelonjtelafcipns i I97S . p.85
41. Robert Raiser, "Senate Approves Pinal Canal

Treaty," Washington Post , April 19, 1978, pp 1,23.

<2. Memorandum Mary Jane Checchi, Aide to Sena-

tor Robert Byrd, to Royt Purvis, February 17, 1978

43 Ibid

44 'Canal Showdown," Newsweek, April 24, 1979,

P 27

45 Congressional Quarterly Ainanac , 1979, p 396
46. Congressional Quarterly Almanac , 197B, p.396.

47 Chronologies , 1978, p 234

48 Congressional Quarterly Almanac , 197B, p 394
49. Newsweek , April 24, 1978, p 28

50 Letter General Omar Torrlios to Senator
Robert Dyrd, April 22, 1978

51 US Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign
Relations, Tfte_Role_£f_the_^£n£^£__ir__7^eat^_^atiji-
catlon , 95th Cong” , 1st 8 ess , 1977,” p Y4

5

Congress, Country X,
and Arms Sales

Hoyt Purvis
John Opperman
Jura C ampanella

During the past two decades arms sales have become
an increasingly significant element of United -States
foreign policy, and Congress has gradually staked out
for itself a role in which it can be influential on
arms sales policies.

Arms sales, as Andrew J. Pierre has written, have
become a crucial dimension of world politics. "Arms
sales are far more than an economic occurence, a mili-
tary relationship, or an arms control challenge— arms
sales are foreign policy writ large. "1

The nature of U.S. arms transfers began to shift
from grants to sales in the 1960s. Before the Kennedy
Administration, most American weapons transfers to de-
veloping countries were in the form of grant aid. The
sales push began in the early 196Qs, with Iran becoming
a major customer. In fiscal year 1958, the U.S. gave
away $1.96 billion and sold $230 million worth of weap-
ons; by fiscal year 1968, grant aid was down to $466
million, while sales were up to $1.5 billion. 2 This
switch from aid to sales was strongly urged by many in
Congress. Those arguing for the shift believed that
the U.S. could no longer afford to "give away" large
quantities of weapons. But, as the shift occurred,
Congress found itself largely excluded from participa-
tion in arms sales to particular -countries. Over a
period of years Congress made a number of efforts to
attempt to increase its role in the arms sales decision
process. The best known of these was the landmark
Nelson-Bingham amendment of 1974, and the International
Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of
1976, which did assure a stronger rqle for Congress in
arms transfer policies.

Origins of Congressional Involvement

The first significant instance of a congressional

106

107

attempt to limit the executive domination of the arms
sales field occurred in 1957 it followed a Senate
Foreign Relations Concittee staff study which disclosed
that the Department of Defense and the Export- Import
Dank (Eximbankj had developed an Intricate procedure
for financing arms exports that was circumventing Con-
gress, 3 When this practice cane to light, it stirred
strong congressional opposition The Exinbank had been
lending to the Department of Defense, which then used
the loans to finance arms sales to developing countries
to which Exlmbank was not otherwise prepared to extend
credit. In this way the Eximbank provided the finance
but did not deal with the buyer or even know the buy-
er's identity Hence the loans were called "Country X

Loans** The loans were not publicized, and before
their "discovery* in 1957, the role of the Eximbark m
arms sales was mentioned only in an occasional phrase
in the Department of Defense mutual aid statements
From 1965-1957 , the Country X program financed wore
than $600 million in military equipment to 14 develop-
ing countries *

The Foreign Relations Committee's staff report re-
vealed that overall arms sales had been rising at a
rapid rate and that an ever-increasing revolving ac-
count, originally authorised by the Mutual Security Act
of 1957, was permitting the Department of Defense to
put the guarantee of the C S government behind more
than a billion dollars in military credits The pat-
tern suggested by the committee staff analysis was
symptomatic of the broader trend in poat-World War II
foreign policy Gradually, the executive was exercis-
ing more and more authority, with relatively little
congressional involvement and oversight. The study in-
dicated that legislation regarding the regulation of
arms sales (the Export Control Act of 1949 and the
Mutual Security Act qf 1954 and amendments to these
acts) was not being adhered to by the executive, 5 How-
ever, at the time the Department of Defense was not
even required by Congress to submit comprehensive re-
ports on export sales, nor to indicate how the military
assistance credit account was being used.

Background to Country X

Executive branch officials were eager to maintain
American influence and protect what they perceived to
be American security Interests by using foreign assist-
ance as an element of tJ*5. security policy But they
were faced with growing congressional resistance to
foreign assistance, even if it was primarily military
or "security" assistance. During the Kennedy and John-
son Administrations, secretary of Defense Robert
McKamara believed that the Military Assistance Program

108

(HAP) was suffering from its identification with for-
eign aid. (Years later, as President of the World
Bank, McNamara was a staunch advocate of international
economic assistance.) He wanted to transfer the mili-
tary assistance program to the Department of Defense
budget and away from the State Department.

Congressional leaders opposed the switch, however.
Thomas E. Morgan (D- Pennsylvania) , Chairman of the
House Committee on Foreign Affairs, , responding to a
request from McNamara for his opinion of the proposal,
informed the Defense Secretary: "A separation of the
military aid program from economic assistance would, in
my judgment, result in a drastic curtailment of econom-
ic aid... I do not regard this proposal as sound and I
would regard its acceptance by the executive and the
Congress as creating major, and perhaps insuperable,
problems in the implementation of our foreign policy." 6

Having failed in this effort, Defense officials
sought alternative jneans of accomplishing their goal of
expanding military assistance. The result -was an
amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1964,. which
allowed the Department of Defense to use the revolving
fund to guarantee credit extended by any "individual,
corporation, partnership, or other association doing
business in the United States" for the purchase of
military equipment. ?

The new provisions for financing credit sales gave
birth to Exim's Country X loans, in fiscal year 1965,
Exim provided just $9 million in credit to developing
countries for arms purchases, while private banks ex-
tended almost $49 million. This appeared to be in line
with what the Johnson Administration set out to achieve
— to have private banks finance arms credit sales to
the fullest extent possible. However, by year's end
the money market situation had grown so tight that com-
mercial banks were unwilling to finance arms sales.
Exim was the alternative, and an increasingly attract-
ive one because of its lower-than-market interest rates.

While the guarantee authority allowed more partici-
pation by Exim in foreign arms sales, the volume of
such loans did not increase significantly. Discussions
between Department of Defense and Exim led to another
proposal for inclusion in the foreign aid legislation
of 1965.® Because of the revolving fund limits, the
Department of Defense sought to expand the guarantee
authority by requiring that only 25 percent of any
credit extended by Exim or other banks be guaranteed by
the Department of Defense. In other words, a $10 mil-
lion Exim loan would require the Department of Defense
to provide a guarantee of just $2.5 million instead of
the full $10 million. This could have the effect of
increasing the guaranteed credit sales fourfold, with-
out an increase in appropriations. In fact, after Con-
gress approved the authority, credit sales increased

109

from $68 million in fiscal year 1965 to $289 million in
fiscal year 1966 For Exlm, credit arms sales in-
creased from $9 million in fiscal year 1965 to $281
million in fiscal year 196$

Congressional Involvement

Although Congress had provided the legislative
authority for the Country X loons, the program remained
veiled from the legislative branch In 1967, when the
program became publicly controversial, President Harold
Linder of the Eximbank asserted that he had consulted
with the chairmen of the House and Senate Banking and
Currency committees before Exim had begun financing the
arms sales s However, both of those chairmen had left
office by 1967, and, in any case, neither of those com-
mittees was involved with foreign policy

The first inkling of congressional opposition to
Exlm's involvement in arms sales came in 1966 during
consideration of foreign aid appropriations Senator
Allen Ellender of Louisiana strongly questioned the
Exim financing Actually, Ellender'a questioning was
spurred by the Xashmir conflict between India and Paki-
stan and an escalating arms race in Latin America At
that time he did not know the extent of Exim financing
of sales to developing countries, but considered any
such financing to be improper within the context of the
bank's charter In defending the financing policies,
McNamara pointed to the congressional insistence on
moving from arms grants to arms sales He also
stressed the political risks to private banks in fi-
nancing arms sales, and, as a result, the need for Exim
financing,^ 0

In late 1966, Linder expressed his concern to the
white House about possible problems facing legislation
which would extend the life of the bank. But the White
House assured Linder that Exim legislation was not in
Jeopardy* and when President Johnson sent the Exim bill
to Congress in January 1967, the role of the bank in
financing arms was not expected to be a problem H

However, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's
staff report in January 1967, flagged the issue of arms
sales end heightened the committee's concern the

study, written by committee consultant William B
Bader, called for a reappraisal of the adequacy of the
machinery of policy control and legislative oversight
PCvatjt lap the sale of arms. 12 Bader,, who later served
as the committee's staff director under Senator Frank
Church, 1979-1980, recalled that at the time the 1967
report was written the committee haa only a small
staff, and he drafted the report which wae then re-
viewed only by the staff director, Carl Harcy, and by
Chairman Fulbright. Meanwhile, the executive branch

u ~c large numbers of people working on arrr- triir:*f<-r

The Arab-Isrseli War in June 1967 (the fix !"'•>«
Ker) wr.' another factor contributing to congress 2 e*'t
concern about arrs sales. The U.S. had supplied vm- •
or.r to both rides in the conflict. (In the case c(
Israel, the U.5- did not begin selling it arcs until
ISO, but altCT 1967 became almost the sole extern,'',
srrr source for Israel. In sore cases Congress ««<•'!
the executive to go beyond what it planned to sell
Israel , and the sales frequently were rade on highl’j
favorable "forgiveness" torr'S.)

In examining the U.S. role in regional arms racer
in 1 967, congressional committees began to scrutlr.lfe
the Country X loan program. The program, core under
fire on three countG: the circumvention of Congrcrr;
the impact on regional arms races; and the concern tint
developing countries were diverting capital from eco-
nomic development in order to purchase military equip*
rent. with sore members of Congress outraged at the
"backdoor" aspects of arms financing, the legislation
extending the life of the Export-Import Dank and In*
creasing its lending authority became the subject of
controversy. The House and Senate Banking Committees
had approved the bill in the spring of 1967, but the
legislation was delayed after arrs sales becare a hot
irriie. The Senate committee hold further hearings on
th*‘ legislation and reported the bill with an nrendr«pt
expressing the sense of Congress that the bank should
not be involved in Country X loans. The committee re-
port asserted that there van no explicit authority for
r.xir financing of arrs sales in its charter or legisla-
tive hirtory. 1 *

Another concern of some members of Congress was
that major arm salee policy decisions were being made
ct riddle levels of government. Senator Stuart Syrir.g-
ten (D-Kicr.ouri ) was the first to raise this ratter,
questioning the role of the Department of Defence's
Henry Kust, Deputy Secretary of Defense for interna-
tional bogisticc negotiations. Kucs was in charge of
all arms calcs negotiations for the Department of De-
fence, and his role in the booming arrs trade business
vac being widely publicised. He was described in new
articles as the Pentagon's "super-salesman, * and v£e
quoted as caving that U.S. arms sales would ooor. reach
$2 billion as year.*- 1

Members of Congress were concerned that the Defense
Department had become too involved with errs manufac-
turers, and that the two were combining to direct arrs
sales policy. Although supervision of arms trar.efere
was supposed to be under the Secretary of State's au-
thority, the words end actions cf Administration offi-
cials left strong doubt that this was the case. ft.
3uly 1967 the Foreign Relations Committee vas told thft

Ill

arms sales were coordinated by a “Senior Interdepart-
mental Croup " This group was made up of officials
from Departments of State and Defense, with occasional
attendance by officials from the Agency for Interna-
tional Development (AID), Treasury, the Anns Control
and Disarmament Agency CACDAi, and the Bureau of the
Budget (BOB) • When Senator Albert Gore (D-Tennessee)
questioned the role of the Interdepartmental Group in
specific Country X sales to Iran, Morocco, Argentina,
and Jordan, it was found that the group met on only one
of these sales [MorrceoW and that representatives from
Treasury, the Anns Control and Disarmament Agency, and
the Bureau of the Budget did not meet with the group at
that instance

The chairman of the Interdepartmental Group, Jef-
frey Kitchen, Deputy ASBietant Secretary of State for
Politico-Military Affairs, indicated that his job was
to coordinate arms sales with the Department of Defense
and Insure that all sales were made with State Depart-
ment 'leadership and guidance “ Nonetheless, upon
questioning by Symington, Kitchen admitted that he Knew
little about Country X loans, and, in fact, seemed to
know less than the staff of the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee Secretary McNamara tried to clear up
the confusion in his testimony before the committee
He explained that the Department of Defense had the
primary responsibility for arms Bales decisions and
that -the Department of State was often 'less informed*
on those matters as a result l 7 This wag contradictory
to the 1963 directive by President Johnson that the
Secretary of State be responsible for all arras trans-
fers, a position that the President had reiterated in a
1966 message to Congress on foreign policy 18 McNamara
also said that the Exim Bank could deny any request
mode for financing by the Department of Defense How-
ever, he acknowledged that Exim had never turned down
such a request, Harold binder of Exim said that his
understanding was that all Country X loan requests re-
quired a presidential determination

The Legislative Struggle

With Congress queationing Administration procedures
and Senator Frank Church of the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee making a speech attacking the Administration's
arms sales policies, sene Johnson White Mouse officials
wanted to counter the charges. There was a particular
concern about Church's claim that balance-of-payments
considerations were overriding foreign policy White
House officials began working on a reply, and received
help from Rubs' office at the Department of Defense
The initial reply was rejected by presidential aides
when it was discovered that State Department officials

112

had not been involved in the drafting. 20 Later, a for-
mal statement on arms sales policy was forwarded to the
President, with the support of the Departments of state
and Defense and several presidential aides. The only
definite voice of dissent was the President's National
Security Adviser, Walt Rostow. He advised the Presi-
dent no to make a statement at that time because of the
continuing sensitivity of the Middle East situation,
Rostow 's argument won out, and no statement was made.

But the controversy continued in Congress. After
more hearings, the Senate took up the Exim legislation
in August 1967 and there were efforts to attach amend-
ments to tighten the "sense-of -Congress" provision ap-
proved by the Banking Committee. An amendment by Sena-
tors Ellender and Joseph Clark (D- Pennsylvania) to
flatly prohibit the bank from financing arms sales to
developing countries was defeated 49-40, leaving the
committee's language intact.

The companion bill in the House originally con-
tained no restrictions on arms sales. However, the
growing congressional concern over the issue resulted
in an effort in the House Banking Committee, led by
Representatives William Widnall (R-New York) and Henry
Reuss (D-Wisconsin) , to prevent the Country X loans.
Committee Chairman Wright Patman (D-Texas ) , a strong
Administration backer, headed the opposition to these
efforts. ,As a compromise, a Reuss amendment, which in-
cluded an important' presidential waiver, was accepted
by the committee. The amendment called for discontinu-
ation of Exim financing of arms sales to less-developed
countries, but it also empowered the President to ap-
prove such financing if it was necessary for "national
security. " 22

Pinal action on the Exim bill was delayed, however,
as the prolonged controversy spilled over into other
legislative debates. This is a typical pattern in Con-
gress. When an issue generates major interest, members
often find a variety of vehicles for debating and act-
ing on that issue. Congress gets at least two cracks
at many issues because of the dual process of authori-
zation and appropriations bills. (For example, the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee and House Foreign
Affairs Committee consider foreign aid authorizing leg-
islation before it goes to the Senate or House floor;
similarly, the House and Senate Appropriations Commit-
tees act on the funding bills for foreign aid and for-
ward them to the full House and Senate for final ac-
tion. In some cases, there is still a further oppor-
tunity for action in the conference committees and on
conference reports.)

In this case, both the foreign aid authorization
and appropriations bills, as well as the Exim Bank ex-
tension bill, contained arms sales provisions and dealt
with the Country X revolving fund.

113

Already facing severe reductions in its foreign aid
proposals, with Congress cutting the authorisation lev-
el to the lowest in the 20-year history of U S aid,
the Administration was forced to defer its efforts to
secure passage of the Exim bill because of problems
surrounding the aid bill. The aid bill reported to the
Senate by the Foreign Pelations Committee included an
amendment by Frank Church to repeal at the end of 1967
the Pentagon's authority to maintain a revolving fund
A strong lobbying effort ms mounted by the Administra-
tion as the Senate nested action on the aid legisla-
tion Administration officials argued that elimination
of the Country X loans would threatened the security of
Israel, and several members of Congress acknowledged
that they were lobbied by American Jewish organizations
to support the Country X program 23 In addition, the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Earle
Wheeler, warned the Senate Armed Services Committee
that cuts in military assistance would invite Soviet
and Chinese aggression.

On the day of the Senate vote, key senators met
with Administration officials who were attempting to
enlist support for an amendment by Senators Henry Jack-
son ID-Washlngton) and John Tower (R-Texaa) The Ad-
ministration was represented at the meetings in Major-
ity Leader Mike Kanfield’s office by Paul Nitre, Deputy
Secretary of Defense} William Gaud, Administrator of
the Agency for International Development (AID), and
Nicholas Katrenbaeh, Under Secretary of State During
the discussion, senators discovered that there was a
provision in the proposed amendment that, in effect,
not only kept the Department of Defense revolving fund
Intact, but allowed it to be replenished through a dis-
counting mechanism with Exim Several senators saw
this as an attempt by the Administration to mislead
them, and angrily left Mansfield’s office Senators
Fuibright and Symington, increasingly at odds with the
Administration over Vietnam and other Issues, charged
that there had been a effort to dupe Congress through a
lobbying effort as intense as they had seen in their
years in Washington Some senators said they switched
their votes ea a result of the episode in Nanficld's
office. Fuibright eaid the Country X program "had been
very successfully concealed from Congress," 2 * and Sym-
ington referred to "the indiscriminate selling of arms,
at times clearly without the knowledge, let alone ap-
proval of the Congress * 2 ^

During the Senate debate, Senator Wayne Morse of
Oregon, who had been one of ohly two senators voting
against the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin resolution, charged
that the Jackson-Tower amendment was "another of the
many instances where the Pentagon seeks blank-check
powers from Congress.” 2 *’ However, Jackson maintained
that a President "needs flexibility— freedom to deal

114

with each individual request for arms and equipment on
its merit in the light of the developing situation at
the time." 27 And Republican Whip Thomas Kuchel sup-
porting Jackson and Tower said, "I am not going to
place the man in the White House in a strait jacket. " 2 &
He quoted a Los Angeles Times editorial stating that
Congress seemed determined to "hamstring the executive
branch in its handling of delicate foreign policy
situations. "29

But Church said the real issue was whether the For-
eign Relations Committee and Congress were going to
"reestablish adequate congressional surveillance and
control" over military assistance. Opposing efforts to
simply require that Congress be informed after the fact
about arms sales, Church said, "Closer congressional
supervision requires that they first tell us how they
plan to disburse the arms, where they are to be placed,
whether *'by sale or grant. Only then will we be in a
position to know whether we want to give or continuing
approval to the program or make changes in it. "30

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee had become a
stronghold of opposition to Johnson Administration for-
eign policy. Another member of that committee was Eu-
gene McCarthy, who took issue with suggestions that by
placing a measure of congressional control over arms
sales the Senate would somehow be undermining national
security. McCarthy said the Senate was simply seeking
a share in decision-making instead of leaving every-
thing to those in the Pentagon on the assumption that
"they are so wise and all-knowing that we should not
question the procedure. "31 (Later in 1967 McCarthy an-
nounced his candidacy for the Democratic presidential
nomination. Although his candidacy was not successful,
many believed it was a factor in Johnson's 1968 decis-
ion not to seek re-election.)

With the group of activist Democrats from the For-
eign Relations Committee leading the way, the Senate
rejected the Jackson-Tower amendment 50-43. Tower then
proposed a similar amendment, still restoring the re-
volving fund, but on a more restricted basis. Tower's
amendment was defeated by one vote, 46-45.32

Congressional Restrictions

The bill reported by the House Foreign Affairs Com-
mittee contained no restrictions on the revolving fund.
Indeed, the bill approved by that committee included an
Administration -backed provision which would have ena-
bled the Defense Department to buy promissory notes be-
ing held by U.S. arms manufacturers who sold weapons to
foreign governments. As was also provided in the un-
successful Tower amendment, such notes would then be
sola to 0.S. financial institutions. When the measure

115

vent to the Rouse floor, widrall was successful In
amending the bill to eliminate the promissory note pro-
vision, overriding the lobbying efforts of both the
Johnson Administration and the arms manufacturers

The Conference Committee charged with resolving the
differences between the Rouse and Senate versions re-
mained deadlocked from September 14 until November 2,
1967, because of the controversy over the arms sales
provisions The Adr.ir.istr at ion suggested transferring
the loon authority from the Defense Department to the
President. House conferees were willing to go along,
but Senate conferees balked, insisting that the pro-
posal would change nothing Neanwhile, the House pro-
ceeded to act on the foreign aid appropriations bill
The House Appropriations Committee attached language
proposed by Representative SilviD Conte (R-Massachu-
settsj that would prevent the sale of sophisticated
weapons to all developing countries except Greece, Tur-
key, Iran, Israel, Nationalist China (Taiwan), South
Korea, and the Philippines Working through Committee
Chairman George Hahon (D-TexasS, the Administration at-
tempted to block this restriction too, claiming that
Conte's amendment would tie the President's hand in
carrying out foreign policy 33 But when the Nahon ef-
fort failed. Administration officials argued that
Conte's restrictions should satisfy the Senate and that
the authorisation bill should thus be approved by the
conferees without the restrictions approved earlier by
the Senate Nonetheless, the Senate conferees held
firm, and were given renewed impetus by reports of an
Administration decision to offer F-S supersonic fighter
aircraft to Beveral Latin American nations The Con-
ference Committee finally agreed on a provision to abol-
ish the Country X revolving fund as of June 30, 1968,
and to limit the amount of arms purchase loans that
could be guaranteed during fiscal 1966 to $190 million
President Johnson was reluctant to sign the bill,
and AID Administrator Gaud urged a Veto. Gaud warned
that U,S, influence would decline as a result of the
congressional cuts and restrictiora and said that de-
veloping countries would be forced to pay cash for
military equipment, which would increase demands for
economic assistance 34 (Congress had also approved a
Symington amendment requiring the President to termin-
ate development loans and food aid to any nation di-
verting such assistance to military expenditures, or
diverting their own resources to ’unnecessary military
spending to a degree which materially Interferes’ tritii
their own development. 3 * As passed by the Senate, the
amendment would have applied to all foreign aid, but it
was toned down in the Conference Committee.) When
Johnson signed the bill, which not only cut his aid
proposals but tied the executive's hand on the dispatch
of arms to developing nations, the President said.

116

"I believe the money cuts and other restrictions in
this act will seriously inhibit the government's ef-
forts to assure and enlarge the security of the free
world." 36

The foreign aid appropriations bill was finally
approved in mid-December, and it reflected the same
pattern of funding cuts and policy restrictions. The
bill prohibited any use of military assistance funds or
the Department of Defense revolving fund to finance the
sale of sophisticated weapons to developing countries
except those which had been specified by the House
Appropriations Committee. There was, however, a pro-
vision for a presidential waiver if the President
determined that such a transaction was vital to the
U.S. national security and so reported to Congress
within 30 days of his determination. Such waivers have
often been attached to legislation so as to leave a
measure of flexibility for the President in matters of
urgency.

Final action on the Exim Bank legislation did not
come until March 1968, and only after further fierce
battling in the House. Representative Widnall at-
tempted to flatly prohibit any Exim financing of arms
sales to developing countries and to drop the Presi-
dent's waiver authority. He said this would be con-
sistent with the action taken by Congress in 1967
setting a mid-1968 termination date for the Country X
fund.

In a rare speech on the House floor, aging Speaker
John McCormack {D-Massachusetts} strongly attacked Re-
publican Widnall 1 s proposal. "If ever an amendment was
against the national interests of our country, it is
this amendment," McCormack argued. 37

Other supporters of the Johnson Administration
criticized Widnall 's amendment as a partisan effort.
Ed Edmondson (D-Oklahoma) argued for using the "arsenal
of democracy for democracy" and said the arms financ-
ing was needed. 30 Widnall' s amendment was defeated and
when the bill went to conference, the House version was
accepted. As finally enacted in March 1968, the bill
prohibited Exim credits for sales of military equipment
to developing countries unless the President declared
that such sales were in the national interest and gave
Congress 30 days notice.

Efforts at Congressional Assertion

Thus, Congress had moved in a piecemeal fashion,
through three separate legislative measures and after
prolonged debate, to place restrictions on credit sales
of military equipment to foreign countries. Congress
had begun to assert some control over the executive's
role in arms sales, which had previously been loosely

117

restricted and had allowed considerable executive flex-
ibility in how arms sales were negotiated and financed
At tinea, both the country seeking American ansa and
elements within the executive involved in anna sales
were in agreement that tha potential congressional check
on arms sales was a troublesome obstacle. In the inter-
est of preserving arms sales relationships and initiat-
ing new ones, special arrangements to circumvent con-
gressional oversight, such as the Country X loans, were
created and flourished until detected by Congress.

In 1966, Congress moved to consolidate the arms
sales provisions, in modified form, into one bill— the
Foreign Hilltary Sales Act This first effort by Con-
gress at comprehensive eras sales legislation was a ma-
jor foundation statute of what later became, in 1976,
the Arms Export Control Act

The congressional action on arms sales in 1967-1968
constituted an important step on the path toward in-
creased congressional involvement in international se-
curity affairs, and waB one of the first signs of the
more assertive congressional role During the cane
period there were other signs of a more active Congress

Questioning national ^Commitments*

In July 1967, President Johnson dispatched three
transport planes to the Congo (later known as Zaire) to
aid Congolese President Joseph Mobutu in putting down a
rebellion 39 (About 150 American military personnel
were involved.) The decision was taken without any
congressional participation, and resulted in strong
criticism from Capitol Hill The criticism came from
both supporters and opponents of the Johnson Admini-
stration's Vietnam policy, and the broad range of oppo-
sition was seen os a demostration of the growing con-
cern about 0 S. involvement overseas Especially sig-
nificant was the role of Senator Richard Russell (D-
Georgia), Russell was extremely influential in the
Senate, and particularly revered by Southern Demo-
crats As chairman of the Senate Armed Services Com-
mittee and ope Of the few members of Congress who at
that time wore informed about U S intelligence opera-
tions (if on an irregular basis), Russell's comments
were especially weighty Although Russell had backed
Johnson on Vietnam, he noted that the U S. role in
Vietnam started out with a commitment not much larger
than the Congolese operation, and that it was difficult
to limit such involvement once it began. No further
commitment of U.S troops or equipment was made in the
Congo, and the planes were gradually withdrawn

Fulbright later said that Russell 'b questioning of
what constituted a national commitment "really began’
what became a two-year effort to define the term, which

118

culminated in the 1969 National Commitments Resolu-
tion. 40 The resolution, adopted by the Senate by a
lopsided 70-16 vote, said a national commitment "means
the use of the Armed Forces of the United States .on
foreign territory, or a promise to assist a foreign
country, government, or people by the use of Armed
Forces or financial resources of the United States,
either immediately or upon the happening of certain
events...” Although largely symbolic, the non-binding
resolution expressed the sense of the Senate that such
a commitment could result "only from affirmative action
taken by the executive and legislative branches of the
United States Government..." 4 ^

In conjunction with this effort, the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee established a Subcommittee on U.S.
Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, chaired by
Stuart Symington. The subcommittee's work spotlighted
the growth in the U.S. involvement abroad and the num-
ber of U.S. "commitments."

The National Commitments resolution was the
precursor of the 1973 War Powers Resolution, limiting
the power of a President to commit U.S. forces to
future hostilities without congressional authoriza-
tion. 4 ^ it was also in 1973 that renewed congressional
efforts to deal with the arms transfer issue in a ser-
ious manner materialized. In the period since Congress
had first begun to scrutinize arms sales, such sales
had continued to grow at a rapid pace. In June 1973,
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee recommended a
wholesale revision of the statutory framework governing
foreign military sales and grant assistance. The
committee's legislation was developed with the strong
personal backing Chairman Fulbright. Fulbright’s ef-
forts actually had their roots in the 1967 staff report
for the Foreign Relations Committee at the time of the
Country X controversy. Over the years he had grown in-
creasingly concerned about arms transfers. Fulbright *s
bill would have phased out the military grant aid
program and the military assistance groups (MAGs)
assigned to foreign countries. The legislation also
called for a new credit sales system of loan guaran-
tees through commercial banks and would allow the Exim
Bank to finance sales to developing countries — but
there would be a ceiling on such sales and, unlike the
Country-X program, there would be no deception involved.

Although the bill passed in the Senate, it did not
become law. Still, it reflected the growing trend in
Congress to alter the pattern of D.S. military grants
and sales to foreign governments. The committee's re-
port on the bill said, "For too many years, the United
States has lived beyond its means abroad, maintaining
vast military forces and bases, and lending and giving
away our resources..." 4 -*

119

Nalson-Blngham Amendment

Finally, in 1974, Congress too* more decisive ac-
tion to assure a role in area sales. The fiscal year
1975 foreign aid authorisation bill (PL 93-559) con-
tained requirements that the President must report to
Congress military sales valued at $25 million or more
and give Congress 20 calendar days to disapprove such
sales by passing a concurrent resolution of disapproval
The Senate amendment was introduced by Senator Gaylord
Nelson (D-Wisconsln) . A similar amendment had actually
been approved by the Senate in 1973, but had been
dropped in Conference In 1974, with Congress becoming
increasingly independent in the aftermath of Richard
Nixon's resignation, both Houses approved the proposal.
It was sponsored in the House by Representative Jonathan
Bingham (D-Hew York) and became known as the Nelson-
Bingham amendment

The push for the amendment came from a Nelson staff
member, Paula Stern, working with Norvill Jones of the
Senate Foreign Relations staff. Concerned about the
inability of Congress to get a handle on arms sales,
Stern ar.d Jones considered a variety of legislative
means before settling on this procedure

Subsequently, the Nelson-Bingham amendment was re-
fined. A major legislative initiative, the 1976 Arms
Export Control Act (PL 94-329) included a number of pro-
visions related to arms sales Section 36(b) of that
act, as updated, provides that Congress has 30 days,
following formal notification, during which it may act,
by concurrent resolution, to disapprove a sale. (Con-
gress is normally given an informal notification 20 days
before the formal notice, although that is not required
by law.) The congressional review provisions initially
applied to any proposed sale of defense articles or ser-
vices valued at $25 million or more, or any sale that
included more than $7 million in major defense equip-
ment, The threshhold figures were subsequently In-
creased, with notification required for sales valued at
$14 million or more for Single items or $50 million or
more for packages. The Arms Export Control Act has also
been amended to provide Congress with the authority to
veto transfers of weapons by recipient countries to
third countries (1977), and commercial arms sales
(1979). More detailed and frequent reports on arms
sales are required by Congress as well There is still
provision, however, that the President can waive Con-
gressional review if he declared that an emergency
exists which requires that a Bole be made in the nation-
al security interest

Beginning with the efforts to exercise some control
over the Country X program. Congress has taken a aeries
of steps to strengthen it role in arms sales As the

120

Senate Foreign Relations Committee stated in its report
on the 1976 Anns Export Control Act, "Congress in the
past has not exercised effective oversight of arms
sales matters and needs additional statutory authority
to do so." 44 With passage of the Arms Export Control
Act, Congress finally succeeded in carving out for it-
self a relatively active role in overseeing and influ-
encing arms sales and arms transfer policies.

Executive Initiative

Despite these moves by Congress to insure a role for
Itself in arms sales, this remains an area where the
initiative rests with the executive and where only a
concerted congressional effort can reverse an executive
decision. However, the congressional role does result,
at least in some cases, in greater leverage for Congress
and in more inter-branch consultation on proposed sales.
Congressional sentiment is usually tested by the execu-
tive, although sometimes the consultation is belated and
minimal. But some proposed sales have been delayed, and
other arms packages have been reshaped or scaled down in
order to head off congressional problems. Further, as a
result of the opportunity for congressional involvement,
there is much more pub- lie and media attention to pro-
posed sales, which seems appropriate in light of the
growing importance of arms sales as instruments of D.S.
foreign policy.

Several proposed sales have been hotly debated by
Congress since passage of the Nelson-Bingham amendment
and the Arms Export Control Act. But in none of these
cases did Congress ultimately use the legislative veto
to stop the sales. Most of the controversial sales have
involved nations in the Middle East and Persian Gulf re-
gion. In 1975, President Ford, faced with the threat
of possible congressional disapproval, compromised on a
proposed sale of Hawk missiles to Jordan. After exten-
sive consultation. Ford informed Congress that Jordan
had indicated that the missile systems would be perman-
ently installed in a defensive and non-mobile manner.
This pledge, which sought to insure that these weapons
could not be used in an offensive role, and thus would
pose neither a strategic threat to Israel nor affect the
power balance in the Middle East, was satisfactory to
Congress and the threat of congressional disapproval
ended.

A year later, Ford had to sharply reduce the number
of Maverick air-to-ground missiles to be sold to Saudi
Arabia. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted
for a disapproval resolution and "repeated its concern
over the failure of the executive" branch to take into
account the Congress' concern over arms sales policy or
to respond fully to the requests for information

131

relevant to proposed sales In order to ameliorate
congressional concern and avoid possible disapproval,
Ford reduced the number of missiles to be sold from
1 ,5DQ to €50

American Arms and Iran

The next major confrontation over ann3 sales oc-
cured in 1977, when President Jimmy Carter proposed to
sell seven of the highly sophisticated Airborne Warning
and Control System (AWACS) planes to Iran, Controversy
over U S. arms sales to Iran dated back to the mid-
sixties With Iran becoming an increasingly important
source of oil, and with the Shah occasionally flirting
with the neighboring Soviet Union, the U S began step-
ping up arms sales to Iran In 1967, Undersecretary of
State Eugene Rostov, arguing that the U S should not
antagonize the Shah, said in a letter to Senator Ful-
bright that this nation had to decide "whether ve
should leave our friends without the means they feel
they need to defend themselves or attempt through
modest sales to help them achieve at least minimum
defense capability." But Fulbright remained uncon-
vinced, saying, "I have been in Iran and it is a most
desolate country There are very few rich people, but
the majority could easily turn to revolution I think
you are doing a gteat disservice to them loading them
down with these arms

tinder the Nixon Administration, arms sales to Iran
were stepped up further Dy 1972, Nixon and secretary
of State Kissinger had agreed to sell the Shah virtual-
ly any conventional weapons system he wanted, beginning
with the advanced F~H fighter plane As one writer
noted , "Within a year Iran became the bazaar for an
American arms bonanza as the three military services
and arms sales converged on Tehran ** 8

In the four years preceding 1973, official U S.
sales to Iran had reached a value of $1.26 billion, in
itself no small figure But in the following four-year
period (1973-1976) the volume of these sales was in-
creased nearly ten tines, to a total of $11 billion
(See Table 5.1}

However, when Carter came into office in 1977, he
announced t new U S policy to govern the transfer of
conventional ar»3. Carter's initiative was at least in
part a response to continuing congressional pressure/
and was designed to restrain W.S sales. He said in
May 1977, that the U S would "henceforth view arms
transfers as an exceptional foreign policy imple-
ment *50 But only a short time later, Carter revealed
plans to sell AWACS to Iran, a $ 1.2-bill ion deal that
appeared to undercut his own policy.

Early opposition to the AWACS sale was led by two

122

TABLE 5.1

U.S. Arms Sales to Iran

Fiscal Year

U.S. Dollars

1969

1970

1971

1972

1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

235.821.000

134.929.000

363.884.000

472.611.000

2.171.355.000

4.325.357.000

2.447.140.000

1.794.487.000

5.713.769.000 *

2.586.890.000 *

41,520,000 *

0

Source : Figures from tHe Department of Defense

♦Some of the sales were cancelled after the Shah was
deposed, and the military equipment was never delivered.

liberal Democratic senators, John Culver (Iowa) and
Thomas Eagleton (Missouri). Culver and Eagleton had
taken a strong interest in U.S. relations with Iran,
particularly after a visit to Iran in 1976. Although
congressional travel is frequently referred to as "junk-
eting," the trip to Iran by Culver, Eagleton and others
was an example of the value that can result from con-
gressional travel when members of Congress are able to
see matters for themselves and make independent judg-
ments. The judgments made by Culver and Eagleton were
contrary to the positions taken by the Ford, Nixon, and
Carter Administrations, all having proclaimed great con-
fidence in the Shah. In contrast to Carter, who was
later to refer to Iran as "an island of stability,"
Eagleton and Culver had strong doubts about the
prospects for future stability in Iran. 51

In a rather prophetic report after their 1976 trip,
the senators pointed out the lack of stable political
institutions in Iran, and said U.S. -Iranian ties were
too dependent on a highly personalized relationship with
the Shah. They expressed concern about "Ugly American"
friction caused by the huge numbers of American techni-
cians living in Iran and raised questions about the
ability of the Iranians to absorb highly advanced tech-
nology so quickly. 52 culver later recalled that the two
had raised the hackles of U.S. diplomatic and military
officials in Iran with their questioning attitude. 53

123

on June 1€, 1977, Carter sent Congress the prenoti-
fication announcement of the proposed sales of the seven
AWACS planes. By the time the formal notification was
given on July 7, opposition, led by Culver and Eagleton,
was growing on Capitol Hill, particularly after a report
by the General Accounting Office (GAO). The CAO, the
independent investigative arm of Congress, raised ques-
tions about the sale, calling the Administration's Jus-
tification ’inadequate' and said the sale could pose a
threat to OS security if, for example, information on
the technology should leak to the Soviet Union 54

Despite the ardent efforts of Culver and Eaglet on,
it appeared that the sale might go through unscathed
Under the Anns Export Control Act, Congress had only 20
days to act to disapprove the sale, and opponents of the
sale found themselves in a time bind as Congress moved
toward a statutory recess period, scheduled to begin
August 5 The Senate was tied up with a Republican fil-
ibuster against a Carter-supported bill for public fi-
nancing of congressional elections

On July 22, the opponents gained a strong ally
Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd hand-delivered a let-
ter to the White House asking the President to withdraw
the notification of the proposed AWACS rale Byrd's
letter noted the scheduling problems facing the Senate
and said that under the circumstances "it will be impos-
sible for the Senate to give the proposal the careful
and serious consideration it deserves ■ Bjrd also ex-
pressed his own "serious reservations* about the sale
and detailed them at some length in the Utter 55 Ad-
ministration officials tried to get Byrd to back down,
but Byrd insisted that Congress deserved time to consid-
er the sale thoughtfully When Carter did not accede to
what the Majority Leader considered to be a reasonable
and responsible request, Byrd expressed hLs determina-
tion to push for a congressional veto of the sale

Carter risked alienating Byrd, a key congressional
figure, who had already proven helpful in fending off
attacks on Carter's foreign policy But apparently con-
vinced that withdrawing the proposal would be interpret-
ed as a sign of presidential weakness and also damaging
to U.S -Iranian relations, Carter refused to pull back
the proposal

Byrd did not relent, and called on the Administra-
tion to reconsider its position Meanwhile he began
working with the Foreign Assistance Subcommittee of the
Foreign Relations Committee, which was considering the
sale. Hubert Humphrey, who chaired the subcommittee,
was concerned by the institutional showdown he saw de-
veloping between Congress and the president As a vet-
eran of both branches, the former Vice President be-
lieved in the importance of consensus and comity between
the branches Working through Ms former Senate col-
league from Minnesota, Vice-President Walter Mondale,

124

Humphrey sought to convince the White House to back off
from a confrontation.

With the White House showing no signs of giving in,
Byrd enlisted the support of Minority Leader Howard
Baker and personally appeared before the Foreign Rela-
tions Committee to urge a disapproval resolution. Byrd
insisted that it was an institutional issue and that the
Senate should pass the disapproval resolution if that
was the only way for the Senate to get enough time to
weigh the issue on its merits. Although favoring the
sale, Baker agreed with Byrd on the institutional prin-
ciples involved.

In view of Byrd's strong commitment, the White House
recognized the probability of a Senate defeat. But
since both Houses had to vote disapproval resolutions in
order to kill the sale, the Administration still felt
safe because it expected to win the House. Speaker
Thomas P. O'Neill told the President that the House
would not oppose the sale. O'Neill had not counted on
the determined efforts of Culver, however. In a two-
hour virtuoso performance before the House Foreign Af-
fairs Committee, Culver pounded the table and delivered
a comprehensive denunciation of the sale. When Admini-
stration officials followed with a low-key defense of
the proposal, they were no match for Culver, and the
committee stunned the White House by voting 19-17 to
disapprove the sale.

At that point the White House recognized that it had
no choice but to temporarily withdraw the sale, and Byrd
commended Carter for his "statesmanlike decision" to do
so. 56 Further, Carter agreed to make some modifications
in the AWACS package to reduce security risks and meet
other concerns expressed in Congress: for example, cer-
tain communications and coding gear would be removed
from the planes. A series of other assurances were pro-
vided when Carter resubmitted the proposal after Con-
gress resumed its session in September. Although some
members remained strongly opposed and others professed
continuing doubts, the sale went through without either
House taking further action.

But the controversy had served to focus greater con-
gressional and public attention on the vast amount of
U.S. weaponry flowing to Iran and on the congressional
review process. One of the assurances provided to Con-
gress in connection with the AWACS sale was that the
Administration would conduct a detailed study of Iran's
ability to continue to absorb high technology without
additional requirements for U.S. technicians. In Octo-
ber 1977, Byrd noted that although the AWACS sale had
been approved, he remained "concerned about the immense
quantity of sophisticated military equipment which we
are selling to Iran” and the possible future ramifica-
tions for both the U.S. and Iran. Pointing out that the
AWACS sale would bring the total sales to Iran since

125

1972 to $18.2 billion, Eyrd called for a moratorium on
such sales. 57 Byra also suggested that Congress consid-
er requiring explicit congressional approval— rather
than a resolution of disapproval— for sales to one na-
tion valued at more than 5200 million 58 Although Con-
gress did not adopt this suggested change In its proced-
ures on ores sales, similar suggestions have been re-
peated, particularly with arms sales having become such
a significant element in American foreign policy

The AHACS was the last major sale to Iran to be ap-
proved before the Shah's regime fell early in 1979 One
of the criticisms directed at the Shah was that he ex-
pended vast amounts for sophisticated weaponry, with
0 S encouragement, while neglecting some of the crit-
ical needs within Iran Despite all the debate on the
AWACS, it was never actually delivered to Iran, because
delivery was not scheduled until 1981, well after the
Shah had departed American officials shuddered at the
thought that the AHAC5 might have fallen into the hands
of an unfriendly government, such as that of Ayatollah
Khomeini

More Middle East Sales

Subsequent major controversies over arms sales have
involved Israel and Arab countries Foremost among
these were the 1978 $4. 8-billion package of jet air-
craft sold to Egypt, Israel, and Saudi Arabia, and the
1981 agreement to sell AWACS to Saudi Arabia

In 1978, Carter had to wage a strong battle to ward
off disapproval of bis proposed sale of jets to the
three Kid-East countries The principal fight was over
the Saudi Arabian component of the package This was
the first proposal to transfer top-of-the-line U S
planes to the Saudis But Secretary of State Cyrus
Vance said that Saudi Arabia was "of immense importance
in promoting a course of moderation in the Middle
East “59 Groups opposing the sale, such as the American
Israel public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), argued that the
weapons being sold to the Arab states were "offensive*
weapons

Once again there was an example of the executive
branch moving to mollify mounting opposition in Congress
by modifying the proposed sale. In this case, the
Carter Administration pledged that the Saudi F-158,
which had provoked the strongest protest in Congress,
would be based outside striking distance of Iprael and
would not be equipped with bomb racks or air-to-air mis-
siles which would give them offensive power. However,
the administration resisted efforts to separate the
Saudi planes from the rest of the package. The Senate
Foreign Relations Committee sent a resolution of disap-
proval to the Senate floor, and Chairman Prank Church

:26

strongly objected to having to consider the three snler
as one package. He said the President was forcing Con-
gress to accept the Saudi sale by threatening to with-
hold the sales of planes to Israel otherwise. ^

This tire the Administration worked closely with
Majority Leader Byrd, winning his support for the pro-
posal. And, after the Administration agreed not to
equip the planes with "offensive" equipment and provided
other assurances, Byrd worked tirelessly to build sup-
port among his colleagues. The Senate considered the
matter in a rare closed-door session in order to discuss
classified matters relating to the sale. During the de-
bate, Senator Abraham Ribicoff (D-Connecticut) , a highly
respected Jewish Senator, spoke effectively in behalf of
the sale. Ribicoff s views were influential in the Sen-
ate's decision, after more than 10 hours of debate, to
defeat the disapproval resolution 54-44, thus allowing
the sale to go through. 61

AWACS for Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia was also at the center of the next
struggle between Congress and the executive over arms
sales, this time during the Reagan Administration. Af-
ter holding off several times because of congressional
pressure, Reagan formally notified Congress in October
1981 of his intention to sell five AWACS planes to Saudi
Arabia. Even before notification, there was strong op-
position to the proposal. But Reagan, not unlike other
presidents, attempted to present Congress with a fait
accompli — arguing that a "commitment" had already been
made to the Saudis, and if Congress went back on that
commitment, it would be disastrous for U.S. -Saudi rela-
tions. The fact that any such "commitment" on arms
sales is subject to congressional review does not pre-
vent presidents from making such arguments.

Opposition in the Democratic-controlled House of
Representatives was overwhelming, and the House passed
a resolution disapproving the sale by a 301-111 vote.
But Reagan had been enjoying great success in winning
congressional support for his domestic policies and now
his Administration turned to an all-out effort to win
the fight for the AWACS sale in the Republican-con-
trolled Senate.

Defeating the AWACS sale was a high priority for the
American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), which
coordinates lobbying for Jewish organizations, and has
long been a potent force in influencing Congress. (Por
more on the role of ethnic lobbies, see Chapter 3.)
AIPAC stressed its concern that the AWACS planes night
be used against Israel by the Saudis, in concert with
other Arab nations, and that there was a danger that the
AWACS secrets might fall into unfriendly hands.® 2

127

Over the years, the Saudis had become more skillful
at building Support in Congress The Saudis retained a
public relations firm to work on their behalf, and a
member of the Saudi royal family— a young, English-edu
cated, American-trained pilot— met privately with many
key Capitol Hill figures Opponents of the sale charged
that Saudi Arabia applied considerable pressure in tie-
half of the sale through business and industrial groups
Aerospace firms, including Boeing the builder of the
AWACS, plus oil and construction companies with strong
Saudi ties mounted major lobbying efforts 63

But the major lobbying effort came from the Presi-
dent himself It was a vivid demonstration of how dif-
ficult it can be to stop a well-organized campaign, led
by a popular President even in the face of strong con-
gressional opposition Reagan held a series of meetings
for senators at the White House and met with many sena-
tors individually to convince them that the sale was
vital if the U S w»b to maintain good relations with
the Saudis

Following the pattern of other executive legislative
struggles over arms sales the Reagan Administration
provided certain "assurances* to help mollify congres-
sional concerns Such assurances often make it easier
for Initially reluctant members of Congress to support a
presidential action and enables them to claim that they
influenced the terms of the sale Early in this debate,
Secretary of State Alexander Haig offered "new assur-
ances" that the Saudis would protect the AWACS secrets
and would not use the planes against Israel But, with
the Senate vote rearing and the outcome still highly un-
certain, Reagan had to write a letter to Senate Majority
Leader Howard Baker offering further assurances that the
Saudis would not misuse or compromise the AWACS The
letter was apparently an important factor in convincing
several wavering senators The Administration also ar-
gued that the death a short time before of President
Anwar Sadat of Egypt — who had been considered America s
beat Arab friend-made it ali the more imperative the
relations with Saudi Arabia not be jeopardized by rejec-
tion of the sale

Even though at one time SO aerators had announced
opposition to the sale, when tbe vote occurred on Octo-
ber 2B, Reagan had succeeded in getting several senators
to switch their positions and the resolution of disap-
proval failed by a 48-52 vote So much attention had
been focused on the issue that, in the final analysis,
a number of senators were reluctant to damage an Ameri-
can President s prestige by opposing him This is often
a factor in congressional foreign policy decisions, and
in this case the Reagan White House used it very
effectively

Despite all the lobbying by business and pressure
groups, it was clearly the President who turned the

128

tide. "The President did a whale of a persuasive job,"
Robert Packwood (R-Oregon), one of the opposition lead-
ers said. 64 Packwood commented, “With 90 percent of the
votes, the President was 80 percent of the deciding
factor." 65 Senator David 'Pryor (D-Arkansas) said, "The
presidential lobbying effort has been as strong as train
smoke, as we say down home." 66

Although the President was victorious, it required
an all-out effort, and some questioned whether he might
have used up too much political capital in fighting off
disapproval of the sale, making him more reluctant to
undertake a similar struggle, or at least leading to
more prior consultation with Congress. Sometimes mem-
bers of Congress who give the President a benefit-of-
the-doubt vote on foreign policy will then feel more
free to go the other way on a domestic issue. Presi-
dent Carter, having engaged in a number of close and
difficult battles on foreign policy, gradually ran out
of political capital and found it hard to convince Con-
gress to continue supporting him on controversial for-
eign policy matters.

Reassessing the Congressional Role

Congress has labored, sometimes effectively, some-
times with minimal impact, to involve itself in arms
sales policy and decisions. Although Congress has con-
sistently proven to be reluctant to formally reject a
sale, it has played a significant role in shaping and
modifying a number of arms deals. An analysis by the
Congressional Research Service noted that the threat of
the legislative veto has on occasion forced administra-
tions to consult with Congress in a manner that led to
reductions or modifications in proposed sales. However,
the same Congressional Research Service study, while
concluding that the Arms Export Control Act compelled
the executive to deal with Congress in a systematic way,
argued that the executive "has almost always found ways
of finessing detailed discussions and negotiations with
Congress on major arms sales until it has made its basic
decision to sell." 6 '

While the degree of actual congressional influence
can be debated, there is little question that the execu-
tive often has had to take Congress into account in con-
sidering arms sales decisions. One of those who helped
shape the congressional participation, Representative
Bingham, said the Saudi AWACS battle underscored the
point that the Arms Export Control Act gives Congress
"an important instrument for sharing in important polit-
ical decisions." 66 Gaylord Nelson, who was Bingham's
counterpart while serving in the Senate, said, "This
kind of debate could not have occurred without this
law." 69

129

Senator CharleB Percy, from his perspective as
Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
considers the Arms Export Control Act to be one of the
•positive’ Steps taken by Congress in increasing its
foreign policy powers. But Percy la concerned about
other areas in which 'Congress sought more control over
foreign policy than it could handle effectively' and
believes that the congressional veto could be
overused. 70

By normally receiving an informal notification pri-
or to the actual notification, Congress is given more
time to review sales than is actually required by law.
But some members believe that a longer review period is
needed And the fact remains that Congress reviews a
proposed Eale only after it has been the subject of ex-
tensive negotiations with the prospective purchasing
country. To disapprove or significantly modify a sale
at that point can risk serious damage to (IS relations
with the would-be purchaser.

Senator John Tower is one who is critical of the
coaqreaslo*a} role It a me sales He says that, as a
result of the llelscn-Binghaw amendments, in recent
years "every major arms sales agreement has been played
out amidst an acrimonious national debate, blown all
out of proportion to the intrinsic importance of the
transaction in question *71 Tower notes that legisla-
tors are put in the position of posturing for domestic
political considerations and often Ignore the merits of
a proposed sale and the long-term foreign policy conse-
quences Such sales become subject to Inordinate in-
fluence by lobbies for various national and ethnic
groups, Tower believes The result can be impairment
ot 'a President's ability to carry put a strategy which
reflects the interests of our nation as a whole *72

There is also the concern that congressional debate
on arms sales proposals can unnecessarily complicate
relations with the purchasing nation if, for example,
Congress places 'trivial and humiliating restrictions"
on a sale Tower believes that has happened in some
cases 73 Representative Les A6pin (D-Wisconsinl says,
*. if we do not sell, the effect is enormous The
countries involved take it aa a personal affront and os
a rejection That is what gets us into trouble, that
we make these deliberations in public as we do, and if
the decision is negative, it can have severe
consequences •**

Referring to the 'rather elaborate procedure* for
congressional consideration of sales, Aspin aays that
the existence of the procedure can itself be a factor
in affecting executive decisions. 75 mi administration
may be dissuaded from proposing a sale because of the
procedure and the fear that Congress might turn it down

Andrew Pierre notes that Congress is not prepared

nor equipped in time and staff to make case-by-case or
country-by- country decisions on every arms sales. But,
because sales are subject to scrutiny on Capitol Hill,
Pierre says. Congress has served as an inhibiting fac-
tor on some prospective sales that were likely to be
seen as excessive.'®

Senator Joseph Biden (D-Delaware) , a member of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee who has been in-
volved in considering many arms sales proposals, ac-
knowledges that Congress may not have been particularly
successful in limiting the quantity of weapons trans-
fers. However, one of the major reasons Congress be-
came involved in arms sales issues was because, begin-
ning with the Country X program, arms sales were becom-
ing an increasingly important component of American
foreign policy. (See Table 5.2.) Congress acted, as
Biden said, "to restrict the ability of the executive
to initiate independently and to carry out, without the
participation of Congress, major foreign policy
changes." 77

What Congress set out to do, Biden points out, was
"to make itself part of the game," 78 and, in that
sense, j.t has been successful.

The Supreme Court's 1983 ruling that the legisla-
tive veto is unconstitutional left the status of the
congressional procedure on arms sales in an uncertain
3tate. (The Court, in Immigration and Naturalisation
Service v. Chadha , said legislative vetoes violate the
constitutional requirements preserving the separation
of powers.) However, even without the legislative
veto, there are ample means for Congress to have an im-
pact on arms sales if it chooses to use them. As noted
earlier. Congress could, for example, require affirma-
tive congressional action on major sales — relying on
approval rather than the disapproval procedure, as has
been the case under the Arms Export Control Act.

The executive will retain the initiative in arms
sales. If Congress is to continue to be part of the
game, it will probably have to reassert itself period-
ically, as it has done since its initial involvement
with arms sales , and to insist on playing and active
role.

131

TABLE 5 2

United States Arms Sales

Fiscal Year

U S.

Collars

1950-70

12,934,000,000

1971

1,390,000,000

197?

2,9 50,000,000

1973

4,640,000,000

1974

10,343,000,000

1975

16,053,000,000

1976

14,673,000,000

1977

8,305,000,000

1978

11,039,000,000

1979

13,014,000,000

1980

15,277,000,000

1981

6,525,000.000

1982

21,500,000,000

Source These figures art based on information^ from
official government and congresaional sources. How-
ever, there are contradictions and i neons latencies in
the figures provided by various agencies Therefore,
the figures should be regarded aa indicative of general
trends rather than representative of precis^ arms
transfers tctais There are also differences in sales
agreements and actual deliveries. In recent years, the
Reagan Administration has released figures showing U S.
arms sales agreements with Third World countries. Ac-
cording to the Administration, these verei FY 1578 -
?7 5 billion; n 1979 ~ *9 billion; W 1980 - 510 bil-
lion; PV 1961 - J4.9 billion By contrast, according
to the Administration, the figurcB for Soviet agree-
ments to sell arms to the Third World during the sane
period werej PY 1976 - S3 billion; PY 1979 - $0.9 bil-
lion; Ti I960 - 514 8 billion; FY 1901 - $6.6 billion.

NOTES

1 Andrew J Pierre, "Arms Sales; The New Diplo-
macy,* foreign Affairs 60, vihter 1901-62, pp 266-267

2. Figures From Committee on Foreign Affairs,
U.S House of Representatives, cited in Congress and
the Nation t Volume 2 , 1967 Chronology Twashlnqton

Congressional Quarterly Press, 1968), p 87

3 US Congress, Senate, Comraitte on Foreign
Relations, Arms Sales and Foreign Policy . Staff Study,
January 25. T967

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid , pp 7-0.

September 1967, p.38.

20. Letter, John HcNaugton, Department of Defense,

to Walt Rostov, July 5, 1967 (Department of Defense,

Agency File, National Security File), Johnson Presiden-
tial Library, Austin.

21. Memorandum, Richard Moose, National Security
Council staff, to Walt Rostov, July 18, 1967 {Depart-
ment of Defense, Agency File, National Security File),
Johnson Presidential Library, Austin.

22. Congressional Quarterly , vol.28, 1968,

pp. 191-192.

23. Neil Sheehan, "Arms Sales Fight Takes New
Tact," The New York Times , July 30, 1967, p.8.

24. Congressional Record , Senate, August 15, 1967,
p.22639.

25. Ibid., p.22641.

26. Ibid., p.22631.

27. Ibid., p.22648.

28. Ibid., p.22643.

133

29. Ibid

30. Ibid , p 22655.

31 Ibid , p 32659.

32. Ibid , p. 22660.

33 Felix Belalr, Jr., [ The New York Times 3.
"House Unit Restrict Sale of Arms Under Aid Bill,"
International Herald Tribune . Paris, November 2, 1967.

34 tetter, William Gaud. Administrator, Agency
for International Development, to Wilfred Rommel,
Bureau of the Budget. November 13, 1967, Enrolled
Legislation, P L 90*137 {Special Piles) Johnson Presi-
dential Library, Austin

35. Congress and the Nation , vol IX, pp 86-88,

36. Robert Siner, "President Signs Aid Bill, Bids
Congress Reconsider,* International Herald Tribune ,
Paris, November 16, 1967

37 Congress and the nation , vol IX, p 107

38. ibid , p.llO

39 US Congress, Senate, War powers Legislation ,
1973, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions on S *60, 93rd Cong , 1st sess , April 1973,
p 1*8

40 Statement by Senator J W Fulbrlght on
S.J475, before the Subcommittee of Separation of
powers. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, April 24,
1972. (Fulbrlght Press Release 18, 1972)

41 $. Refi 85, 91st Cong , lat ecss , Congres -
sional Record , p SI 7245 , 1969

42. War Powers Resolution, P L 93-1*8, approved
November 7, 1973

43 y.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign
Relations, Report on S 2443 , The Foreign m ilitary. Sales
and Assistance Act ,Report 93-189, 1973

Tn DTs! Congress, Senate, committee on Foreign
Relations, Report on S 2662, International S ecurity
Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, Report
94-605, January 30, 1976, p.6

45. U 5 Congress, House, Committee on interna-
tional Relations (Foreign Affairs), Congress and
Poreiqn Policy— 1975 . Committee Print, 1976, pp 70-71

46. U,S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign
Relations, Legislative Activities Report _oE — theCom-
mifctee on" ^Foreign Relatione , 94th Cong , 1975-76,

February 21, is/7,

47. U S. Congress, senate, wmm«» *-*~-u‘*
Relations, Hearings or Hear East and South — East — Asia,
90th Cong, /ist "sesT, Harch 14, 1967, p

48 Richard T Sale, *The Shah'fi America, The
Washington Peat , Kay 12, 1977, _

497 George F Kennan, The Cloud, o f Pa nger j Cur -
rent Realities of American foreign Ron gy (Boston;
Little, Brown, 1977) , p.87 ...

50, congressional Record , Senate, Kay 20, *977,

P.S8242

134

51. Public Papers of the President , Jimmy Carter,
1977 (Washingtons Government Printing Office, 1977-
1978, 2 vols.), II, 2221.

52. Congressional Record , Senate, May 24, 1977,
P.S8542.

53. Interview with John Culver, July 20, 1982.

54. Norman Kempster, "GAO Sees Peril in Sale of
Radar Planes,” Los Angeles Times , July 16, 1977? also
Staff memorandum. Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
July 1977, p.3.

55. Letter, Senator Robert C. Byrd to President
Jimmy Carter, July 22, 1977.

56. Congressional Record , Senate, July 29, 1977,

pp.S13 08 5-13086.

57. Congressional Record , Senate, October 7, 1977,
p.S16620.

58. Ibid., p.S16621.

59. Middle East Aircraft Package, Reference

Papers, Department of State, March 1978? Announcement
by Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, February 14, 1978,

Department of State Press Release #75.

60. Congressional Record, Senate, May 15, 1978,

P-S7435.

61. Congressional Record , May 15, 1978.

62. See "The U.S. in the Middle East: A Forceful
or Fearful Foreign Policy?" Speech by Thomas A. Dine,
Executive Director, American Israel Public Affairs
Committee, A1PAC Policy Conference, Washington, D.C.
May 18, 1981? Paul Taylor, "Lobbying on AWACS," The
Washington Post , September 28, 1981.

63. Thomas B. Edsall, "Conservatives, Corporations

Aided AWACS," The Washington Post , November 1, 1981?

Steve Emerson, "The Petrodollar Connection," New
Republic 186, February 17, 1982, pp. 18-25.

64. James McCartney, (Knight-Ridder) , "President
Wins Victory on AWACS," Dallas Times Herald , October
29, 1981.

65. Lee Lescaze, "President, Hill Make 'a Nice
Save'," The Washington Post , October 30, 1981.

66. Howell Raines, "A One-Time Dividend on a High-
Risk Investment," The New York Times , November 1, 1981.

67. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Com-
mittee on Foreign Affairs, Executive-Legislative Con -
sultation on U.S. Arms Sales , Congress and Foreign Pol-
icy Series No. 7, Congressional Research Service, Li-
brary of Congress (Study prepared by Richard Grimmett),
December 1982, p.3.

68. Congressional Quarterly , October 31, 1981,

p.2096.

69. Ibid.

70. Charles H. Percy, "The Partisan Gap," Foreign
Policy 45, winter 1981-82, pp.8-9.

135

71. John G. Tower, "Congress Versus the President}
The Formulation and Implementation of American Foreign
Policy,' Foreign Affairs 60, Vinter 1961-82, p 234

72. Ibid., p 237

73. Ibid , p 135

7<. Arwa Sales? A Useful Foreign Policy Tool? AEI
Forum 56^ American Enterprise Institute for Public
Policy Pesearch, Washington, September 1981, p 8

75 Ibid , p.13.

76 Andrew J. Pierre, The Global Politics of Arms
Sales iPrincetcm Princeton University Press, 1982),
p 51

7 ? Arna Sales t A Useful Foreign Policy Tool7

p 13

78 Ibid.

6

Nuclear Nonproliferation

Steven /. Baker

Israel's June 1981 air attack on the Iraqi nuclear
research reactor revived interest in a set of policy
issues that the Reagan Administration seemed inclined
to ignore, but which had enjoyed high visibility during
the Carter Administration. Early in 1981, President
Reagan had declared that proliferation was none of
America's business, and Secretary of State Alexander
Haig had sought to lower the priority of nonprolifera-
tion policy, without abandoning the objectives alto-
gether. Newly appointed Secretary of Energy James
Edwards advocated steps towards the so-called "pluton-
ium economy," notably by proposing the licensing of the
Barnwell, South Carolina nuclear fuel reprocessing
plant? operation of this plant had been blocked by
President Carter as part of his nonproliferation policy.

With the Israelis practicing "assertive nonprolif-
eration," the Reagan Administration was reminded that
the spread of nuclear weapons capabilities continues to
be a source of instability in various parts of the
world, and that this instability can directly impinge
on American foreign policy objectives. In the Middle
East, the United States finds itself in the uncomfort-
able position of seeking to be an ally of both sides in
the Arab-Israeli dispute; hence the Israeli raid on
Iraq had the result of worsening U.S. relations both
with Israel and with major Arab allies such as Saudi
Arabia. In the short run, the on-going effort by State
Department negotiator Philip Habib to achieve a cease-
fire between Israel and Lebanon was sidetracked, the
proposed sale of AWACS to Saudi Arabia became even more
controversial, the delivery of jets to Israel was sus-
pended, and the U.S. for the first time joined with
other United Nations security Council members in a
unanimous censure of Israel’s action.

In the wake of the Baghdad raid, the Reagan Admin-
istration hastily issued a policy statement endorsing
nonproliferation, but it was clearly responding to

136

137

events rather than articulating veil-planned objec-
tives Resolutions calling for an Administration
nonproliferation policy statement had already been in-
troduced in Congress 1 The Administration had earlier
raised questions about its nonproliferation policy by
reviving the proposal to resume military and economic
aid to Pakistan! even though Pakistan is persisting in
its 'Islamic bomb" program And soon after the Israeli
raid against Iraq, the U.S announced that the nuclear
cooperation agreement with Egypt, pending since 1974,
would finally be implemented, with U S industries auth-
orised to supply Egypt with nuclear power reactors.
Once the shipment of jets to Israel was resumed, wags
began to suggest that the Reagan Administration’s non-
proliferation policy vs* to supply Israel vith the of-
fensive capability to knock out her neighbors’ nuclear
capabilities, while supplying Israel's neighbors with
the appropriate targets

Policy Contradictions

Contradictions in American nonproliferation policy
are nothing new Since 1945, American policy for deal-
ing with the spread of nuclear weapons has rigged and
ragged In the early years of the Carter Administra-
tion, a more coherent policy emerged This involved
cooperation with other industrial countries to block
emergence of additional nuclear weapons capabilities
through export controls and reassesment of domestic
nuclear energy programs After three years, the Carter
Administration policy began to show oeriQU3 contradict-
tiona, while the P.eagan Administration reached that
point in six months In fairness to the Reagan Admini-
stration, two points deserve emphasiB first, the
shift toward downgrading nonproliferation as a b S
policy objective came in the last year of the Carter
Administration, not in the first year of the Reagan
Administration By proposing to resume military and
economic aid to Pakistan in th« wake of the December
1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Carter Admini-
stration signaled that it was prepared to subordinate
its globaL nonproliferation strategy to regional geo-
political objectives. In essence, this was also the
Reagan Administration's nonproliferation policy 2 The
contradictions that result are less attributable to a
particular administration than they are inherent in a
selective nonproliferation policy# one where nonprolif-
eration pressures are applied to some countries but not
to others,

A second point that should be emphasized is that
the direction nonproliferation policy takes will depend
in large part on the U.S. Congress. Nonproliferation
policy 1 b no longer an exclusive executive prerogative.

138

but is embodied in U.S. statutes. If the Reagan Admin-
istration is determined to abandon a universal approach
to nonproliferation in favor of a casc-by-case ap-
proach, it will have to seek the cooperation of Con-
gress, because various legislative measures are in
force that require a universal policy. Indeed, follow-
ing Israeli attack against Iraq, steps were taken in
Congress to initiate a review of nonprolifcratJon leg-
islation with an eye toward revisions that would re-
flect a shift in U.S. policy. 3 The need for such a re-
vision had already been established in the last year of
the Carter Administration.

President Reagan scored an initial success when
Congress voted to authorize a resumption of aid to Pak-
istan, waiving the provisions of the Symington amend-
ment to the rorcign Assistance Act that had been the
basis for cutting off aid to Pakistan in early 1979. *
But the Reagan Administration's attempts to get legis-
lative approval for a major shift in nonproliferation
policy were blocked. Nonproliferation policy presented
the Reagan Administration with the challenge of articu-
lating a policy that auqured to he effective abroad
while maintaining support in Congress.

Congress and Nonproliferation

Nonproliferation policy is a prime example of the
reassertion of congressional foreign policy preroga-
tives in the 1970s. Congress took the load on nonpro-
liferation policy in the faces of indifference and oc-
casional hostility on the part of the Nixon and Ford
Administrations. Nonproliferation policy achieved some
coherence during the first throe years of the Carter
Administration because a convergence of views between
Congress and the Administration made cooperation possi-
ble. These views diverged in the last year of the
Carter Administration, particularly ns a result of the
controversy over shipping nuclear fuel to India,

The Indian case was an important turning point.
Its significance predated the Carter Administration and
its effects will last long into the future. Although
India refused to comply with the provisions of the Nu-
clear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA1, President
Carter approved the shipment to India of 38 tons of
nuclear fuel for U.S. -supplied power reactors. The
President's action was overwhelmingly disapproved by
the House of Representatives, but narrowly upheld by
the Senate. Thus, even before the advent of the Reagan
Administration in 1981, there was an apparent shift in
U.S. nonproliferation policy that raised fundamental
questions about both the role of Congress in foreign
policy and about the future of nonproliferation pol-
icy: Had Congress lost the initiative, so recently

139

acquired, in foreign policy? Had U S, nonproliferation
policy lost its coherence?

Joint Committee on Atomic Energy

Congressional involvement in nonproliferation pol-
icy can be traced back to the immediate postwar years
The 1946 Atomic Energy Act created the Atomic Energy
Commission IAEC1, and entrusted supervision of the
Atomic Energy Commission to two political authorities —
the congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
(JCAEl and the President While there was Initial un-
certainty as to who was favored in this distribution o£
authority, over time the Joint Committe on Atomic Ener-
gy cane to play a role in nuclear policy that went far
beyond legislative oversight, often prevailing over the
President 4

The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy was designed
to reconcile the demands of nuclear technology and
democracy The Joint Committee’s nine representatives
and nine senators were given broad Jurisdiction over
the nations’ nuclear activities, but were also enjoined
to maintain a high level of secrecy to protect national
security This secrecy, combined with the highly tech-
nical nature of nuclear policy questions, reinforced
the Joint Committee's statutory monopoly on nuclear
policy in Congress

The President also had advantages In his role in
the nuclear policy field The President's predominance
in foreign policy, his power to appoint Atomic Energy
Commission members, and to propose the Atomic Energy
Commission budget made him a key source of nuclear pol-
icy initiatives But often the Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy proved to be the more assertive of the
two political masters of the Atomic Energy Commission 5
The predominance of the Joint Committee over the Presi-
dent in nuclear policy was further strengthened as
civil nuclear policy became a policy priority along
with nuclear weapons, reducing the national security
implications of nuclear policy.

Powerful and ambitious Joint Committee members pur-
sued a tev, well-defined nuclear policy goals. Through
long tenure on the Committee, men aueh as Senators
Brian hcKahon, Burke Hickenloopcr, Clinton Anderson,
John Restore, and Representatives Craig Ressner, Chet
Bolifield, and Melvin Price were able to acquire a high
degree of specialized knowledge which gave greater au-
thority to the Joint Committee and reinforced their
personal influence in Congress This influence was
used to foster a “vigorous, imaginative, and aggressive
atomic energy program, demanding boldness and risk-
taking rather than caution and economy Successive
presidents lagged behind the committee in enthusiasm

140

for bold nuclear programs , often preferring small-scale
projects .

While the Joint Committee divided internally, some-
times along partisan lines , on issues such as public
versus private electric power, the committee generally
supported the twin goals of developing commerical nu-
clear energy and modernizing nuclear weapons. The
Joint Committee could claim major responsibility for
such significant steps as development of the H-bomb,
expansion and diversification of American nuclear ar-
senal, development of nuclear-propelled submarines, and
development of a commercial nuclear power plant for
generating electricity.

Given its central role in nuclear policy, the Joint
Committee necessarily influenced U.S. foreign policy as
well as domestic policy. Generally, the committee
tended to resist the relaxation of nuclear secrecy
against pressures from the executive and private indus-
try for greater access. For example, the Joint Commit-
tee completely rewrote the Eisenhower Administration's
Atoms for Peace proposals. The resulting revision of
the Atomic Energy Act permitted the sharing of peaceful
nuclear technology with friendly countries and nuclear
weapons technology with selected allies subject to the
committee's authority to oversee this sharing. 7

The Joint Committee was more reluctant than the Ad-
ministration to share nuclear weapons technology with
allies. For example, the Joint Committee helped to
block nuclear aid to France when Secretary of State
John Foster Dulles seemed to favor such a possibility. 8
The committee was also concerned lest the Administra-
tion "give away" peaceful nuclear technology developed
at the American public's expense. For example, the
1958 U.S.-Euratom Joint Program subsidized the export
of several power reactors to Western Europe, along with
fuels and technical assistance for European research
and power programs. The Joint Committee supported this
program as a means of opening the European market to
the eventual sale of American nuclear power plants. 9

Mew Congressional Role

Given this history of involvement in all aspects of
nuclear policy, it is not surprising that Congress
should have taken the initiative on nonproliferation
policy in the mid-1970s. What was new about nonprolif-
eration -policy as it emerged from Congress in the mid-
1970s was that it reflected a different set of concerns
and involved a different set of actors than before.
The Joint Committee had been concerned with reconciling
national security interests in maintaining the secrecy
on nuclear technology with economic interest in promot-
ing the development of a nuclear energy industry. As

141

dependence on nuclear energy grew in the late 1960s,
doubts began to be expressed about the safety and
economic viability of nuclear plants As the salience
of the nuclear energy question grew, a larger number of
people sought to influence nuclear policy, challenging
the monopoly of the Joint Committee within Congress iu
The first casualty of this shift in the policy context
was the Atomic Energy Commission It was broken up in
1974 because its goals of promoting and regulating
nuclear energy were seen as increasingly incompatible
The Energy Research and Development Agency IPADA) and
the J.uclear Regulatory Commission were set up to take
the place of the Atomic Energy Commission, and in 1977,
the Department of Energy replaced the Energy Research
and Development Agency

The Indian nuclear test explosion in May 1974,
served as a catalyst for linking growing doubts about
the wisdom of US domestic nuclear energy policy with
growing concern about the worldwide proliferation of
nuclear weapons There was a feeling that the Joint
Committee had been co-opted by the nuclear energy pro-
moters, and, ironically, the Joint Committee was seen
as having been insufficiently cognisant of the dangers
of nuclear proliferation inherent in the export of U.S
nuclear fuels and facilities In sum, nuclear policy
had become too important to be left to a small number
of "initiates "

In the wake of the Indian nuclear test, there were
several congressional attempts to make American nuclear
export policy more restrictive, initiatives that were
generally opposed by the executive branch Under
President Pord, preventing the spread of nuclear weap-
ons capabilities began to receive more emphasis The
Ford Administration began to see v cooperation among
nuclear suppliers, but did not welcome efforts in Con-
gress, usually led by Democrats, to legislate nonpro-
liferation policy changes In the House, Representa-
tives Richard Cttinger (D-New York), Clarence Long
(D-Karyland) , and Jonathan Bingham (D-New York) were
active In moves to wrest control of nonproliferation
policy from the Administration and the Joint Commit-
tee, In the Senate, the Government Operations
Committee, under the leadership of Abraham RlbicpEf
<D-Connectieut), attempted to draft a comprehensive
nonproliferation policy Democratic Senators Stuart
Symington and John Glenn sponsored legislation to cut
off U “5 aid to countries importing uranium enrichment
facilities and plutonium reprocessing facilities be-
cause these would provide direct access to weapons
material 11 Finally, in 1977 the Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy was disbanded. From that time forward, a
number of Senate and House committees would compete for
control over various aspects of nuclear policy.

142

Nonproliferation Legislation

The advent of the Carter Administration in 1977
provided a favorable climate for cooperation with. Con-
gress, with the Democrats controlling both Houses as
well as the White House. Carter had seized on the non-
proliferation issue early in his presidential campaign,
and in April 1977 he submitted to Congress his Nuclear
Nonproliferation Policy Act. Over the next year, the
Administration bill was considered by several commit-
tees in both Houses, along with two other major pieces
of nonproliferation legislation — one emanating from the
House Foreign Affairs Committee and one reflecting the
views of Senator Glenn, Charles Percy, and others.
What resulted from these deliberations was the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA) , a tangled compro-
mise among the major actors that fully satisfied no one
but was acceptable to most. Passed in the House by a
vote of 411 to 0 and in the Senate by a vote of 88 to
3, the Nonproliferation Act of 1978 was signed into law
on March 10, 1978.

The Nonproliferation Act is a dense, often redun-
dant piece of legislation that establishes statutory
guidelines for a universally applicable nonprolifera-
tion policy based on restricting American nuclear ener-
gy exports. First, it establishes "fullscope safe-
guards” as a criterion for receiving any nuclear
material or nuclear facilities from the U.S. In other
words, if nations are to receive nuclear materials or
facilities from the U.S., they must allow international
inspection of all of their nuclear facilities, not
just those supplied by the U.S. This provision has
been referred to as a kind of "poor man's Nonprolifera-
tion Treaty," having direct impact on a handful of
nations that have nuclear agreements for cooperation
with the U.S., that have not ratified the Nonprolifera-
tion Treaty (NPT) , and that have some nuclear facili-
ties not presently being inspected by the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)— nations such as India,
Argentina, Spain, and South Africa.

A second, corollary provision of the Nonprolifera-
tion Act called for the renegotiation of all existing
agreements for cooperation with othe countries to re-
flect the changes in American law embodied in the Non-
proliferation Act. If the renegotiation efforts failed
in the 18 months alloted, then the Nonproliferation Act
requires an end to nuclear cooperation with the country
in question.

A third provision of the Nonproliferation Act gives
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) a role in nu-
clear export license approval. For example, the NRC is
to judge whether full-scope safeguards are in effect,
and whether physical security measures are adequate in
countries seeking to import nuclear fuels or facilities

143

ttoa the U S Giving this responsibility to an inde-
pendent regulatory agency diminished the control of the
President over nuclear exports and enlarged the formal
responsibilities of the NRC, extending its responsibil-
ities abroad.

A fourth provision of the Nonproliferation Act
asserts American control over other nations' reproces-
sing of spent nuclear fuel of American origin Most
existing agreements for cooperation establish that no
American-supplied fuel can be reprocessed without
mutual agreement between the U.S. and the country in
question, however, the agreements are not uniform and
this provision of the Nonproliferation Act was intended
to close any possible loopholes

Finally, the Nonproliferation Act allows the
President to waive the provisions of the act and
authorize a nuclear energy export if he judges that
"withholding the proposed export would be seriously
prejidlclal to the achievement of United States non-
proliferation objective# or would otherwise jeopardize
the common defense and security * A presidential
waiver would, however, be subject to review by Con-
gress through a 'legislative veto”*— the President's
waiver could be blocked by a concurrent resolution of
disapproval, requiring a majority vote of both
Houses, 12

With the Nonproliferation Act, Congress had enacted
a stringent nonproliferation policy, based on the per-
ceived link between civil nuclear energy programs and
nuclear weapons capabilities This policy was nondia-
erininatory, applicable to all countries that cooperate
with the US in nuclear energy The Carter Admini-
stration enthusiastically endorsed nonproliferation,
only objecting to a few of the most restrictive provi-
sions of the Nonproliferation Act such as the legisla-
tive veto of a presidential waiver

On the other hand, Congress baited at one part of
the Carter Administration's nonproliferation policy;
Carter sought to bring 0 S domestic policy into line
with his international nonproliferation objectives by
discouraging U 5 moves toward the reprocessing of
spent nuclear fuels by the recycling of plutonium in
light water and breeder reactors Carter also sought
to discourage other nations from reprocessing spent
fuel, avoiding the development of a so-called "pluton-
ium economy" worldwide But while Congress acquiesced
in postponing indefinitely commercial reprocessing In
the VS., it /raatrated Idniniftration efforts ir»
eliminate the Clinch River fast breeder reactor ptOto-
type under construction in Tennessee, As a result of

•See Chapters 1, 5, and 8 for* discussion of the 1993
Supreme Court decision concerning legislative vetoes

porkbarrel politics. Congress kept alive the plutonium-
fueled fast-breeder prograin at Clinch River. The re-
sult was a $15-jnillion-a-montb boondoggle that was no
longer a logical part of the nation's nuclear energy
program. Congress' action on Clinch River suggested to
some foreigners that America might not be completely
sincere in its efforts against the plutonium economy.

The Indian Nuclear Fuel Case

The controversy over the export of 38 tons of nu-
clear fuel to India came to a head in the summer of
1980. This controversy was important for two reason:
it was the first major test of the provisions of the
Nonproliferation Act of 1978, and it came in the wake
of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Therefore, this
issue was widely perceived as pitting nonproliferation
policy against geopolitical preoccupations in South
Asia. Since the Carter Administration had vigorously
supported nonproliferation policy during its first
three years, its advocacy of the Indian nuclear fuel
exports was seen by many as a significant reversal, the
kind of policy zig-zag for which the Administration was
widely criticized. The question was whether Congress
would follow the President's lead in this policy shift,
and if it were to do so, what the implications would be
for nonproliferation policy in the future.

As provided in the legislation, during the 18
months after the March 1978 enactment of the Nonpro-
liferation Act, the U.S. had sought to persuade the
Indian government to accept the "comprehensive safe-
guards" on all of its nuclear facilities, as a condi-
tion for continuing to receive American nuclear fuels.
The Desai government in India seemed genuinely opposed
to further nuclear tests or a nuclear weapons develop-
ment program, but it refused to accept comprehensive
safeguards as a matter of principle. The negotiations
on revising the nuclear cooperation agreement found-
ered. The return to power of Indira Gandhi in January
1980, changed both the tone of Indian policy and the
substance. Mrs. Gandhi refused to rule out future nu-
clear tests, and her government openly threatened that
the U.S. failure to supply India with nuclear fuel
would be considered a unilateral U.S. abrogation of the
1963 agreement for cooperation.

The Gandhi government argued that abrogation would
remove existing safeguards from U.S. -supplied facili-
ties and spent fuel stockpiles in India, and permit
India to seek nuclear fuel supplies for American power
reactors elsewhere — i.e., from the Soviet Union. India
would also feel free to reprocess the 200 tons of U.S.-
supplied spent fuel stockpiled in India, and to recycle
the plutonium obtained from the spent fuel in the

Tarapur reactors , or use reprocessed fuel in its breed-
er reactor program India might even use U.S. -derived
plutonium as part of a weapons program at some time in
the future 13 The State Department denied that the
Indian threats constituted a case of 'nuclear black-
mail,* but the U S government fears about the conse-
quences of stepping the supply of nuclear fuel to India
proved an ironic twist to the ’leverage* argument that
is so often used to justify American nuclear exports i
far from inhibiting India's pursuit of its own nuclear
policy objectives, u S. nuclearoid had given India con-
siderable influence over U.S nonproliferation policy
Two legal questions dominate the controversy
First, did the Nonproliferation Act of 1978 supercede
the 196? U S, -India agreement for cooperation? The
Indian government argued that the ti S could not uni-
laterally alter the terms of an existing international
agreement, and the State Department agreed that the
U S had a legal commitment to continue to supply fuel
to India H The second legal question was more compli-
cated, could shipments of nuclear fuel be made after
24 months from the Nonproliferation Act's passage if,
as in the Indian case, these licenses were properly
filed during the law’s 18 mohth renegotiation period?
The Administration argued that these licenses should be
approved, even though India did not conform to the
standards of the Nonproliferation Act, because the
licenses were filed within the 16-month period *5 But
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ruled that because 24
months had elapsed from the date of passage of the Non-
proliferation Act, the 18-month renegotiation period
and a 6-menth grace period, no licenses could be ap-
proved to countries not meeting Nonproliferation Act
standards Unfortunately, the legislative history

was not clear on Congress' intent regarding the rele-
vant provisiona of the Nonproliferation Act

These legal arguments raised important policy
questions Supporters of nuclear exports argued that
the U.S had a legal commitment under the 1963 agree-
ment to supply the Tarapur reactors with nuclear fuel.
However, opponents of the exports pointed out that the
Indian government had flaunted the 1963 “peaceful uses’
agreement when it used American-supplied heavy water to
produce the plutonium for its 1974 nuclear explosion
Export opponents also argued that the 1963 agreement
and agreements pursuant to it had to be consistent with
American law, and that there were ample precedents for
changes fn American law governing foreign ownership and
use of nuclear materials j

Although the Administration insisted that support
for these two fuel shipments would not constitute a
precedent. Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher
refused to rule out additional shipments to India be-
yond the disputed licenses tut opponents argued

146

that if the U.S. were to refuse fuel shipments in the
future, the Indians would once again cry "abrogation."
Opponents also argued that the approval of the two
pending licenses would only add to the stockpile of
spent fuel that the Indians would eventually feel free
to use, or abuse, as they saw fit — better to end co-
operation now than in the future.

Beyond a possible precedent for future Indian fuel
shipments, approving these licenses might have implica-
tions for nuclear fuel shipments to nations such as
South Africa, Spain, and Argentina. Each of these na-
tions has fuel-supply agreements with the U.S. that
predate the Nonproliferation Act; none has been willing
to accept comprehensive safeguards, and each had fuel
license applications pending in 1979. South Africa is
suspected of having a nuclear weapons development pro-
gram, and Argentina is a "nuclear threshhold" country.

It is significant that legal arguments should play
so prominent a part in the resolution of a question
that is fundamentally political. For legislators, many
of whom are lawyers, legal arguments have deep appeal,
especially where the level of interest in or infor-
mation about the political substance of the issue is
relatively low. It may well be, as Senator Glenn
concluded, that the Administration's legal case tipped
the scales in the President's favor in the Senate, and
thereby determined an outcome favorable to the
Administration. 1 9

Compared to these rather arcane legal points, the
geopolitical calculations behind the Carter Administra-
tion's endorsement of the fuel export licenses were ob-
vious. The Russian invasion of Afghanistan in December
1979 reinforced frantic attempts to bolster the U.S.
position in an area which had already been seen as vol-
atile as a result of the Iranian hostage crisis. The
initiative for these attempts, like much of the foreign
policy of the last year of the Carter Administration,
came from the National Security Council.

It was National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brze-
zinski who publicly offered to extend military aid to
Pakistan without first consulting either Pakistan or
the Congress. The failure to consult Pakistan contri-
buted to the ultimate rejection by General Mohammed
Zia-ul-Haq, the Pakistani leader, of the $450 million
aid package as "peanuts. "20 Brzezinski made a highly
publicized trip to Pakistan, and was photographed
pointing a rifle in the direction of Soviet troops on
the other side of the Khyber Pass. Thus, Brzezinski
managed to further increase tensions with the Soviet
Union while failing to win the support of Pakistan.
Advance consultation with Congress was important, since
assistance to Pakistan had been cut off earlier in 1979
as a result of the 1975 Symington amendment to the For-
eign Assistance Act. Pakistan is known to be proceed-

inq with a clandestine uranium-enrichment program as
part of the effort to construct an ■Islamic bomb." 2 *
The U S eld cutoff was required by the Symington
amendment, and only a presidential ruling that supreme
U S. interests were Involved could clear the way for
the necessary congressional approval of aid to Paki-
stan Given the situation in Southvest Asia after the
invasion oE Afghanistan, there was support in the Sen-
ate for allowing the resumption of military aid to Pak-
istan However, there was little support in Congress
for what General zio really wanted and what Brterinaki
proposed informally! a long-term militray commitment
guaranteeing Pakistan's security The Senate was pre-
pared to go no further than responding to the present
emergency, without assuming long-term obligations
Sentiment toward Pakistan was not altogether favorable
on Capitol Hlllx only a few months earlier, a mob had
sacked and burned the U S Embassy in Islamabad, and
the Zia government had done Uttle to protect the Amer-
ican personnel and their dependents

Administration support for the Indian nuclear fuel
licenses emerged aa part of a regional balancing act.
If the 0 S proponed to help Pakistan, and had to bend
U S nonproliferation policy in order to do so, then
the U S had to do something for Ihdia at the same
time The pending nuclear fuel licenses provided a
neat solution However, the Administration persisted
in trying to provide the fuel to India even after the
collapse of the effort to renew aid to Pakistan Pres-
ident Carter promised to deliver the fuel to India in a
private letter to Mrs Gandhi, and the Administration
thereafter argued that the U.S. was 'committed* to this
course of action.

The $1. 6-billion arms deal between the U.S S.R. and
India, announced in May 1980, paradoxically strength-
ened the determination of the Carter Administration to
deliver the nuclear fuel to India Opponents of the
fuel export pointed to Mrs. Gandhi's growing dependence
on the U S S.R. and her initially uncritical reaction
to Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, and asked, 'Why
should we do her any favors?' Put the Administration
argued that because Soviet influence in India was grow-
ing, the U.S had to compete. 22 The nuclear fuel ex-
port licenses were a pending issue that could be imple-
mented quickly, without major resource allocation
problems

The bureaucratic line-up on the nuclear fuel
license case was more complex than usual Brier inski
and the Rational Security Council Initiated the policy
to bolster the U.S position in South Afiia, but the
execution of the fuel license policy was largely left
to the State Department The State Department wbb
divided internally along fairly predictable lines The
country office people — those who followed U»$ -India

148

relations on a day-to-day basis — supported the fuel
exports as a means of bettering relations with India.
Many State Department area specialists had never given
more than luke-warm support to a comprehensive
nonproliferation policy. By training and institutional
interest, they tended toward a "case-by-case" approach
to nonproliferation, which usually meant trying to pre-
vent nonproliferation policy from damaging U.S. rela-
tions with their particular countries. This approach
had prevailed in the Nixon-Ford Administration decision
to not . protest the 1974 Indian test explosion, and in
moves to improve ties with Brazil in the wake of the
1975 German-Brazil ian nuclear energy agreement. Within
the State Department, support for the Carter Admini-
stration's comprehensive nonproliferation policy was to
be found mostly in those offices with functional re-
sponsibilities that cut across specific regional bound-
aries — International Security Assistance, Political-
Military Affairs, and Policy Planning. The influence
of nonproliferation advocates in the State Department
waned with the departure of key Carter appointees such
as Joseph Nye and Leslie Gelb, and many believed that
Carter's appointee as especial ambassador for nonpro-
liferation, veteran diplomat Gerard Smith, had stepped
back from the earlier, aggressive nonproliferation pol-
icy. Coincidentially, Smith had negotiated the 1963
nuclear cooperation agreement with India and he strong-
ly supported the President's decision to ship nuclear
fuel to India.

However, it came as a surprise to many that the new
Secretary of State Edmund Muskie, chose to side with
the supporters of the Indian fuel exports. Muskie had
resigned from the Senate in April 1980, to succeed
Cyrus Vance at the Department of State. Muskie 's re-
cord in the Senate and the views of some of his staff
created speculation that Muskie might reverse the
decision to go ahead with the Indian fuel licenses as a
last-minute "midnight judges" attempt to present the
new Secretary of State with a fait accompli . If this
was indeed the intent, it apparently worked; within a
few days of becoming the Secretary of State, Muskie
became the Administration's most effective advocate on
behalf of the nuclear fuels exports to India.

The other important institutional actor was the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Of the five commis-
sioners, only Victor Gilinsky had a strong record in
favor of a vigorous nonproliferation policy. Gilinsky
lobbied actively against shipping nuclear fuel to
India. The positions of most of the other Nuclear
Regulatory Commissioners against the Indian nuclear
licenses indicated that their unanimous rejection of
the licenses was based on their limited statutory au-
thority. In other words, even though they felt prohib-
ited by the terns of the Nonproliferation Act from

149

approving the licenses themselves, they did not neces-
sarily oppose the President acting by executive or-
der 23 The legally circunscribed position of the Nu-
clear Regulatory Commission did, however, serve to put
the burden of proof on the President — and, given the
situation in the summer of 1992, President Carter was
forced, in turn, to convince the U S Senate

Focusing on the Senate

The ultimate responsibility for deciding the Indian
fuel licensee export question fell to the Senate be-
cause the Nonproliferation Act requires a concurrent
resolution of disapproval to block a presidential exec-
utive order— i e , a majority vote of both Houses
against the President Under the Nonproliferation Act,
the Congress provided 6 check on the executive by giv-
ing the authority to license nuclear exports to the in-
dependent Nuclear Regulatory Conroisaion By giving the
President the option to proceed counter to a Nuclear
Regulatory Commission ruling. Congress provided the
President with discretion and flexibility to be used in
exceptional circumstances And, by retaining the op-
tion to review a presidential exception. Congress pro-
vided b mechanism for assuring that the intent of the
Nonproliferation Act would not be ignored unless Con-
gress agreed with the President that it should be.
This is an example of the kind of legislation device
that Congress seeB as essential to its ‘oversight*
functions but which the executive branch often feels
encroaches on its prerogatives to "execute" the lav

From the beginning, the House seemed certain to
reject the presidential order. On June 11, Clement
Zablocki, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Commit-
tee, warned the President privately that a majority of
hia committee would oppose the fuel shipments, with the
implication that a majority of the House would probably
follow suit, Zablocki and Representative Bingham were
the main nonproliferation spokesmen in the House and
two of the legislators most responsible for the passage
of the Nonproliferation Act They were neither "anti-
India* nor "anti-Carter >* indeed, Zablocki, Bingham,
and ethers were interested in the possibility of some
sort of compromise that might avoid a direct confronta-
tion with the President on this issue Proposals such
as approval of the shipment of reactor spare parts and
components without nuclear fuel were discussed with the
Administration Former State Department spokesman on
nonproliferation, Joseph Nye, proposed the approval of
one of the two fuel licenses as a way of avoiding an
embaraasing defeat for the Administration that would
also compromise U £ foreign policy objectives 24

It soon became clear that there was little hope for

150

winning House approval, even of a compromise. The
Indian government's expressed willingness to sell food
and other supplies to Iran to break the U.S. blockade
did little to improve the climate of opinion in the
House. 25 since a negative vote in the House alone
would not block the President, the Administration wrote
off the House and concentrated its lobbying on the Sen-
ate. The September 10 voice vote of the House Foreign
Affairs Committee in favor of the resolution of disap-
proval and the September 18 House vote of 298-98 in
favor of disapproval had been long anticipated by the
Administration. However, the nearly 3 to 1 margin of
the House vote did raise fears that the anti-nuclear
export momentum would spread to the Senate .

The Bouse has a reputation in the eyes of the for-
eign policy community, fairly or not, as being erratic
in its behavior on foreign policy questions — too easily
influenced by domestic constituency pressures and other
considerations that foreign policy professionals often
consider "extraneous." Images to the contrary notwith-
standing, the House vote to overrule the President and
deny the nuclear fuel shipments to India would appear
to be more consistent with established nonproliferation
policy that the subsequent Senate vote; in effect, the
House was acting responsibly to maintain the continuity
of American foreign policy in the face of the Carter
Administration's policy shift. The Senate has the
image of being more "responsible," i.e., more inclined
than the House to follow the President. This has not
always been true, but, in this case, the Senate did
follow the Administration lead.

For most senators, the Indian nuclear fuel license
question was not a major issue; certainly, as a foreign
policy concern it was subordinate to the ongoing hos-
tage crisis in Iran and the Soviet intervention in
Afghanistan. And the issue came to the Senate just as
the 1980 campaign season was heading into its most
intense period. Some senators who had been interested
in the issue of nonproliferation in the past — such as
Stuart Symington — were no longer in the Senate; others
— such as Ribicoff — showed limited interest in the
question. The key Senate spokesman on behalf of non-
proliferation policy in 1980 was John Glenn. His mem-
bership on the Foreign Relations Committee .and his
chairmanship of the subcommittee of the Government
Operations Committee that handles nonproliferation
questions put him in an influential position and pro-
vided him with an able and experienced staff to help
handle this issue. But Glenn was also in the middle of
a re-election campaign, as were Foreign Relations Com-
mittee Chairman Frank Church and ranking Republican
Jacob Javits, and all were frequently out of Washington
in the summer of 1980. However, the delay in Senate
consideration of the President's executive order until
well into the 60-day period provided by law was largely

1S1

due to Administration requests for time to lobby imcora-
*ii feted senators

The Administration sought the support of Senate
Majority Leader Robert C. Byrd Bis help had been cru-
cial in the Tan&ma Canal Treaties debate, and he had
done a great deal to keep alive the possibility of ap-
proving the SALT II Treaty through early 1900 But, by
the summer of 1980, relations between the Carter White
House and the Senate leadership were at an all-time
low Byrd made it clear early on that the Senate would
study the Indian nuclear fuel question carefully, 26 tut
he was not personally very interested in the issue
When preoccupied with other matters, Byrd was inclined
to fellow the lead of hie committee chairmen Without
a major push from the Democratic leadership, the Admin-
istration had to carry the burden of convincing a ma-
jority of the Senate to support its position on the
Indian nuclear fuel licenses A resolution of disap-
proval was filed in the Senate by Barry t Byrd, Jr of
Virginia on June 20, two days after the President
signed his executive order* a substitute resolution was
considered by the Foreign Relations Committee, where
Senator Glenn was its sponsor and principal advocate

The State Department began to lobby the Senate in-
tensively at all levels, U S Ambassador to India
Robert P Goheen was brought heme to Washington to per-
sonally plead India's caae with senators; however the
Indian Ambassador in Washington kept a low profile
throughout Secretary Kuskie spent an extraordinary
amount of time lobbying his former colleagues in the
5enate on thin issue; he became the first Democrat ever
to address the Republican Policy Committee 22 And in
the days immediately proceeding the final vote on the
Senate floor, the President took tine away from a «id-
vest campaign swing to lobby senators; he phoned sever-
al senators from Air Force One in what waa conceded by
Senator Glenn to be a very effective lobbying effort 28

Commit tea Action

The first teat of the Administration's strength
came in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee From
the first, key committee staffers, some of whom were
former foreign service officers, strongly favored nu-
clear fuel exports to India Both majority and minor-
ity staffers sought to bolster the Administration’s
case for the exports, in part to "carry water" for the
State Department i and in part out of a preference for
the "case-by-case" approach to nonproliferation Bi-
partisan support for the Administration was equally
evident in the committee membership Ranking Republi-
cans Javlts and Percy were the strongest proponents of
shipping nuclear fuel to India, both in the committee
and during the floor debate Javits, often called the

152

"Senate's lawyer", by his colleagues, based his advocacy
on his interpretation of the legal obligations flowing
from the 1963 agreement for cooperation, 2 9 while Percy
stressed the importance of improved relations with the
Indian government to overall U.S. foreign policy. 30
Percy's position was particularly interesting because
he had been one of the promoters of the Nonprolifera-
tion Act in 1978, and because he subsequently became
Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee when the
1980 elections returned a Republican majority to the
Senate. (Javits would have become chairman- had he not
been defeated in 1980.) Foreign Relations Chairman
Frank Church admitted that there 'were good arguments on
both sides of the issue, but concluded that because it
was a close call, he was inclined to support the Admin-
istration.^ This position probably accurately sums up
the feelings of many senators who had no particular
interest in the question. Church also revealed an Ad-
ministration promise that only one of the two fuel
shipments would be made immediately. 3 2

Senator Glenn led the fight against the President's
action, arguing that it was a betrayal of the Admini-
stration's own nonproliferation policy that would sow
doubt about America's steadfastness and raise problems
in our relations with other nuclear threshhold coun-
tries. 33 Glenn scored a signal victory when the For-
eign Relations Committee voted to disapprove the Presi-
dent’s executive order by a vote of 8-7.

The Administration was surprised by the loss and
the unpredictability of the line-up: Glenn was joined
by liberal Democrats George McGovern, Paul Tsongas,
Joseph Biden, and Claiborne Pell, and the Republican
conservatives Jesse Helms, S. I. Hayakawa, and Richard
Lugar. Republican Minority Leader Baker joined Percy
and Javits, and Democratic Senators Church, Paul
Sarbanes, Richard Stone, and Edward Zorinsky in support
of the President.

The Senate Vote

When the debate moved to the Senate floor on Sep-
tember 23, there was a replay of the arguments within
the Foreign Relations Committee but with a different
outcome. The. major figures in the debate were Percy
and Glenn. Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-New
York), an ex-Ambassador to India, predictably supported
the full shipments. Senator Alan Cranston (D-Cali-
fornia) took a strong stand against shipping the fuel
and in favor of adhering to the letter and spirit of
the Nonproliferation Act, a position he had earlier
enunciated as a witness before the Foreign Relations
Committee. 34 The arguments which seemed to carry the
most weight were the legal points , especially the

153

Administration's contention that the 0 s had an ob-
ligation to supply nuclear fuel when licenses were
filed before September 10, 1980 And, while there was
no great outpouring of affection or support for India,
there was obviously a belief among many senators that
the geopolitical situation in South Asia required some
attempt to improve the U S position there.

On September 24, the resolution of disapproval
failed by a 46-48 vote? therefore the Senate upheld the
President’s decision to authorize the shipment of 38
tons of nuclear fuel to India As in the Foreign Rela-
tions Committee, the vote on the Senate floor cut
across party and ideological lines— Majority leader
Byrd voted with the President while Majority Whip
Cranston voted against. Minority Leader Baker and Mi-
nority Whip Ted Stevens both voted to support the Ad-
ministration Conservatives such as Helms, Gordon
Humphrey, end Harry Byrd voted against the Administra-
tion, while conservatives such as James McClure and
Jake Garn voted with the Administration Liberals from
both parties were on each side of the issue — Republican
Charles McC Mathias and Democrat Thomas Eagleton voted
with the Administration, Democrat Fdvard Kennedy and
Republican Mark Hatfield voted against Hor did being
up for re-election seem to incline senators one way or
another— George McGovern and Gary Hart voted against
the Administration, while Church and Javits voted with
the Administration The result was a narrow victory
and a source of satisfaction for an embattled Admini-
stration, whose foreign policy woes were a major lia-
bility in its fight for re-election

Influences on Congressional Action

There are several factors that seem to account for
Congress 1 behavior in the Indian nuclear fuel case To
the extent that the same or similar factors are found
to be important in other cases, these factors may have
explanatory ns well aa descriptive significance

bonprol iteration is one of those issue areas that
bridge the gap between foreign and domestic politics,
and between security concerns and economic interests
America's stake in limiting the spread of nuclear weap-
ons in an uncertain world has to be reconciled with
America's economic interest in civil nuclear energy
exports. The overlap of 'high politics" and "low poli-
tics" guarantees the active interest and involvement of
Congress in this kind of issue However, in the case
of the Indian nuclear fuel licenses in 1980, national
security calculations df a traditional, geopolitical
sort clearly predominated in the actions of the Carter
Administration American economic interests were very
limited in this particular case? At stake were future

154

fuel supplies, but no major reactor or other nuclear
equipment orders. Mired in other problems, the U.S.
nuclear industry did not mount a major lobbying effort
in support of continuing fuel shipments to India. Fur-
thermore, there was no domestic ethnic group lobbying
on this issue — either on behalf of or in opposition to
India. In the absence of the two most potent domestic
interest factors that have an impact on most " internes-
tic" issues (issues on which the international-domestic
distinction is blurred), the Carter Administration suc-
ceeded in posing the question in a national security
vein. On national security questions, the Congress is
still inclined to defer to the President, even if it
does so less automatically than in the past.

The Indian nuclear fuel case provides a good exam-
ple of the use of the "legislative veto" provisions
Congress wrote into a number of laws . 35 It is impor-
tant to note that in spite of all the controversy sur-
rounding the legislative veto, there is no example of
Congress successfully blocking an important foreign
policy initiative by the President by this device) how-
ever, the threat of a legislative veto has compelled
the President to consult with Congress. If, as in the
case of the Indian nuclear fuel licenses, the President
is prepared to fight for what he wants, he often gets
his way.

How an issue is perceived is closely related to the
salience of the issue to the President and to members
of Congress., The more a question is seen as a tradi-
tional national security issue, the more the President
might be expected to prevail over his congressional
competitors. This is reflected in the attitude of some
senators that if it was a close call, then the Presi-
dent should have his way. But obviously, this feeling
did not prevail in the House, which sought to uphold
the letter and spirit of the Nonproliferation Act in
the Indian nuclear fuel case and to block the Presi-
dent's waiver. If the issue had been of higher sali-
ence, if more senators had been convinced that the
question was fundamentally important, then more might
have been willing to challenge the President on the
nuclear fuel question. Many senators did not see this
as an important issue, and this worked to the advantage
of the Administration. Because the stakes were higher
for the President — both in terms of his foreign policy
objectives in South Asia and in terms of his image at-
home in the presidential campaign — he was willing to
expand extraordinary effort on the Indian nuclear fuel
question, and many senators were inclined to allow him
to have his way.

The structure of the Senate was an important factor
influencing the outcome in this case. The leadership
was not crucial in marshalling support for the Presi-
dent either in the Foreign Relations Committee or on
the Senate floor, but leadership also posed no major

155

obstacles to the President* in the absence of strong
push from leadership, Senator Glenn was able to use his
position as chairman of a subcommittee of the Govern-
ment Operations Coemittee to lead the campaign against
the Administration on a foreign policy question Given
the low salience of the issue and the state of rela-
tions between the White House and the Senate leader-
ship* Glenn was never in danger of being sanctioned be-
cause of his efforts

Personalities played a very important role in de-
termining the outcome in this instance The major
actors, Glenn and Percy, were both popular among their
colleagues? there is no evidence of personal scores
being settled in this case The fact that ex-Senator
Huahie had recently become Secretary of State was un-
doubtedly the major ABset the Administration had at its
disposal Muskie's active lobbying of his former col-
leagues on this question, his first major foreign pol-
icy initiative, was effective Muskie was widely liked
and respected in the Senate, more than the President he
served. Some of those who did not feel strongly about
the question of the Indian nuclear fuel licenses were
doubtless swayed to back Secretary of State Muskie on
this issue, even though on questions they might per-
ceive as core important, they would have been prepared
to oppose him

It would be excessively rational to conclude that
the outcome of the deliberations of a legislative body
necessarily constitute a Judgment on the merits of the
iasue Obviously, secondary questions and sometimes
wholly extraneous matters can influence, if not deter-
mine, the outcome Rationally, one might assert that
the Senate vote in this case was a Judgment on the
merits of US nonproliferation policy generally and
its specific application to India However, a close
examination of the record suggests that secondary con-
siderations may have been more persuasive than the pri-
mary arguments

The legal dimensions of the problem helped to muddy
the waters. Even those senators who might have been
inclined to uphold nonproliferation policy and fidelity
to the letter of the law could differ on what the law
demanded? unilateral abrogation of a contract is a
difficult thing for senators to approve, especially
those with legal training, it was easier to argue that
these two particular licenses should be exempt from the
requirements of the honpro life rat ion Act, without pas-
sing judgment on the merits of the law itself Thuc,
the decision to 6itfe with the Adomistratfott o<tc a
clear-cut vote to endorse local geopolitical objectives
at the expense of universal nonproliferation objec-
tives in sum, the Senate acted to support the Pres-
ident by a very close vote, in circumstances that make
it difficult to conclude that there was a meaningful
consensus on a shift in U 5. nonproliferation policy.

156

Whither Nonproliferation?

There are two general questions about the future of
U,S. nonproliferation policy that the Indian fuel case
raises: whether the universal approach to nonprolifera-
tion established 'by the Nonproliferation Act should be
abandoned in favor of a selective application of non-
proliferation measures, and whether this kind of for-
eign policy issue is better left to wide executive dis-
cretion or narrow statutory limits.

The consensus on a universal approach to nonprolif-
eration seems to have been lost — abandoned first as a
matter of expediency by the Carter Administration, then
as a matter of principle by the Reagan Administration.
The former is more comprehensible than the latter:
there will always be a tension between following a
"policy" and responding ad hoc to events, and in the
third year of the Carter Administration the latter won
out. And yet, the record of the first three years of
nonproLiferation policy was substantial and positive. 36
Certainly, making an exception for India in I960 was a
policy failure, bringing none of the supposed benefits
in terms of U.S. -Indian relations. In the first few
months of 1981 nuclear cooperation between the two na-
tions broke down and termination of the 1963 agreement
was again a possibility. And, as predicted, India in-
sisted that the O.S. was guilty of abrogating the con-
tract, and therefore would have no control over the ac-
cumulated stockpile of nuclear fuel of U.S. origin.
During Mrs. Gandhi's visit to Washington in August
1982, it was announced that the O.S. would allow France
to assume the responsibility of supplying fuel to the
Tarapur reactors. However, this "solution" may have
been no more than a diplomatic way to paper over
persisting problems. After Mrs. Gandhi's return home,
it was unclear whether France would be much more ac-
comodating than the U.S. had been with regard to plu-
tonium separation and Indian rights to re-use plutonium
as they see fit. 37 And the Reagan Administration ap-
peared ready to resume some forms of nuclear cooper-
ation with India, such as the supply of spare parts for
Tarapur .

The major objection to a universal approach to the
nonproliferation problem is that such a policy must be,
by definition, insensitive to specific circumstances,
especially to the differences between friendly nations
and others. Such a rigid policy can only be defended
when compared to the defects of the alternative case-
by-case approach. First, and most important, a case-
by-case approach easily amounts to having no "policy
at all. In international politics, there are only
special cases, as every diplomat knows. The choice is
between being blind to the rich diversity of interna-
tional politics or being arbitrary, choosing to oppose

157

the aspirations of one nation while favoring the
aspirations of others A universal nonproliferation
policy offends those lew countries who are friends and
whose nuclear programs will be negatively affected? a
selective nonproliferation policy offends the many who
ere inclined to support nonproliferation objectives but
who resent exceptions being made for a chosen few

The second defect of a selective, caBe-by-caae ap-
proach to nonproliferation is thst it is almost impos-
sible for the U.S governoent, as presently consti-
tuted, to implement such a policy successfully The
formulation and Implementation of American foreign pol-
icy is a complex process involving multiple institu-
tional actors To be successfully implemented, foreign
policy positions must bo clearly stated and communi-
cated to all parts of the foreign policy apparatus
That is why o universally applicable set of nonorolif-
eration atandards la a more effective basis for Ameri-
can policy than a selective, case-fcy-case approach,
varying from country to country To be successful ,
selectivity requires a degree of flexibility and
secrecy that are lmcotpatible with American political
practices The choice is between tailoring institu-
tions to fit policy objectives, or tailoring policies
to what political institutions will permit

While there was an apparent shift in tJ.S nonpro-
liferation policy in I960, there were no immediate
changes in nonproliferation legislation, and this was a
source of ambiguity The Nonproliferation Act was one
of several recent attempts by Congreas to legislate
foreign policy in substantial detail Policies

grounded in law have the advantage of providing coher-
ence and continuity because laws do not change as often
«a events Policies embodied in statutes reflect not
the transitory judgment of the executive foreign policy
establishment but also the judgment of Congress These
policies ere more likely to be effective, less subject
to being undermined in their implementation Such pol-
icies also have a better claim to public support as
representing the national interest And finally, leg-
islating foreign policy is an attempt to master inter-
national events rather than allowing events to dictate
policy

As long as the executive and Congress generally
agree on the problem in question, legislating policy
may work well — President Carter’s position on nonpro-
liferation policy was strengthened by the fact that
thlo policy had a statutory base. However, when the
executive and Congress diverge on an issue — as occurred
in the Indian case, with the House voting overwhelming-
ly against the president— then institutional confronta-
tion and legal confusion threaten Paradoxically, leg-
islating policy seems to work best when it is least
needed, when the executive and Congress generally agree

158

on what should be done; legislating policy seems to
work worst when it is most needed, when substantial
differences exist about what the policy is or should
be. The latter was the case under the Reagan Admini-
stration, which sought to remove some of the nuclear
export restrictions in the face of resistance from
Congress.

There are two ways to avoid an impasse on nonpro-
liferation policy: either the policy can be adjusted
to conform to legislation or the legislation altered to
conform to the prevailing policy. Failing to do one of
these two things breeds policy confusion and disrespect
for law. Neither confusion nor disrespect serve the
interests of American foreign policy. The Indian nu-
clear fuel controversy posed this problem without
answering it.

NOTES

1. Congressional Quarterly , July 25, 1981,
pp. 1348-49; and July 12, 1981, pp. 1223-28.

2. James L. Malone, "Nuclear Cooperation and Non-
proliferation Strategy," U.S. Department of State, Cur-
rent Policy N. 354 , December 1, 1981? see also Lewis
Dunn, Controlling the Bomb (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1982 ) .

3. Congressional Quarterly , December 10, 1981,
pp. 2497989? General Accounting Office, Report to the
Congress: The Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978
Should Be Selectively Modified (Washington: Government
Printing Office, May 21, 1981).

4. Thomas Morgan, Atomic Energy and Congress (Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1963).

5. Harold P. Green and Alan Rosenthal, Government
of the Atom (New York: Atherton Press, 1963).

6. Ibid., p.105.

7. Harold Nieburg, Nuclear Secrecy and Foreign
Policy (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1964), p.4.

8. William Bader, The United States and the
Spread of Nuclear Weapons (New York: Pegasus, 1968),
pp. 26-35.

9. "Review of the International Policies and
Programs of the U.S." "Report to the Joint Committee
on Atomic Energy," October I960 (Washington, GPO,
I960); and Irvin C. Bupp and Jean-Claude Derian, Light
Water (New York: Basic Books, 1978), esp. Chapter 1.

10. Clarence Long, "Nonproliferation: Can Con-
gress Act in Time?" International Security , spring
1977, vol.l, no. 4.

11. Ibid.; and Warren Donnelly, "Congress and Non-
proliferation, 1945-1977," in Alan Platt and Lawrence
D. Weiler, eds., Congress and Arms Control (Boulder:
Westview, 1978).

159

12, Public Law 95-242, March 10, 1978

13 See The Time a of India , March 20, 1980 i and

Robert T* Coheen in Th» Washington Post , June 27, 1980

1* Testimony ~Ey Warren Christopher before the
g S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and Commit-
tee on Governmental Affairs, June 19, 1980,

15 “Application of Section 128 of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954 vith Respect to Fuel Exports to
India," Memorandum of law, Department of State, June
18, 1980

16 Leonard Bickvitt, 'Application of Section 127

and 128 of the Atomic Energy Act to Proposed Exports to
India,* Muclear Regulatory Commission, May 12, 1980,

and Memorandum and order, CLI-80-, Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, May 16, 1980

17 See 'Separate Views of Commissioners Gilinsky
and Bradford,* in The Hatter of NSC Export License Ap -
plication XSHM-1322 , March 23, 1979, p 5, fn 15

18 Christopher statement

19. Congressional Quarterly , September 27, 1980,

p 2872.

20 The hew York Tiroes , January 18, 1930, p 1

21 The Christian Science Monitor , November 30,

1981. ” ~

22. Christopher statement

23, WRC Memorandum and Order CLI-80

24 The New York Tires , August 30, 1980, p 15,

25 The^aah irigton' fost , June U, I960

26 Congressional' Record , Wednesday, May 21, 1980,

p £566?

27

p, 513216/

28 Congressional
p, 813211

29, Congrei

Congressional Record . September 23, 1900,

September 23, 1980,

Record ,

sslonal Record, September

1980,

pp. 513249-527

30, Congressional
pp S1321S-19

31, Congressional
pp,S13255-57

32 Ibid , p S13255.

33 Congressional Record , September 23,

Record , September 23,
Record, September 24,

1980, pp

813209-27, and September 1980, pp S13249-63 ad. interim

34. Congressional Record , September 24, isau,
pp.S!3265-?6

35 See, for example, Thomas E Cronin, *A ***)”;“
gent Congress and the Imperial Presidency, Political
Science Quarterly i vol 95, no 2, summer 1980, PMU~
25j and congressional Quarterly , July 13 1 l98 J' ?

36. 'See, lorexampIeT Joseph 5 Hye, ‘Maintaining

a Nonproliferation Regime,' Internation a l Organisati on,
winter, 1981, . ,,

37. Link (New Delhi) September 5, 1982, pp 33-i«.

7

The Senate and Arms Control:
The SALT Experience

/. Philip Rogers

If Congress is to play a significant role in the
formulation of United States foreign policy, it could
scarcely address a more critical issue than nuclear
arms control. However, while all agree that avoiding
nuclear war is an essential goal, there is considerable
disagreement over the best means to achieve this goal.
Given the gravity and controversial nature of the is-
sue, the involvement of Congress might be seen as de-
sirable since Congress is ostensibly the most "repre-
sentative" branch of government. This normative con-
cern for democratic decision-making has been coupled
with the pragmatic belief that the Senate might be more
likely to approve an arms control treaty which it had a
hand in developing. Finally, congressional involvement
in the area of arms control has been advanced as a
means for keeping this issue at the forefront of execu-
tive branch attention. When executive interest in arms
controls seems to lapse, as many believed was the case
early in the Reagan Administration, congressional de-
bate can reinvigorate the issue.

Taken together, these arguments seem to make a
strong prima facie case for congressional involvement
throughout the arms control process. How well do these
arguments fare in the light of empirical evidence?

The first major episode of congressional involve-
ment in the nuclear arms control process occurred in
the late 1950s and early 1960s. At that time, the pri-
mary concern of the public was the effects of radioac-
tive fallout from the atmosphere nuclear tests. Even-
tually, the Senate would approve the 1963 Limited Test
Ban Treaty. In that case, the Senate was able to work
well with the Kennedy Administration to accomplish the
arms control objectives it sought. Significantly, Con-
gress did so without sacrificing an open and vigorous
debate on the issue.

While this early experience tended to support the
argument for congressional involvement, later experi-
ence raised some serious questions. The most important

160

period for arms control is the era of SALT— -the Strate-
gic Arras Limitation Talks. The SALT process stretched
from 1969-1979. During thie tine, two formal agree-
ments, SALT I in 1972 and SALT II in 1979, were pro-
duced. SALT I vine overwhelmingly approved by the Sen-
ate after relatively little debate and little prior
consultation, while SALT ll was shelved aEter lengthy
Senate hearings and the intense involvement of various
senators throughout the negotiating process

Wth the failure of the Senate to approve the SALT
II Treaty, It might he argued that perhaps the Senate
is inherently ill-suited for major participation in
arms control negotiations Nuclear arms agreements may
be an exception to a generally valid principle— an area
of foreign policy in which rornally desirable institu-
tional characteristics such as public debate are imeom-
patlhle with the overriding qoal of securing nuclear
ams agreements. The Senate's fsilure to complete
action on SALT II after it was signed In 1979 could be
at least partially attributed to factors not directly a
part of the treaty Nonetheless, the failure of the
Senate to approve an agreement negotiated over a period
of seven years by three presidents points up the need
to weigh normative considerations favoring congression-
al participation against an equally valid need for con-
sistency in foreign policy, and for what many see as
the critical need to secure arms control agreements

There are five arguments that have been made in
questioning a major role for Congress in artiB control
negotiatlcnB* 1

(11 Members of Congress do net have the
requisite expertise to understand the
arcane facts of arms control.

(2) Open congressional debate on US arms
control policy weakens U S bargaining
leverage in dealing with the Soviets

(3) The decentralized nature of Congress and
its •adverserial* relationship with the
President makes presidential consultation
difficult This further inhibits the
development of coherent policy

14) Congressional approval frequently comes
at too high a price* e.g « with promises
of increased defense spending in areas
not covered by the agreement

(5) Congressional involvement throughout the
proceed * politicizes" the issue Arms
control agreements are particularly sus-
ceptible to "grandstanding." The open
and political nature of debate in Con-
gress forestalls the achievement of ser-
ious progress and makes final approval
problematic

treaties to come before this body in a good
many years Vet, there seems to be little in-
terest on the part of the membership to dis-
cuss the pending business. We will have to
twiddle our thumbs and wait for the expiration
of the time limit unless .(someone) under-
takes their constitutional responsibility

Despite Mansfield's plea, the debate was short and
the treaty was overwhelmingly approved by an 88-2
margin 5

The SALT 1 agreement actually consisted of two
parts! the treaty restricting the deployment of ABM
systems and an agreement imposing certain limits on of-
fensive weapons. If public and congressional informa-
tion was sparse with regard to the evolution of the ABM
Treaty* it was virtually non-existent concerning the
offensive weapons negotiations Throughout the entire
negotiation period, with only rare exceptions. Congress
and the public were kept totally In the dark on the de-
velopments A few senators did make an attempt to
gather more information Senator John Sherman Cooper
(R-Kentucky) attempted to attend the negotiations in
Vienna, but hie visits were without official sanction
(Chief SALT negotiator Cerard Smith is said to have
favored his participation, but Henry Kissinger vetoed
It ) Cooper never was allowed to participate in or
even observe any substantive negotiations 6

Brooke Resolution

Tho primary congressional concern in the area of
offensive weapons was the widespread belief that a re-
striction or bail on MIRVs should be Bought Throughout
1969 a plethora of congressional resolutions were sub-
mitted calling for a limit or a ban on MIRVa Probably
the most widely aupported of these was proposed by Sen-
ator Edward Brooke (R-Maasachusetta) in June 1969 7
Despite its widespread support* however, Brooke's re-
solution languished in the Foreign Relations Committee
for almost a year without action According to Alton
Frye, the reason fot Senate inaction was that various
senators were given the impression by the Nixon Admin-
istration that actual deployment of O.S MIRVs would be
held in abeyance during the upcoming SALT negotiations
in hopes that a ban could be obtained In addition.
Step *>?t\9 tors b&SSeveS that pvrft further MIRV testing
would not be conducted since the Soviets still had not
achieved their first successful test. Apparently the
feeling on Capitol Hill was that since the basic le-
gislative intent* of the Brooke Resolution was sat-
isfied, actual formal passage would be superfluous
Since Brooke's proposal was merely a "sense of the

164

Senate" resolution, which is not legally binding, it
made little sense to recommend to the Administration to
do what it already intended to do.®

This attitude received a sharp jolt in March 1970
when in testimony before the Armed Services Committee,
Secretary of the Air Force Robert Seamans inadvertently
let slip that deployment of MIRVs would begin that
June. The reaction of the Senate was immediate and
negative. The Foreign Relations Committee activated
testimony on the somnolent Brooke's resolution, and
shortly thereafter passed a revised version by a unan-
imous vote. President Nixon's response to the Foreign
Relations Committee's initiative is perhaps indicative
of his Administration's attitude toward congressional
participation. Nixon stated that the resolution was
"irrelevant to what we are going to do. "9 Perhaps in
response to such a politically insensitive pronounce-
ment, the resolution picked up additional momentum, in-
cluding the endorsement of Republican Minority Leader
Hugh Scott, and eventually passed 72-6.

SALT I produced no MIRV ban of any form however.
Kissinger has claimed that the Administration tried and
failed to get the Soviets to agree on some sort of MIRV
restrictions. 10 He repeatedly assured members of Con-
gress that the Administration was as interested as they
in securing MIRV restrictions, and was in fact making
proposals to the Soviets along those lines. Since the
senators were kept in the dark, with no basis on which
to challenge the Kissinger assertions, little objection
was made at the time. Recently, however, in two separ-
ate accounts, Gerard Smith 11 , chief SALT negotiator,
and Lawrence Weiler 12 , a key assistant, have argued
that the Administration's MIRV proposal was intention-
ally constructed as a non-starter, something that the
Soviets would reject out of hand. The base their case
on three points:

First, it called for extensive on-site inspections,
something that until recently the Soviets have been ad-
amant in rejecting. Perhaps most incredibly of all,
the Kissinger proposal lumped on-site inspection of the
MIRVed missile sites with inspection of Soviet surface-
to-air missiles (SAMs) as well. Smith says that the
Soviets told him this was an obvious attempt to engage
in surveillance of the Soviet air defense system.

Second, the Administration’s proposal was dropped a
mere two months after is was proposed, with no subse-
quent attempt at a counter-proposal to the Soviet MIRV
proposal. This failure to follow up occurred despite
the repeated calls of Smith and others for more explor-
ation of the topic.

Finally, Smith cites the fact that before the pro-
posal was submitted to the Soviets the SALT verifica-
tion panel never was instructed 'to do a study on how
on-site inspections might actually be carried out.

165

According to Smith, this was not the normal procedure
for more "aerioua* propoaalu

Unaware of all thio at the time, the Senate appar-
ently believed that with the passage of the Brooke
resolution it had discharged its responsibility on the
issue

The MIRV issue ceased to capture significant con-
gressional interest after that. Only a minority would
later support the mere binding MIRV proposals advanced
by Senators Ceorge McGcvern (D-Scuth Dakota) and Hubert
Humphrey (D-Kinnesota) . Humphrey's proposal would have
put HIRV deployment funds in ’escrow* until "the Presi-
dent and Congress jointly determined that 5oviet test-
ing and MIRV development necessitated □ B resumption
of its program as a guarantee of retaliatory capabil-
ity.' Humphrey's legally-binding proposal failed to
engender the widespread support given to the Brooke
'sense of the Senate resolution * Apparently, many
senators believed that to enact such binding legisla-
tion during negotiations would be to step beyond the
bounds of institutional propriety perhaps even more
inportantly, Senator Humphrey failed to convince the
Senate leadership of the necessity of undertaking such
•drastic" measures, so the amendment was brought up by
the leadership on a day when many of Humphrey's sup-
porters were absent It was easily defeated 13

The ABM debate and the Brooke resolution were rare
flickers of congressional assertiveness More typical
of the congressional pattern in this period was the
indifference and/or acquiescence to Administration pro-
posals. This attitude was reinforced by «H Administra-
tion that had no intention of including Congress in the
development of policy Congressional hearings, when
they occurred at all, often consisted of a perfunctory
questioning of Administration officials 14

Jackson Amendcnt

There waa one significant exception to this pat-
tern Congress did take one action that would have a
major long-term impact on arms control negotiations.
This nos the approval of the Jackson amendment to the
resolution approving the 1972 Interim Agreement on
Strategic Offensive Arms On June 13, 1972, when Sena-
tor Jackson was finally made aware Df the terms of the
Interim Agreement, he angrily denounced the * inequi-
ties* in the agreement His major objection was to the
fact that the Soviets were allowed to keep a larger
number of missile launchers, which, with their advan-
tage in missile launch weight, made for a tremendous
potential advantage in throw-veight Since the agree-
ment vaB temporary, Jackaon agreed to support it if the
resolution of approval waa amended by one ioportant

166

qualification, to the effect that:

future treaties on offensive weapons not limit
the United States to levels of intercontinent-
al strategic forces inferior to those of the
Soviet Union.

Jackson argued that these agreements should be based on
"equality." There was considerable debate on the floor
of the Senate about what equality should mean (i.e.,
whether it applied to just aggregate launcher numbers
or to other aspects as well, such as throw weight). A
number of amendments were offered in an attempt to
loosen the language, but these were all defeated. In
the end, the Jackson amendment was passed, and subse-
quently, the Interim Agreement also received Senate ap-
proval. The legislative history of the Jackson amend-
ment suggests that Jackson intended it to apply to
dimensions such as throw weight as well as numbers of
launchers. This would be as issue of considerable im-
portance later. *5

SALT II-A (1972-1976)

The SALT II negotiations began not long after SALT
1 was ratified. The pattern of congressional involve-
ment in this period was similar to that of the earlier
period, with the exception that Senator Jackson in-
creasingly used his Subcommittee on Arms Control to
o??m UCt criti c a l investigations. Immediately after
SALT I, Jackson is reported to have met with Nixon to
discuss the number of "soft-headed" negotiators in the
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. it appears to
have been at Jackson's instigation that a "mini-purge"
of ACDA officials was conducted, in a deliberate effort
to begin SALT ii with a new set of "tougher"
negotiators. 16

The most significant congressional involvement dur-
ing this period occurred at an executive session of
Jackson's Armed Services Subcommittee on Arms Control
on June 24, 1974. Paul Nitze, who had recently re-
signed his post as a SALT negotiator (Nitze was one ne-
gotiator of whom Jackson approved), told the subcommit-
tee that the Administration had left a number of 'loop-
holes' in SALT I. According to Nitze, these loopholes
were only closed after Kissinger made some secret
agreements with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin.
Nitze also asserted that President Nixon had given se-
cret assurances to the Soviet leaders that the U.S.
would not increase the numbers of submarine-launched
ballistic missiles (SLUM) to the maximum permissible
level. Jackson made the most of this information in

167

putting the heat cn the Administration to disclose the
contents of their “secret* negotiations It was later
suggested that Jackson's real intention in holding the
hearings was to sabotage the next round of SALT II
talk# until he could get adequate Information on the
positions being put forth.!’ In any case, this episode
proved to he a watershed in congressional attitude
toward the executive After this incident, senators
were increasingly auspicious of the executive branch
and leas willing to stand on the sidelines 18 The
nascent congressional assertiveness would not fully
emerge until the Carter Mainistration, but the tide
had turned

During this period. Senator Jackson's influence be-
gan to be felt, not just in his public hearings, but on
the actual substance of 0 S negotiating poaLtion
President ford had wanted to conclude SALT II during
hie Administration, but the 1976 Republican primaries
and the criticism from Ronald Reagan made this diffi-
cult Khat was accomplished during his tenure was the
signing in 1974 of the Vladivostok accords, which were
supposed to serve as the basis for the formal SALT II
agreement

As noted, the Jackson amendment actually had no
impact whatsoever on the 1972 Interim Agreement What
it did effect, in an important way, was subsequent
offensive anas agreements (the Vladivostok accords and,
eventually, SALT III The Vladivostok accordB were the
first agreement with "parity* in terms of equivalent
numbers of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDV)
However, this parity did not extend to the numbers of
heavy missiles nor to the overall throw-weight compar-
isons. Therefore, one could argue that, although it
was a step toward the provisions of the Jackson amend-
ment, it did not fulfill the requirment of that amend-
ment in all respects. Probably the actual manner in
which the Jackson amendment affected the accords was
indirect; i,e., by reinforcing the position of those in
the executive bureacracy who had similar goals

During the 1972-1976 period a few other senators
pursued the issue of arms control Many of these indi-
viduals adopted the opposite position from Jackson
Rather than believe, as Jackson did, that the Admini-
stration had gene too far in SALT 1, these senators
thought that it had not gone far enough Senators

Charles Met. Mathias (R-Maryland) , McGovern, Humphrey,
and Thomas McIntyre (D-HeW Hampshire) tried to encour-
age the Administration to pursue deeper cuts, but
without notable success These "arms controllers"
stirred little Interest among their colleagues The
overall characterization of congressional participa-
tion during the 1972-1976 period is largely on of

disinterest l 9

168

SALT IX-B (1977-1979)

Jimmy Carter came into office promising an open
administration, which implied greater congressional
participation in foreign policy. Compared to his pred-
ecessors, this policy was largely realized. From
February 1977 until the signing of SALT II, Administra-
tion officials briefed congressional committees almost
50 times. Counting informal briefings of individual
senators, the number of briefings exceeded 140.20
While the quality of these briefings might be ques-
tioned, the quantity certainly could not. Congress re-
sponded to this new openness with a new assertiveness
of its own.

One significant example of this assertiveness oc-
curred during the 1977 confirmation hearings of Paul
Warnke as Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency (ACDA) and chief SALT negotiator. Confirmation
hearings for these positions were normally pro forma ,
with little effort to probe or influence policy posi-
tion. Not so with the Warnke hearings. Warnke was
questioned closely by the Foreign Relations Committee.
He also consented to go before the Armed Services Com-
mittee, although this was not a requirement. It was
here that he received his most severe grilling. There
were also opposition witnesses, including Paul Nitze.
Although the Senate could have opted to conduct the
confirmation vote for the two positions as one vote, it
chose instead to split the vote. The importance of
this change was that it allowed those Democratic sena-
tors who were concerned about Warnke' s "toughness" as a
negotiator to register their concern without embarras-
sing a new Democratic president. Consequently, there
was a major difference in the vote margins on the two
votes. Warnke was easily confirmed for the less-con-
troversial position as head of ACDA by a vote of 70-
29. However, the vote on Warnke as chief SALT negotia-
tor was much closer — the final tally was 58-40. (See
Chapter 1.) Warnke has suggested that Majority Leader
Robert Byrd's floor leadership was critical for this
successful (albeit close) outcome. 21

It is significant that this margin of victory was
less than the two-thirds margin which would be neces-
sary for Senate approval of any SALT treaty. Even Sen-
ator Alan Cranston, a strong SALT supporter, admitted
that this vote accurately reflected the Senate's in-
tent to "send a message" to President Carter to the
effect that any SALT agreement would be carefully

scrutinized. 22

One of the most dramatic differences between SALT I
and SALT II was the fact that during the summer of 1977
25 senators, (and a number of Representatives as well)
were invited by Warnke to participate in the ongoing
negotiations. They were even allowed to converse

159

directly with the Soviet delegation. In addition, over
the next tvo years, six members of the foreign Rela-
tions Committee traveled to Geneva on several occasions
to keep track of the progress of the negotiations,
Another Senate delegation vent to Moscov and spoke with
Soviet official? there Pinally, after the completion
of the SALT 31 agreement in dune 1979, Majority Leader
Byrd vent to the Soviet Union to explain the Senate's
role to Soviet President Leonid Breshnev and other
Soviet leadera. One important objective of Senator
Byrd's mission was to clarify for the Soviet Premier
the differing legal implications of the various forms
of understandings, reservation*, or amendments the
Senate night attach to the treaty 23

While executive-congressional relations had been
fairly good throughout the spring and summer of 1977,
by the early fall some significant congressional oppo-
sition had begun to emerge. It coalesced around Sena-
tor Jaekaon President Carter had made a concerted
attempt early in hi« administration to enlist Jackson's
support. He had el loved Jackson to make a number of
proposal* to the government on vhat the 0 6 position
should be— a few of which were incorporated in the

Hatch 1977 proposals The provision of the March 1977
proposals that Jackson liked most was a proposal that,
In effect, would amount to sharp reduction in the num-
ber of Soviet "heavy* missiles (the SS-16 in particu-
lar). However, the Soviets rejected the proposals,
citing the reduction of the ■heavies* a« one of the
more objectionable provision* In September, darter
decided to stop pursuing a cutback in heavies, to focus
instead on attempting to reduce the total number of
MIRVed intercontinental ballistic miaalles (XCBM)
This may or may not have been a wise decision But the
significant fact was that the Carter Administration
made this change without consulting key senators
Jackson was particularly incensed not only by the
change in policy, but because he learned about it in
m Wav York Time* , it is doubtful that prior consul-
tation wltR Jockson would have convinced him to forego
his long-time fixation on the 'heavies,’ but perhaps
prior notification might have mitigated his outrage
Other congressional participants echoed this refrain
about an inconsistency of consultation One armed
Services aide, for example, called the Carter consulta-
tions *a triumph of quantity over quality Senator

Charles Percy was later to remark, "The Administration
failed to consult frequently with key senators about
substantive changes at crucial points in the negotia-
tion a Consolations would have lessened the subsequent

opposition within the Senate. " 26

- - - be overdrawn Be

These charges againat Carter may

did, after all, consult to a greater extent *J* n JJJ r
before — in both qualitative and quantitative ay

170

What can be said with some degree of certainty is that
Carter was inconsistent in his consultation and that in
the case of SALT II, congressional demands for partici-
pation grew faster than the willingness of the Admini-
stration to comply.

It was in the. midst of this growing tension between
the President and Congress that the Administration
realized that the 1972 Interim Agreement on Offensive
Weapons was about to expire (Octoger 4, 1977) — with no
immediate prospect for a replacement. Something had to
he done, or hopes for SALT II could disintegrate in the
midst of a renewed arms race. Given the climate in
Congress at the time, the Administration was hesitant
to submit any decision to extend the Interim Agreement
for fear the congressional hardliners would embroil the
negotiations in controversy. Instead, the State De-
partment and the U.S.S.R. issued simultaneous "parallel
unilateral declarations," that the Administration main-
tained were not subject to congressional review. Few
in Congress bought that argument. There was a wide-
spread belief in the Senate— among both SALT supporters
and detractors — that the Administration had violated a
provision of the 1961 Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency Act which states: 27

no action can be taken under this law or any
other law that will obligate the U.S. to dis-
arm or reduce or limit the armed forces or
armaments of the U.S., except pursuant to the
treaty-making power of the President under the
Constitution or unless authorized by further
affirmative legislative action by the Congress.

Senators Cranston, Jackson, and other key senators co-
sponsored a resolution declaring approval for the ex-
tension of the Interim Agreement. Their intent was to
reassert the congressional prerogative in this area. 28

Linkage Issue

The debate on SALT II (which centered primarily in
committee hearings) did not stick strictly to the
merits of the treaty. In fact, one of the most import-
ant areas of concern was whether or not to "link"
favorable treatment of SALT II with Soviet behavior.
Because of the extreme preoccupation of a number of
senators with the "linkage" issue, it is not unreason-
able to argue that SALT II was not approved because it
was seen in the context of deteriorating relations with
the Soviets while SALT I passed because it was consid-
ered during the heyday of detente. SALT II failed to
gain approval because its fate became linked to in-
ternational events, especially the international

171

activities of the Soviets

As hard as President Carter tried to decouple the
debate over the nerita of the treaty from world events,
this proved increasingly difficult to do in the
spring of 1979, for example , a poll of senators found
roughly <0 who considered themselves generally favora-
bly disposed to arna control agreements, but who were
undecided on SAL" II because of the Soviet military
build-up and activities in the world 29

Eventually "linkage* would become the dogma of the
Republican Party There were various calls for a break
in negotiations in response to Soviet activities
Linkage is a rather broad concept that can be used to
apply to both the internal and external "behavior" of
the Soviet Union A good example of an application of
"internal" linkage, vaa in regard to the trial of
Anatoly Shcharanoky, a Soviet dissident Unfortunately
the Soviets choao to try Shcharanaky just prior to a
critical meeting between Secretary of State Vance and
Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko Senator Robert
bole (R-Kanaas) called on Vance to cancel the meeting*
Senator Jackson said to go ahead would be to "send the
wrong signal, at the wrong time. "30

Fore typically, however, the SALT II treaty was
linked to Soviet International behavior, especially to
activities in the Third World The argument for link-
age wa* that the U.S can use agreements such as SALT
IX as leverage to induce the Soviets to change their
international or internal behavior Many senators had
the notion that by signing SALT I, the Soviets had
tacitly agreed to "behave * The activities of the
Soviets in the Third World (e g , the Horn of Africa)
were aeen aa clear evidence that SALT I had not
achieved these objectives

Later, in the minority report filed by Republican
Senators Howard Baker, Richard Lugar, S I. Hayakawa,
and Jesse Helms explaining why they voted against SALT
II in the Foreign Relations Committee, "linkage* ac-
counted for three of the four reasons cited At one
Point the Senators stated: 31

We disagree with the Administration's con-
tention that SALT and our consideration of
this treaty should not be linked to the over-
all geopolitical relationship between the
Soviet Union and the United States.

The debate in the Senate (which centered in com-
mittee hearings) was not by any means totally focused
oo the "linkage" issue. There was, in fact, a good
deal of debate on the nerita of the treaty in three key
respects* 31 |j) salt II's impact on the strategic
balance, J2> verification concerns, and (3) implica-
tions of SALT for NATO

Strategic Balance

To the arms control hardliners, SALT II simply did
not deal with the critical issue: the "window of vul-
nerability." The window of vulnerability refers to the
hypothetical vulnerability of American ICBMs to a
Soviet ICBH first strike. One of the most important
differences between 1972, when SALT I was signed, and
1979, when SALT II was signed, was the evolution of
Soviet strategic forces. The Soviets had always had a
numerical advantage in terms of large ICBMs. This was
not considered a problem by many senators in 1972 be-
cause Soviet missiles were not very accurate and none
of them were MIRVed. However, once the Soviets began
MIRVing their large missiles and making drastic im-
provements in their accuracy, the situation changed.
The fear of Paul Nit 2 e and others was that unless the
number of Soviet heavy missiles was drastically re-
duced, the Soviets would be able to capitalize on this
strategic advantage for political gain. Nitze and his
congressional allies charged that because SALT II did
not reduce the number of Soviet "heavies," the "window"
was left wide open. 33

On the other side, proponents of the treaty argued
that the fear of a Soviet preemptive strike was unreal-
istic, and could never be translated into strategic ad-
vantage for the Soviets for a number of reasons, in-
cluding the relative invulnerability of the other legs
of the U.S. strategic triad . 34 (The triad consists of
the three elements of O.S. strategic capability— land,
air, and sea-based.) Moreover, the proponents argued
that the fractionation limits imposed by SALT II; i.e.,
the limitation of the number of warheads which could be
placed on the Soviet "heavies" would greatly reduce the
utility of these behemoths.

There was also a third group of senators, typified
by Senators McGovern and Mark Hatfield (R-Oregon), who
questioned SALT II on the grounds that it did not go
far enough, that it made no progress toward real reduc-
tion . 35 SALT supporters responded by saying that al-
though SALT II would not result in any dramatic reduc-
tions, it was an important and necessary first step in
checking the arms race before seeking some significant
reductions in SALT III. The proponents of the treaty
contended that SALT critics tended to focus on the
matters not covered by the treaty and to ignore what
was dealt with, such as the fractionation limits.

One reason that the final SALT II product disap-
pointed both the Hatfield and Oackson viewpoints was
that it did not measure up to earlier expectations. In
March 1977 Carter had called for deep cuts, including
cuts in the Soviet heavy missiles. But when Carter
pulled away from these "deep" cuts after the Soviet

173

rejection, disillusionment set in. Another benchmark
against which SAW II was unfavorably compared was the
Jackson amendment Since Jackson could make a convinc-
ing case that the amendment mandated parity for throw-
weight as well, the SALT II treaty did not fulfill this
aspect of that amendment

Verification Concerns

A Major concern of some senators who generally were
Inclined to support SALT II (e.g , John Glenn) was
whether the treaty could be adequately verified Since
SAW t, there had been growing doubts about whether the
Soviets could be trusted to honor their agreements
This perception was fed by the fact that the Soviets
had taken advantage of certain loose definitions in
SALT I Thia particularly related to the rather vague
definition in SALT I of exactly what a “heavy missile"
vac. Staying bearly within the letter, if not the
spirit of the agreement, the Soviets were able to in-
troduce a new generation of missiles (the S5-19) that
was substantially larger than what the U S. had in-
tended to allow 36

Secondly, there vaa the assertion by some of the
anti-SALT forces that the Soviets had actually violated
the literal terms of the agreement. The primary charge
was that they had used various radar set-ups “in an ASM
mode,* 37 The Carter Administration argued that when
questions concerning such activities had been raised
that, in every case, the Soviets had either changed
their behavior or presented an explanation that satis-
fied the terms of SALT I, 3 ® Some treaty opponents were
not convinced, however, and persisted in their belief
that the Soviets had cheated on SALT 3,

The consequences of all this led to a fixation with
verification issues that was unrealistic and counter-
productive. A good example of this came in an exchange
between Senator Glenn and Secretary of Defense Harold
Brown Glenn contended that with the existing state of
technology* the O.S could not monitor all the qualita-
tive restrictions imposed by BALT II. in particular,
he maintained that while the agreement prohibited im-
provements o! missiles by mere than 5 percent on cer-
tain dimensions, in actuality, the intelligence capa-
city was no where near that sophisticated. Brown
countered that Glenn’s logic might lead him to seek an
agreement that was verifiable, but totally undesirable
(e g. r setting improvement levels at 56 percent). 39

Implications for MATO

The final major area of concern in the debate on

174

the merits of SALT II was over the implications of the
agreement for U.S. allies. The major question was
whether the U.S. was giving too much away in allowing
restrictions on the ground-and-sea-launched cruise mis-
sile scheduled to be placed in Europe at a later date.
The fear was that even though these restrictions were
scheduled to expire in three years (before the cruise
missiles could even be deployed) certain aspects of
SALT suggested that these restrictions might be ex-
tended. Various senators, Sam Nunn (D-Georgia) in par-
ticular, worked assidiously to prevent any problems for
the NATO allies from SALT II. '*0

Committee Action

If the quantity and quality of congressional parti-
cipation from 1977 until the signing of SALT II greatly
exceeded that of previous years, the involvement of the
Senate after the signing of the agreement was also dra-
matic. One important change was that committees other
than the Senate Foreign Relations Committee were in-
volved to a greater degree than before.

One new committee that played a role in SALT II was
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on the ver-
ification implications of the SALT II treaty. The In-
telligence Committee received briefings on Soviet com-
pliance with SALT I and on the technical ability of the
United States to monitor the new requirements of SALT
II (especially the qualitative requirements). The com-
mittee recommended that Congress appropriate money to
increase U.S. capabilities. With this improvement, it
was generally argued that any "strategically signifi-
cant" violation could be detected in time for a U.S.
response. 41 Although the overall conclusion tended to
support SALT II, there was enough controversial mater-
ial in the report to keep the verification issue a
major point of contention. There was no Intelligence
Committee in the Senate in 1972, so this investigation
was a major change from SALT I.

In addition to the Intelligence Committee's hear-
ings, the Senate Armed Services Committee also con-
ducted hearings on the "Military Implications" of SALT
11.42 At the conclusion of the hearings. Senator
Jackson and nine other members attempted to report out
a negative evaluation of SALT II, over the protests of
Chairman John Stennis and six other members. A report
from this committee could not become the basis for
legislative action, but it did serve as a vehicle for
the anti-treaty forces. Of course, the fulcrum of the
SALT debate continued to be the Foreign Relations
Committee .

On SALT I, the Foreign Relations Committee had held
seven days of hearings on the treaty, and the Senate

175

A need Services Committee held nine days of hearings
The increase in number of hearings held by both com-
mittees on SALT II was dramatic For example, on SALT
II the Foreign Relations Committee held 11 sessions on
procedure alone in addition, there were 30 public
hearings and 13 executive cessions prior to "nark-
up " During this mark-up perlod—when the committee
discussed and voted on the provisions of the treaty and
proposed chonges—there were a total of 22 sessions
The Foreign Relations Committee eventually reported
favorably on the treaty by a narrow $-6 margin A
number of important conditions were attached to the
treaty when the committee approved it In all, the
committee voted for 20 conditions which would have been
sent to the Senate floor along with the treaty it-
self. What is most significant about the mark-up
process is that the committee did not recommend any
amendments This action was largely the result of

Majority Leader Byrd and Chairman Church of the For-
eign Relations Committee Both men were well aware
that had any amendments passed, and been approved by
the full Senate, this would have necessitated even-
tual renegotltion of the treaty Some of these

potential “killer amendments" came within one vote of
being passed by the Foreign Relations Committee

Committee Changes

Perhaps the most significant change the Foreign
Relations committee proposed related to an item in the
Joint Statement of Principles and Jaslc Guidelines for
Subsequent Negotiations (an annex to the SALT II agree-
ment) A provision in this document stated that The
parties shall, in the course of future negotiations,
pursue certain objectives, one of which is "resolution
of the issues included in the protocol" to the SALT II
Treaty.* *

The problem with this provision was that the items
covered in the protocol were exactly the items many in
Congress did not want to see become the basis for fu-
ture negotiations One of these items was the bas-
ing of ICOMs in a mobile mode. The Foreign Relations
Committee included a statement in its report on the
SALT II treaty saying that the Dnited States should
issue a declaration of its Intent to deploy a mo-
Wle-hamed "jrdaaJle exparitrebtel" /MX1 once the
protocol expired In its report, the Foreign Rela-
tions Committee also recommended that the Senate ac-
cept language stating that nothing in the treaty or
protocols

Establishes a precedent for any limitations

which may be proposed in future negotiations

176

relating to systems limited in the protocol . 45

More important than even the MX basing mode was the
restriction on sea-and-ground-launched cruise missiles,
also in the protocol. Given the passage from the
Joint Statement for Future Negotiations, which sug-
gested that the protocol did form the basis for future
agreements, this was a significant action by the com-
mittee. This interpretation in the committee report
was complicated, however, by the fact that Senator
McGovern introduced a resolution {endorsed by the com-
mittee) which seemed to support the idea of using the
protocol for future negotiations . 46 This apparent
contradiction was left unresolved by the committee.

The committee also recommended that the Senate
adopt a sense-of~the-Senate resolution to the effect
that the protocol could not be extended unilaterally by
the President without Senate approval. Obviously, this
was an attempt to avoid the type of controversy that
arose from Carter's extension of the Interim Agreement.

Another important change which resulted in a loos-
ening of the provision of the SALT II agreement was the
committee's interpretation of the circumvention claus-
es. The circumvention clauses were vaguely worded pro-
visos that papered over a basic difference between the
United States and the Soviet Union. The difference
concerns whether or not the U.S. would be permitted at
some future point to transfer cruise weapons and/or
cruise technology to its NATO allies. Senator Nunn had
been instrumental in ensuring that these provisos were
vague in the first place. The Foreign Relations Com-
mittee recommended loosening the restriction even more,
by an explicit statement that "nothing in the treaty or
the protocol. , .precludes cooperation in modernization"
(i.e., by transfer of cruise weapons ). 47

SALT and International Circumstances

The Foreign Relations Committee's review of the
SALT II Treaty was protracted well beyond the original
timetable. The delay was largely caused by a series of
international events that clouded the atmosphere for
treaty considerations and raised questions about Soviet
intentions. When the Senate began its August recess,
it was thought that the Foreign Relations Committee was
nearing completion of its consideration of the treaty.
Although there had been some strong criticism of the
treaty during the committee's hearings, much of the
criticism related to the overall U.S. defense posture
rather than to the specific provisions of the treaty.
And Administration witnesses, particularly the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, and other supporters had made a strong
case for SALT II. Thus, the pro-treaty forces appeared

177

to be gaining mementoes, which supporters hoped would
carry through to the time when the full Senate took up
the treaty.

However/ when the Senate returned to session in
early September, prospects for SALT II had been badly
damaged by the 'discovery' of a Soviet military brigade
in Cuba Foreign Relations Chairman Prank Church and
several Administration officials quickly hade sweeping,
categorical statements about the Soviet troops before
the full facts of the situation had been established,
{See Chapter 1 ) SALT critics quickly seized upon the
issue and pointed to three 'lessons' from this incident
that proved that SALT II should not be approved. They
argued that U) The Soviets went to great lengths to
hide the presence of the troops, proving once again
that they could not be trusted {2) The troops had
apparently been in Cuba for some years This cast
doubt on the ability of OS intelligence to detect
Soviet activities 1 3 ) The presence of Soviet troops
in the Western Hemisphere was proof of the Soviet
aggressive tendencies

The controversy over the Soviet troops in Cuba
diverted attention from the merLts of the treaty it-
self, and necessitated a further delay in Senate floor
debate. In the course of this delay, much of the pro-
SALT momejitura dissipated

At the height of the flap over the Soviet troops,
Senator Russell Long (D-Louisiana) announced his oppo-
sition to the treaty, citing the incident as a factor
in his decision. Senator Long was one more key Senate
figure whose support the Administration bad needed.

The strong statements made by Senator Church upon
first learning about the Soviet brigade were a major
factor in the controversy Church was facing a stiff
challenge from the right wing in hla bid for re-elec-
tion in Idaho, and was under attack for his support of
the Panama Canal Treaties Almost reflexively, he
latched onto the Cuban issue as an opportunity to
demonstrate his resolve and a tough-minded attitude
Innediately after being informed about the Soviet
troops/ Church made several remarks he would later
regret, including the statement that, 'There is no
likelihood whatsoever the Senate will ratify the treaty
While there are Soviet troops in Cuba Coming from

a leading SALT supporter and the man who, with Majority
Leader Byrd, had been expected to lead the SALT floor
debate, this was a damning statement Byrd labeled the
incident os a "pseudo-crisis' and noted indications
that the troops had been in Cuba for some time Church
later tried to back away from his statements, while
saving a little face He introduced a condition to the
treaty whereby the President would have to certify
before the treaty could be approved that these troops
were not engaged in a combat role and would not become

178

a threat to any country In the Hemisphere. 50 But by
that time the damage to SALT II had been done. The
damage was not so much in terms of a loss of specific
votes but in the loss of crucial momentum.

Another international development that complicated
the environment for SALT II consideration was the tur-
moil in Iran. The fall of the Shah in early 1979 had
led to fears that the Soviets might rush in to fill
this "power vacuum. " A more direct consequence for
SALT II was the loss of certain U.S. "listening posts"
in Iran after the Shah's fall. These had been used by
the U.S. to monitor Soviet missile testing. The loss
of these stations was one of the reasons Senator Glenn
had questioned the ability of the U.S. to effectively
monitor compliance with SALT li.Sl

There was another and broader sense in which the
developments in Iran had a debilitating effect on SALT
II. Paul Warnke has stated that arms-control agree-
ments are an "index of a nation’s self-confidence." 52
In late October- 1979, SALT II proponents were beginning
to show signs of regaining momentum, as the controversy
over the Soviet troops in Cuba died down. But, in
early November, the United States Embassy in Tehran was
seized by Iranian militants, and embassy personnel were
taken as hostages. The Iranian situation dealt a seri-
ous blow to U.S. self-confidence and to the chances for
SALT II approval.

The coup do grace to SALT II prospects came with
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan at Christmas-time
1979. In early January 1980, President Carter and
Majority Leader Byrd agreed that the consideration of
SALT II should be suspended. In light of those inter-
national events, consideration of the treaty on its
merits seemed highly unlikely.

The Case For and Against Senate Involvement

The Senate's record on SALT I and II provides an
historical framework for consideration of the validity
of the arguments for and against major Senate involve-
ment in the arms control process. The discussion will
be structured around the arguments made against Senate
involvement, but, in the process, the arguments for
Senate involvement will also be covered.

Lack of Expertise

The first argument against major Senate involvement
in the arms control process is in many respects the
weakest argument. Briefly stated, this argument as-
serts that senators are typically not arms control ex-
perts and hence lack the requisite expertise to grapple

with such a highly technical, arcane subject. This ar-
gument is actually a vestige of a more general argument
against congressional involvement in foreign policy
that had much more validity In a previous era, Hov,
the argument makes little sense. Present-day senators
have much greater access to technical information and
expertise. One factor increasing this access is the
quantitative end qualitative improvements in Senate
staffing. In preparation for SALT II consideration,
all the Senate leadership and many of the interested
senators contracted their own staff experts on arms
control. 7hose who did not had access to the staff
experts assigned to the relevant committees. Secondly,
senators can utilize research services such as those of
the Office of Technology Assessment or the General Ac-
counting Office to do specialized studies

Finally, some individual senators became arras
control experts in their own right A few, such as
Senator Glenn, already had a technical background from
which to draw Clem, for example, with the help of
key aides, made some improvements to the treaty during
the Foreign delations Committee hearings These condi-
tions, attached to the resolution for ratification
passed by the Foreign Relations Committee, dealt with
such technical subjects as a tighter definition of
cruise missile range and the composition of elements of
the "bus" or MIRVed misaile carrier 53

Glenn ' b focus on definitions suggests another
broader aptitude at which members of Congress generally
are well-practiced « the refining of procedure Repre-
sentative lea Aepin (D-Wecon»in) has argued that one
of Congress* major strengths is the refinement of gov-
ernmental or legal process 54 The aptitude comes both
from the fact that many senators are lawyers and per-
haps more importantly, because such is the warp and
woof cl their legislative endeavors. This aptitude can
and should be harnessed — at the negotiation stage, as
well as final approval stage It is not inconceivable
to argue that the examination of the proposed SALT I
Interim Agreement by a critical Senate might have de-
tected the loose definitions before the process was too
far along

Reduction of Bargaining leverage

The second argument against Senate involvement
during the negotiations asserts that "the public nature
ot sTenate debate, wi eft its cencaetiteat critic! sat £*m-
prevailing U.S, position, weakens 0 S bargaining le-
verage in dealing with the Soviets The implicit as-
sumption here in that a lack of unity necessarily re-
sults in a weaker bargaining position — at least when
this disagreement is apparent tb the adversary This

180

docs not appear to be universally valid, however.

In sore cases the arcurcnt does seer, to be intui-
tively correct: for example i in those cases in which
many senators are advocating positions closer to thr
adversary than the administration. Henry Kissinger has
argued that the mood of Congress during the Paris nego-
tiations on Vietnan led to a greater recalcitrance on
the part of the North Vietnamese. 55 Applying this
logic to SALT, had the Senate been rore inforred during
the negotiations on SALT 1, that particular Congrcsc
might have “weakened" the U.S. position. But that is
speculation; it might also have worked in the opposite
direction.

In any event, this whole line of reasoning does not
fit SALT II. In this case there appears to be clear
empirical evidence that the involvement of the Senate
strengthened U.S. bargaining leverage. Paul Warnke has
remarked that he intentionally exposed the Soviet nego-
tiators to some "hard-line" U.S. senators so that the
Soviets might better understand why certain positions
would be unacceptable to the Senate. Warnke indicated
that this seems to have strengthened his bargaining
position with his Soviet counterpart. 56

A less confrontational variant of this tactic was
used on at least one occasion to extract a specific ant)
significant concession from the Soviets. When Senator
Mathias met with the Soviet negotiator, Vladimir
Semyonov, they apparently developed a personal rap-
port. Based on this rapport, and on Mathias' reputa-
tion as an arms control advocate, Mathias was able to
credibly argue that the Senate simply would not approve
a treaty that was not accompanied by an "agreed data
base" (on the number of Soviet weapon systems of dif-
ferent sorts). This had been a frustrating sticking
point for the American SALT delegation ever since SALT
I. Consequently, when Semyonov responded positively to
Mathias' suggestion, it greatly surprised sore of the
professional negotiators. 57

Difficulty of Presidential Consultation

The third argument against Senate involvement rep-
resents an attack on sore of the more widely recognized
institutional flaws in the legislative branch: speci-
fically, its decentralized nature and its alleged con-
frontational relationship with the executive. Although
these two factors are analytically distinct, they are
said to produce similar effects. Both factors are said
to make it more difficult for effective presidential
consultation, which has the ultimate result of rafcir .5
the articulation of a coherent arms control policy
extremely difficult.

This third argument has a basis in truth, but ite

lai

significance is all too often exaggerated. The Senate
is indeed decentralized to the point where the clear
articulation of policy is often difficult This de-
centralization or lack of unity has occurred for a
whole litany of reasons that should be familiar to any
student of political science i the decline of party
loyalty i the diminishing power of the Senate leader-
ship! and the fragmentation of responsibility beLng
primary factors One direct result of the fragmenta-
tion of responsibility la that there is no one focal
point for presidential consultation. The President
cannot simply send his representatives to one commit-
tee, but instead must stay in touch with several com-
mittees and subcommittees in both Souses, as well as
the leadership of both parties, plus scwe interested
individual senators Consequently, some of the incon-
sistency which sene members of Congress attributed to
President Carter, may have been due in some part to
thiB institutional flaw

Another well known syatematic "flaw* is the fact
that the executive and legislative branches exist in an
inherently adversarial relationship This has its
strengths, but it eleo makes articulation of a coherent
policy more difficult Evidence of the tension between
the two branches during SALT can be seen in the dispute
over the "parallel unilateral declarations* which rep-
resented a presidential attempt to circumvent a con-
gressional prerogative

While all this is true, care must be taken not to
exaggerate either the extent or the significance of
congressional decentralization and legislative-execu-
tive tension The SALT II experience provides a number
of illustrations indicating that the situation is a
good deal more complex than ia soretimes suggested by
simplistic models of Congress For example, the Warnke
confirmation hearings exhibit both evidence of the ten-
sion between branches and proof that the systems works
rather well despite that tension. The tension is ex-
emplified by the fact that in the vote on Warnke's
nomination aa chief SALT negotiator, he failed to get
two-thirds of the votes cast. As mentioned, this was a
deliberate signal to the President that the Senate
would not passively accept any arms control initiative
that the executive eent, but would examine any such
proposal diligently.

What may have escaped notice about this episode
however is the deft political maneuver employed by the
Democratic leadership to separate the votes on Warnke’s
two positions This adroit move enabled Democratic
senators to express their concern to the President in a
manner that minimized political embarrassment to him
and mitigated the tension between the two branches.
Not incidentally, War nice was confirmed for both
positions

Mira in central usfiAfiy

182

Perhaps even more significant in this regard than
the Warnke nomination was the careful coordination be-
tween President Carter, Majority Loader Byrd, and For-
eign Relations Chairman Church to ensure that in the
formal committee consideration of SALT II no "killer
amendments" were added. Such amendments would have
required renegotiation with the Soviets. Since in the
resultant process of renegotiating the entire agreement
was likely to unravel, the amendments were said to have
the potential to “kill" the treaty.

Despite the addition of some 20 conditions by the
Foreign Relatione Committee, none were of such a nature
as to require sending the treaty back for renegotia-
tion. Given the great opposition to SALT II, this was
no mean achievement. Both this example and that of the
Warnko confirmation demonstrate that at certain crucial
points, despite the problems, the system works remark-
ably well.

SALT and Defense Spending

The fourth argument made against Senate involvement
in the arms control process is a cogent one, which is
difficult to refute from the SALT experience. This ar-
gument asserts that Senate involvement in SALT II led
to an increase In military spending through two mutual-
ly reinforcing dynamics:

A. The need to "win over" some of the more
defense-minded senators to a pro-SALT
position induced President Carter to
raise the proposed levels of military
spending.

B. Because so much of the discussion in the
SALT II debate focused on the expanding
military prowess of the Soviet Union,
many senators, (both for and against
SALT) become 'sensitized' to the need (or
perceived need) for an increase in mili-
tary spending to- bolster U.S. military
forces.

Jimmy Carter was elected on a platform of reducing
military spending. However, after the SALT II Treaty
encountered opposition in the Senate, he appeared to
reverse his position. Although one might attribute
this change of heart to a reassessment of the Soviet
military threat, it is equally plausible that he was
motivated by "political" considerations. During the
discussions on the fiscal year 1981 military budget,
Carter agreed to a real increase of 3 percent in mili-
tary spending. At that point Carter desperately needed
the support of a "defense-minded" senator to pull m

183

undecided votes With the less of Senators Jackson and
Baker, Senator Nunn became a pivotal figure Senator
Bunn's position on the Armed Services Committee and his
credentials as an advocate of a strong defense policy
enhanced hla attractiveness. Best of all. Kuna ap-
peared truly open on SALT However, Nunn was adamant
(as were Senators Tower of Texas and Ernest Hollings of
South Carolina) that a 3 percent defense increase vould
not be sufficient. Senator Nunn kept pushing for a 5
percent Increase, and eventually Carter relented
Although Nunn never made a firn commitment on SALT II,
after tho increase in the proposed defense budget, he
was reported to be leaning toward support of the
treaty

In the second type of linkage between congressional
involvement in SALT and increased defense spending the
dynamics are different Here the argument is that high
congressional involvement led to increased military
spending because the extensive discussions of Soviet
military power "sensitized* nany senators to the is-
sue. Many of these senators had not been well informed
about the Soviet military build-up before this point
The SALT II debate changed that. It ia ironic that a
congressional debate on an arms control treaty should
lead the participants to favor a military build-up (In
areas not covered by the treaty)? but that seems to
have been the case. One very important point that

Bhould be stressed here 1b that this dynamic worked on
both proponento and opponents of SALT It was not juat
tKe“ traditional hawks who were fueling this debate
One reflection of this dualistic attitude (pro-arms
control? pro-military spending) can be seen in one of
the conditions added to tho Foreign Eolations Committee
report on the treaty. The same committee that voted

approval of the SALT II treaty supported a 'sense-of-
the-Senate* declaration calling for funds for an MX,
•advanced penetrating bomber,* Trident II submarine and
missile, and other weapons systems 60

The interaction of domestic political and systemic
factors can be seen in the debate on haw to deploy the
HZ missile. The argument for a mobile HX was that a
mobile I CBM would provide a means of redressing the
perceived vulnerability Of American ICBMs to a Soviet
preemptive strike The validity or likelihood of a
preemptive strike may be questionable, but Paul Nitze
and senators such as Henry Jackson were convinced that
the threat was real enough From the Carter Admini-
stration perspective, the beauty of deploying the tiX ia
a mobile mode was that while it could theoretically
reduce the threat to the ICBMs, this only made sense
within the context of a SALT agreement that limited the
number of Soviet warheads by various means In other
words, if Carter accepted the logic of the mobile
basing, he would have at least a plausible response

184

to the Hitze-Jackson charge that he was doing nothing
about the much-discussed "window of vulnerability,"
Nitze and Jackson never accepted that argument; they
said that even with SALT II the Soviets could still
threaten the missiles.®! However the Carter Admini-
stration hoped that the argument would be plausible to
other uncommitted senators. Moreover, Carter's de-
cision to support the idea of a mobile MX (an idea that
had a passionate support of the Joint Chiefs) helped
get the military leaders "on board. "®2

"Politicization" of Negotiations

The final argument made against Senate partici-
pation in arms control negotiations is probably the
most important. The gist of this argument is that
Senate involvement "politicizes" the negotiations to
such an extent that the chance for "serious progress"
in the negotiations and/or eventual approval of the
agreement are greatly diminished. Obviously, there are
two different, and somewhat contradictory, applications
of the politicization argument. The first application
pertains to the substance of the treaty while the
second application pertains to the chances for rati-
fication. The assumption of the first is that serious
progress can occur only under conditions of secret
diplomacy where neither party will be tempted to engage
in propagandists blasts instead of concentrating on
formulating a substantive agreement.® 3

The second application of the politicization argu-
ment is based primarily on the SALT experience. Before
SALT the prevailing wisdom was that the Senate would be
more likely to support policies it had a hand in devel-
oping. This assumption was called into question, how-
ever, because SALT I was approved after only minimal
debate and little prior consultation while SALT II was
not approved despite extensive Senate involvement. So
this "new" wisdom suggests to some that the involvement
of the Senate early in the process politicized the de-
bate to such an extent that approval became extremely
difficult, if not impossible. The logic of this argu-
ment is based on two mutually-reinforcing dynamics.
First, the involvement of a greater diversity of view-
points made negotiating the agreement more difficult
and protracted the entire process. Second, because of
the protraction of the negotiations and the open nature
of the debate, opposition groups could more effectively
mobilize.

Before discussing the different applications of the
politicization argument, it is useful to deal with the
general point that the involvement of the Senate in the
arms control process "politicizes" the issue. In the

extreme variant of the argument, which is easily re-
futed, the Implicit assumption is that it is the spe-
cific involvement of senators that Introduces the po-
litical element into the equation, this assertion is
patently false It ignores the highly politicized na-
ture of the executive branch as a whole, not to mention
any ulterior motives the President nay have The Pres-
ident is directly involved in the electoral process
himself, and so large an issue as arms control cannot
help but have major political ramifications There is
good evidence to suggest that in response to criticism
from the right wing of the Republican Party (especially
his opponent for the 1976 Republican nomination, Ronald
Reagan), President Ford initiated a slow-down in SALT
activity 64

Moreover, bureaucratic politics is just as applic-
able to arms control as it is to other issues The
various ‘actors* all have certain perspectives on the
issue, which are at least partly grounded in an organi-
zational bias Each actor has certain vested interests
to protect. The involvement of the Senate did rot
create the splits or disagreements among executive
policy makers The Senate might be more accurately
described as mirroring policy differences that already
existed both in the executive branch and the public at
large Although Senate involvement reinforces this
trend, given the differing bureaucratic and ideological
perspectives within the executive branch, merely elim-
inating legislative involvement will not somehow mirac-
ulously produce unatninlty and coherence. Of course, if
the involvement of most of the actors in the executive
branch is curtailed as well— something Henry Kissinger
largely succeeded In doing in SALT I— this might result
in a closer approximation of a "unified* position.
Such a tactic has its own coats however, and these
costs may be too high of a price to pay Gerard Smith,
the SALT I chief negotiator, has suggested that when
Kisalnger took most of the negotiations into his own
hands, the agreement that Kissinger finally negotiated
was less favorable to the U S on several hey points
than what was ■in the works* through more formal
channels.® 6 However, even if the ‘extreme* version of
this argument le fallacious, there is still a great
deal of truth to the assertion that the involvement of
the Senate exacerbates the difficulty in securing an
arms control agreement. This is true if for no other
reaaon than that the number of political actors is
greatly increased when the Senate is involved.

Senate Involvement and "Substantive Progress"

Granted that Senate involvement does increase the

186

"political" nature of the issue, does the inherently
public nature of congressional debate prevent the
achievement of "substantive progress?" The results are
mixed. One partial refutation of this objection can be
found in the number of improvements to SALT II that can
partly be attributed to Senate pressure.

For example. Senator Thomas McIntyre insisted that
the negotiators establish a time for the dismantling of
the strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDVs) that
did not overlap with the end of the protocol. McIntyre
reasoned that if the Soviets delayed the dismantling of
their systems, they might be able to use this as lever-
age to force continuation of the protocol limits. Be
wanted to allow the U.S. the option to extend or dis-
continue the protocol. McIntyre's proposals were writ-
ten into the language of the agreement. 6'

Senator Gary Hart (D-Colorado) was a major force in
pushing for significant qualitative limits on "new
types" of missiles. At Hart's urging, the restrictions
on modernization were pushed down to the 5 percent
range. This was an important change, because previous
arms control agreements concentrated on quantitative
dimensions. So Bart's insistence was an important step
forward .

Another example of a qualitative restriction that
was encouraged by congressional interest was the
fractionation limit (the limit on the maximum permis-
sible number of warheads per missile). It is not that
the members of Congress originated this idea or any of
the others. This was rarely the case. However, it can
be argued that the long-term interest of the Senate in
attempting to get some sort of MIRV ban finally came to
fruition with this Carter Administration proposal.
Perhaps the most accurate description is that congres-
sional interest in a fractionation limit reinforced the
positions of those in the executive branch who desired
this option as well.

However, the general objection to extensive public
discussion of specific proposals may have some valid-
ity. Many analysts believe that it was a mistake for
President Carter to publicly disclose some of the
specifics of his March 1977 proposals before submitting
them to the Soviets. The desire to secure Senate
support may have been part of his motivation. Con-
sequently, the best alternative may be some sort of
compromise between secret, executive-dominated di-
plomacy (as in SALT 1) and a wide-open public debate on
specific proposals during the negotiations. Putting
this compromise into operation would be difficult, but
one possibility would entail limiting congressional
debate in the early stages to committee "executive
session" discussion.

187

Impact of Early, Senate Involvement

The second aspect of the politicization argument
focuses on the question of the impact of early Senate
involvement on chances for final favorable treatment of
the agreement. This whole question is closely tied to
the relationship between electoral politics and arms
control. The American political process seems to dem-
onstrate its more deleterious effects on the arms con-
trol process os election times near Jimmy Carter was
intensely aware of this Consequently, he began nego-
tiations on SALT It very early in his Administration
The hope, and indeed the belief, was that the treaty
would be signed and presented to the fenate well before
the approach of the 1960 election This would have
meant that domestic political factors would have bad
less of an Impact on the decision

Unfortunately, for a number of reasons, including
the early involvement of the Senate, the negotiations
dragged on much longer than had been anticipated By
the time the treaty was finally presented to Congress
in the summer of 1979, the support for the President
had dwindled, and powerful SALT opposition groups had
emerged to challenge the treaty

One such group was the American Conservative Union,
which took out ada on 350 television stations arguing
against SALT XI before it was even signed '° This
could only be possible in an atmosphere in which at
least some cjf the general terms of the prospective
agreement were known in Congress Secretary Vance
remarked at one point « '1

On© of tty real frustrations has been that the
protracted negotiations have prevented us from
laying out the strengths of the agreement and
from answering some of the misleading
statements

Still, all of this might not have nattered, had it
not been for the fact that the 1980 elections were rap-
idly approaching The calculation of the pro-SALT
strategists was that since moderate Republican support
for the treaty was absolutely essential {to get the
necessary two-thirds), the Senate debate had to take
place as Boon ea possible and before spring of 1980
Spring would signal the start of presidential primary
season, and an increasingly partisan atmosphere in Con-
gress There would be a powerful incentive for Repub-
licans to criticise trte President , <rrd j £isl
for then to adopt bipartisan positions On SALT II,
the moderate Republicans would also come under intense
pressure from the conservative wing of their party to

vote against the treaty. Against this backdrop, th**
equivocation of rany rodcrate Republican senators is
politically understandable. Therefore, as internation-
al events forced the continued postponement of the PM.?
11 debate, and with the 1980 elections looming increas-
ingly closer, the prospects for SALT II approval dirr^tl.

An interesting case in point is that of Howard
Coker, who was Senate Minority Leader at the tire.
Baker planned to run for the Republican presidential
non! nation in 1980. He was faced, however, with con-
siderable opposition frors the conservative wing of his
party for his support of the Panama Canal Treaties.
Baker's support had been absolutely critical to the
gucccss of those treaties. (See Chapter 4.) His back-
ing of the treaties r.adc it easier for other Republi-
cans to support then. The support of the Republican
moderates was crucial because of the constitutional
requirement that a two-thirds majority is necessary for
treaty approval. Carter was hoping for thir. care
support in the SALT II debate. Therefore, Baker's
denunciation of SALT II as "fatally flawed" dealt a
serious blow to the chances for eventual treaty
approval. When thin situation is contrasted with that
at the time of SALT I (a Democratic majority in the
Senate and a Republican President) it can be concluded
that the divided leadership of the Senate in SALT II
proved to be more important than divided party affil-
iation between President Nixon and Congress in SALT I.
In other words, intra-institutionol tension nay be rore
important than inter-institutional division.

Although many of these arguments would appear to
militate against congressional involvcnent, particular-
ly in the early stages, a return to the era of congrea-
sional acquiescence is not likely.

Influence of Politics and Experience

Any attempt to circumvent the Senate's prerogative
is apt to be met with stiff resistance. The growing
assertiveness of the Senate in the field of arrs con-
trol was apparent in 1979. There were a number of rea-
sons for this increased assertiveness. One rajor rea-
son might be labeled the "legacy of SALT I." A perva-
sive belief in Congress was that past administrations
had not been as forthright as they right have been.
This suspicion was reflected in a statement by Senator
Church to Secretary Vance:

When the committee held hearings on SALT 1,
the Secretary of State, William Fogers, de-
clared categorically that there are no secret
agreements. Within six weeks after the Secre-
tary made that statement, we were later to

169

discover that Mr Kissinger had entered into a
secret agreement with Anatoly Dobrynin about
the Soviet <5-1 subs ..Then later it was dis-
covered that Mixon informed Brezhnev the U.s
would not deploy the maxintm number of sub-
marine missiles I don't want any surprises
of this kind in the course of our consider-
ation of this SALT II agreement 12

in addition to this fear of executive secrecy, there
was also a widespread belief that the U S. had been too
lax vith the Soviets in SALT I Many senators saw it
as their duty to prevent this from happening again

Coupled with this “rational" explanation of in-
creased assertiveness, there are several factors that
reinforced this trend The first factor was a shift in
the public attitude toward detente and the Soviet
Union. politically, this meant that those politicians
who advocated arns control during the BALT 11 period
were vulnerable to political attack The publie opin-
ion polli at the time presented an Interesting con-
trast! Although a healthy majority of the American
public continued to support arms control in general, a
large majority were also suspicious of the Soviet
Union. Perhaps most significantly, some pf the later
polls indicated that many of those citizens who were
most informed about SALT (and hence were likely to take
it into account when they voted) were opposed to the
agreement . 7 i

Finally, there were what might be called the 'les-
son* of Panama * Many of those serving ih the Senate
in 1979 at the time of SALT ir had not been there in
1972 Consequently, ouch of their attitude toward the
treaty process derived from the Panama Canal debate.
In the course of the Panama debate, many senators
learned the ropes, so to speak, with regard to treaty
consideration, This infused them with self-confidence
in regard to the SALT II agreement Many of theta
generalized the experience of the Panama debate and ap-
plied that to SALT II As a consequence of the experi-
ence in the Panama debate, many in the Senate believed
they could make substantial improvements In the SALT II
Treaty itself and not destroy the arms control process.

Given this congressional assertiveness, it ear be
argued that Senate involvement in the SALT process did
increase the odds for favorable treatment of the treaty
relative to what the odds would have been without that
participation. If the only effective voice the Senate
has 1 b in the approval phase, an assertive Senate might
be much leas careful to avoid "killer amendments “

AIbo it must be stated that the political process
does not necessarily hinder arms control— it could
conceivably facilitate it If there is a situation in
which the executive is not seriously committed to arms

190

control , while the public is, then the involvement of
the Senate should enhance the pressure for arms control
initiatives. Signs of this could be seen in the early
1980s, with Congress as a "link” between a public with
a strong interest in arms control and the Reagan Ad-
ministration, which many believed was not seriously
committed to arms control.

Summary

The historical record indicates that Congress had a
neglible impact or, SALT I. This study suggests that
the reasons for this are two-fold: [1) The Nixon Ad-
ministration effectively kept the process of policy
development in the White House by drastically restrict-
ing the amount of information Congress had concerning
the substance of U.S. proposals or the status of the
talks. (2) There was a broad willingness in Congress
to allow the executive to have control. Congress did
not press the Administration to any great degree. A
major reason for this aquiescence was the indifference
of the part of many members toward arms control is-
sues. There were a few strong supporters of arms con-
trol centered in the Foreign Relations Committee during
the chairmanship of J.W. Fulbright, but except for this
group, plus Senator Jackson and a few others, there was
relatively little interest in arms control issues.
This attitude persisted through the mid-seventies
before a more assertive attitude gradually emerged,
which finally expressed itself during the more "open"
Carter Administration. It appears that the efforts of
congressional involvement in the arms control process
are mixed. From an arms control perspective, some of
these efforts militate for congressional involvement,
and some militate against it.

One the one hand, congressional involvement re-
sulted in these effects which could be seen as negative
from an arms control perspective:

1. In the case of SALT II, it led to an in-
crease in military spending because:

a. The desire to secure the support of
defense-minded senators induced
President Carter to increase the
proposed levels of military spend-
ing. The need to secure the support
of these senators was brought about
at least in part, by the constitu-
tional requirement for a two-thirds
majority.

b. So much of the SALT II debate fo-
cused on ,the expanding military
prowess ^stemen Soviet Union, this

191

“sensitized* tinny senators to the
need to increase P.S military
spending

2 The decentralized nature of congress and
the lack of party loyalty made it diffi-
cult for the President to consult with
Congress and for Congress to articulate a
clear, consistent policy direction

3. The involvement of the Senate early in

the process did increase ithough it did
not create I the “politicization* d£ the
issue The effects of this were mixed,
though the major negative impact was to
contribute to the protraction of the

negotiations The length of the negoti-
ations and the openess of the debate al-
lowed opposition groups to mobilize

early Finally, the proximity of the
1980 elections to the formal considera-
tion of the treaty made favorable treat-
ment more difficult

4 The failure of the Senate to approve the
SALT II Treaty led to an inconsistent
V S foreign policy and raised questions
abroad about the ability of the executive
branch to commit the U 5 on major for-
eign policy issues

On the other hand, there were some positive results
from congressional involvement as welli

1 It increased U 5 bargaining leverage in
dealing with the Soviets

2. Congressional involvement improved the

substance of the treaty There were
several examples, but the most Important
ones related to the push in congress for
a greater qualitative emphasis in SALT II

3 Congressional involvement, Imperfect
though ft may be, is still the best means
for encouraging representative government
lor as close an approximation of it as
may be possible in a pluralistic society!

4, Congressional involvement in the early
stages of SALT II increased the chances
for final approval compared to the odds
if there had not been that involvement.

If the Senate had been denied initial
participation, the Senate would have been
much more likely to amend the treaty
This would probably have killed it As
it was, the 5enate leaders might have
been able to steer it through to approv-
al without the addition of “killer

192

amendments" had international events not
kept the full Senate from debating the
treaty in 1979-1980.

On balance, the SALT experience suggests that a
stronger case can be made for congressional partici-
pation in strategic arms negotiations than can be made
against it. This is particularly true because of such
actions as the attempt of the Senate in SALT I to
encourage the pursuit of a MIRV ban. This suggests
that the impetus from arms control initiatives can come
from Congress as well as the President.

However, there are changes that could be made in
Congress that might mitigate some of the negative
tendencies. One possible improvement would be the
establishment of some type of ad hoc national security
committee. Such a suggestion has frequently been made
to facilitate better congressional participation in
foreign policy in general. It has special relevance
for arms control negotiations, however, because of the
necessity for a central Senate focal point for execu-
tive consultation. Establishing a small, clearly iden-
tified group of senators would serve the dual purpose
of encouraging more consistent presidential consulta-
tion while making it easier for Congress to articulate
policies and proposals. Such a consultative committee
could be made up of the majority and minority leaders,
the ranking members from the Intelligence, Foreign
Relations, and Armed Services Committees (as well as
the ranking members from the Arms Control Subcommit-
tees), plus a small number of interested senators to be
selected by party caucus. Obviously such a consulta-
tive committee would not resolve all the problems, and
might even create a few of its own, but it would prob-
ably be an improvement over the present diffuse system.

There have also been suggestions that the constitu-
tional requirement for a two-thirds majority for treat-
ies should be changed. Such a change is seen as highly
desirable by many arms control advocates. The two-
thirds requirement not only makes it more difficult to
secure approval for arms control agreements, but is
viewed by some as undemocratic (in that it is anti-
majoritarian) . Approval of arms control agreements by
a simple majority vote — perhaps of both Houses — would
still allow Congress to block agreements that did not
have widespread support, but it would prevent a minor-
ity from exercising veto power over U.S. arms control
policy. Nonetheless, the constitutional two-thirds
requirement is likely to continue in effect and to
remain an important consideration when it comes to arms
control treaties, particularly as long as the Senate
insists on retaining an active role in this area.

193

NOTES

1 These arguments ace a composite of typical
arguments taken Cron several sources* especially John
Spanier and Eric Uslanor, Foreign Policy and the Demo -
cratic Dilemmas (3rd ed.) and Lawrence Weller “Secrecy
in Aral Control Negotiations,* In congress and Anna
Control , Lawrence Weller and Alan Platt; eda 7
(BouFrieri Westviev, 1978 )» pp 157-104,

2 SALT 3 actually consisted of two parts: the
ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement on Offensive
Weapons while Senate approval was necessary on both
parts, the house was allowed to consider only the
Interim Agreement The House was brought Into the ap-
proval process as a result of a 1961 act which mandated
approval la regular majority wbb sufficient for approv-
al) from both Houses for arms control agreements
couched In tJie form os an executive agreement rather
than a treaty

3. Alan Platt, The Senate and Strategic Arms
Policy, 1969-1977 ( Boulder i WestvFew, 1970), pp 29-30.

4. John Nevhouse, Cold Pawn: The Inside Story of
SALT {New York: Holt, Rinehart, and _ >ilns"tcin / 1971 J,

pp (>6-101

5 Recounted in Platt, p 25 See Congressional
Record , Augu*t 3, 1972 for full account

T Platt, p 20

7. Senate Resolution 211, Passed April 1970

8 Alton Frye, A Responsible Congress , (Wew
York: HcCraw Rill, 1975 T, pp SF-TI

9 Mxon remark reported In Washington Post ,

Harch 22, 1970, p.A-1. See Platt, p 1* for discussion
of episode

10. Henry Kissinger, Yeats of. Upheaval {Boston:
Little, Brown, 1902} , pp 256-274

11. Gerard Smith, Poubletalk (New York:
Doubleday, 19B0), pp. 154-178

12. Weller, pp 162-170 , , „

13 Platt, p.16. See also Congressional Record ,
June 14, 1971, p.24992.

14. Platt, pp. 30-31.

15, U.S Ccngross, Senate, Hearings before tne

Committee on Armed Services, 92nd Cong , 2d aess.,

1972, pp. 511-567,

16. Joseph Krurel, cited
Quarterly , June 15, 1974, p 1546
Tk Leslie Celb, 'The Story
Policy 16, fall 1974 Gelb nalces a
tfat Jackson '« charges are overblown.

in Congressional

of a Flap,* Foreign
compelling argument

18, Platt, p.57,

19. Ibid,, p.65-68.

Soviet Relations . Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public
Affairs, Austin, Texas, February 26, 1982,

22. U:S. Congress, Senate, Warnke Nomination ,

Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations,
95th Cong., 1st sess., February 8-9, 1977. See also

Congressional Record , March 9, 1977.

23. U.S. Congress, Senate, The SALT II Treaty ,
Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 96th
Cong., 1st sess., (Exec. Report 96-14), pp. 10-12.
(Hereinafter referred to as SFRC Report.)

24. Strobe Talbott, Endgame; The Inside Story of
SALT II (New York: Harper Colophon, 1980), p.290.

25. Thomas M. Franck and Edward Weisband, Foreign
Policy by Congress (New York: Oxford University Press,
1979), p.290.

26. Charles Percy, "The Partisan Gap," Foreign
Policy 45, winter 1981-82, p.13.

27. Public Law 87-297.

28. Congressional Record , October 15, 1977.

29. Congressional Quarterly , April 15, 1979.

30. Talbott, p. 154 .

31. SFRC Report, Minority Views, p.491.

32. These categories are taken from Flanagan,
pp. 61-69.

33. U.S. Congress, Senate, The SALT II Treaty ,
Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations,
96th Cong., 1st sess., (Hereinafter referred to as SFRC
Hearings), Part 1, pp. 435-440. See also SFRC Minority
Report, pp. 464-494.

34. SFRC Hearings, Part 1, pp. 481-482 and Part 4,
pp. 405, 434.

35. Flanagan, p.50.

36. SFRC Hearings, Part 2, pp. 265-280.

37. This pertained to the Soviet SA-5 radar. See
SFRC Hearings, Part 5, pp. 15-25. See also Congres -
sional Record , June 16, 1977.

38. U.S. Department of State, Special Report,
"Compliance with the SALT I Agreements and Verification
of the Proposed SALT II Treaty," Department of State
Bulletin , April 1978.

39. SFRC Hearings, Part 2, pp. 273-275.

40. SFRC Hearings, pp. 228-252.

41. U.S. Congress, Senate, Principal Findings on
the Capabilities of the United States to Monitor the

155

43 SFRC Report, pp. 27-28

44. SFRC Report, p.7 See also SASC Hearings,

Part 1, pp.23-50

45. SFRC Report, p.73. Resolution of Ratification
f-E

46. Ibid., p 75. Resolution of Ratification 1-L.

47. Ibid , P 72. Resolution of Ratification 1-B

48. SFRC Bearings, Part 5, pp.«Q-B8,

49. Ibid., Part 5, p 77.

55 SFRC Report, pp 73-74. Resolution of Ratifi-
cation 1-7.

51. SFRC Hearings, Part 2, pp 273-275

52. Paul Warnke, panel discretion remarks at
seainar on Nuclear Negotiations, Austin, Texao,
February 1982

53 SFRC Hearings, Part 1, p 119

54. tea Aspin, ■Congressional Procedure and Arras
Control,* in Platt and Weller, eda , Congress and Arris
Control , pp <3-58

55 Henry Kissinger, The White House Years
(Boston. Little, Drown and Co , T575T7pp ll75-14t)Q

56. Paul Narnke, rerarks at aealrar on Nuclear
Negotiations, Austin, Texas, February 26, 1982

57 Talbott, pp 95-98

58. The 5 percent incrcaae would go into effect in
later years

59. Congressional Quarterly , Deccnber 15, 1979

60. s»RC Report, pp 55,76

61 SFRC Hearings, Part 1, pp 481-462 and Part 4,
pp. 405, 4)4 Eeo also SASC Hearings, Part 1, pp 210,257.

62 Talbott, pp. 179-180

63 See Weiler, 'Secrecy in Arms Control Negotia-
tions,* for an excellent rebuttal of this argument

64, Flanagan, p 59.

65. Gerard Smith's diacus«ien* of the bureaucratic
battles in SALT X arc very interesting in this regard
See boublctnlk , especially Chapters 7-8

66 JBIdT, pp. 223-229.

67. Franck and Welsband, p 290

68. Ibid

69 Talbott, pp 38-67.

70 The Hew ¥orh Times , April 13, 1979

71 Talbott, p 204

72. sfrc Hearings, Part 1, p.119
73 Can ice Olsen, SALT II i A Review of Public

Opinion Polls . Congressional Research service, issue

8

Conclusion: Sharing Responsibility

Steven }. Biker

The five policy studies — arms sales, the Panama
Canal Treaties, strategic arms limitations, relations
with Turkey, and nonproliferation— cover a wide range
of problems. However, there are common features that
make these studies interesting as a group as well as
individually.

First, each of these is a policy area in which
traditional national interest/national security
dimensions of the problem predominated. Characteris-
tics that play an increasingly important role in making
foreign policy in an interdependent world — economic
interests, transnational actors, concerns about human
rights — played subordinate roles in these policy stud-
ies. Second, each represents a policy area in which
Congress has had a major impact, and where Congress'
activity intensified as a result of the resurgence in
the early 1970s. Third, each had at least one critical
episode in the 1978-1982 period; each affords at least
one example of how the Congress exercises the foreign
policy prerogatives that it reasserted in the early
1970s. Finally, the issues range in salience from high
visibility (Panama and SALT) to relatively low vis-
ibility (the Indian nuclear fuel shipments) to varying
salience (the highly controversial 1981 AWACS deal as
opposed to the more routine arms transfers). Con-
sidered as a group, these studies tell a great deal
about how well Congress performs its foreign policy
chores .

In Chapter 2, five standards were outlined for
judging Congress' foreign policy performance: legiti-
macy, interest articulation and public information,
expeditious consideration, coherence, and effect-
iveness. By applying these standards to the policy
studies, it should be possible to evaluate Congress
foreign policy performance, and to determine those
areas where Congress' performance might be improved.

196

197

(1) Lagltlaa cy

In each of these five policy areas. Congress has a
legitimate role to ploy, stemming from its basic over-
sight functions (aid to Turkey, nonproliferation and
arms sales) or from the Senate's treaty functions (SALT
and Panama Canal). However, the policy studies also
deal with extensions of congressional authority that
nay be questionable, e g , the participation of sena-
tors in direct discussions and negotiations with a for-
eign government during consideration of the Panama
Canal Treaties, and the legislative veto provisions in
arms sales and nonproliferation legislation

The SALT and Panama experiences show the Senste ex-
ercising Its responsibility to advise and consent to
treaties However, the Panama treaties were approved
by a narrow margin and only after a long and Involved
process! SALT II was never called up for debate on the
Senate floor The need to obtain two-thirds majority
approval of a treaty proved to be very difficult in
both of these cases, and combined with the often-cited
Versailles Treaty experience, has led to suggestions
for amendments to the Constitution, e g , reducing the
required two-thirds majority to a simple majority.
Certainly, both the SALT 11 and Panama treaties could
probably have been approved relatively quickly by a
simple majority with fewer of the political problems
that encumbered these controversial treaties

The principle behind the qualified majority— that
solemn international obligations should only be under-
taken with broad support— has rot lost its force. But
the practice of foreign policy has greatly eroded this
principle Host treaties are routine, often dealing
with economic, technical, or consular affairs, and are
routinely approved by the Senate. In the last several
years, the Senate has received from 12 to 30 treaties
per annum, and has approved up to 80 percent without
amendment. Controversial treaties such as Panama and
SALT II are the exception to the rule. Amending the
Constitution to deal with a few exceptions might not be
warranted

On the other hand, the Senate often disposes of
substantial policy matters on the basis of a simple
majority. Tor example, most defense budget votes prob-
ably have a greater impact on U S national security
than most treaty votes Why should treaties continue
to be subjected to the very demanding two-thirds "super
majority" requirement, when equally important questions
are decided by a simple majority?

Moreover, presidents have increasingly resorted to
the use of executive agreements, avoiding the need for
congressional approval In the year 1979, for example,

30 treaties were presented to the Senate, but if p rx?c-
utive agreements were concluded. Since the par pace r f
the Casc-2nblocki Act in 1972, all executive rgrem-c-.t *
are supposed to be transmitted to the Cor.ates*; r.o th't
Conorosc will at leant be informed of the a«jreer,-r.ta
and the President is less free to rake secret cc — lt-
rentc. Jn fact, the substance of the executive agree-
ments is often as routine an the substance of the
treaties that the Senate routinely approves.

Treaty approval by a nirplc majority would perhip*
reduce the incentive for resort to executive agreement'-,
because one justification giver, for the increasing u*e
of executive agreerents is the obstacle posed by the
two-thirds Senate approval requirement for treaties.
However, while there are undoubtedly instance?; where
potential Senate recalcitrance is a factor, it seer*
questionable that this is the rajor reason for presi-
dential preference for executive agreerents, Executive
agreements reinforced a presidential rode of conducting
foreign policy, enhancing the executive's role and au-
tonomy vis-a-vis Congress. Thus, presidents right vMl
prefer executive agreements to treaties, whatever the
terms of congressional involvement in treaty approval.

The fact rerains that treaties of substantial, im-
portance, even if few in nurber, have been blocked by
the Senate: in other words, the Senate's exercise of
its treaty approval function has an important qualita-
tive impact even if its quantitative impact in slight.
An alternative proposal for constitutional change would
replace the requirement for two-thirds Senate approval
with approval by a simple majority of both HouefC.
This is what the Constitution requires for a declara-
tion of war: why should treaty approval requirement c
be r3de rore stringent? If such a change was aired at
raking the approval of treaties easier, submitting con-
troversial treaties to both Houses would seer highly
problematic. For exarple, a rajority in the House
night well have voted against the Panama treaties is.
1978. Involving both Houses would almost certainly
lengthen the tire necessary to consider treaties. Per-
suading the Senate to share its constitutional preroga-
tives in the treaty approval would mean overcoming for-
midable institutional barriers. Of the several pro-
posed constitutional amendments under discussion in the
early 1980s, changes in the treaty approval provisions
are among the most sensible and least likely. Alterna-
tives to the two-thirds rule have little evident polit-
ical support, certainly nothing comparable- to the po-
litical forces mobilized in support of efforts or. re-
half of the Equal Bights Amendment, or the proposed
amendments that would allow prayers in public schools,
prohibit abortion, or balance the federal budget.
Whatever their substantive merits, constitutional
amendments to streamline treaty ccnsidc-raticn ceer

199

dubious in practical and political terms.

Tile direct participation of senators in interna-
tional negotiations during consideration of the Panama
Canal Treaties was the moot questionable exercise of
treaty authority by the Senate in these studies Al-
though the discussions had no formal status, in effect
they constituted a second stage of negotiations, com-
ing after the treaty had already been signed by Presi-
dent Carter

During the SAIT negotiations, senators vent to
Geneva, but as observers, not as negotiators Majority
Leader Byrd traveled to the Soviet Onion to meet Presi-
dent Brezhnev in July 1979, after SALT II had been
signed, but he went to explain the Senate’s role in
considering the treaty, not to negotiate changes Byrd
explained to Soviet leadership that the Senate has an
independent role In the treaty process and discussed
areas of possible Senate action to clarify terms of the
treaty

The involvement of senators in actual negotiations
with foreign nations is not unprecedented. In the
Nineteenth Century, senators receiving diplomatic
charges from a President usually resigned from the Sen-
ate But around the turn of the century, the practice
of making sitting senators members of diplomatic mis-
sions was used in order to help overcome «h institu-
tional impasset from 18 71-1898, the Senate failed to
pa sa a single important treaty

Today, s senator's responsibilities limit the role
that he could play in protracted international negotia-
tions. At best, members of Congress can observed the
proceedings and advise and consult with u S negotia-
tors As noted in Chapter 3, Democrat Tom Connelly and
Republican Arthur Vandenberg, the senior members of the
Senate Poreign Relations Committee, played active roles
when appointed by President Truman as delegates to the
San Prancisco meeting to draw up the United Nations
Charter, and also served on U S. delegations on the
European peace conferences at the end of World War 11.
But in the case of the Panama treaties, the senators ih
question were not appointed by the President to nego-
tiate, nor did they confine themselves to observation
Because of the statesmanship and wisdom of the princi-
pal senator# involved, especially Byrd and Baker, the
•second-stage* negotiations on Panama were concluded on
terms acceptable to all parties, making it possible for
the treaties to win approval But this type of sena-
torial involvement in diplomatic negotiations could
constitute a dangerous precedent. It is easy to imag-
ine that the consequences of direct involvement In
other diplomatic negotiations might not end so well.

Questions about the constitutional propriety of the
congressional role also arise in regard to the nuclear
proliferation and arms sales statutes These laws

200

provide for a so-called "legislative veto," an oppor-
tunity for Congress to review formally the executive
branch's execution of the law. In 1983 the Supreme
Court ruled unconstitutional the scores of legislative
vetoes that are written into laws dating back to the
1930s. In the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act (NNPA) of
1978, having given the President the authority to make
an exception to the law's nonproliferation standards,
Congress reserved the right to review that exception.
The 1976 Arms Export Control Act gave Congress 30 days
to disapprove a major arms sale. Recent Presidents
have seen legislative veto provisions as an unwarranted
intrusion into the executive's prerogative to "execute
the law," and a violation of the separation of powers.
For example, the Carter Administration formally pro-
tested the congressional veto provision of the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Act, even though the President pro-
ceeded to sign the law.

The Supreme Court's 1983 ruling ostensibly sides
with the executive branch in prohibiting the legisla-
tive veto as a means of congressional oversight. How-
ever, the majority opinion calls into question the
whole pattern of congressional delegation of power to
the executive, and therefore may lay the basis for re-
stricting the scope of power the President has come to
wield. If this interpretation is sustained, Congress'
error may not be in seeking to limit the President's
authority through a legislative veto, but in delegating
authority to the executive in matters that more proper-
ly should be legislated. Ironically, the 1983 decision
could lead to more "legislating foreign policy" rather
than less. For example, in the future Congress may
press for legislation that requires all nuclear exports
and all arms exports to have legislative sanction,
greatly increasing congressional involvement in imple-
menting foreign policy. In foreign policy, Congress
exercised its legislative veto rights very sparingly,
chosing to selectively challenge the executive only when
there were irreconciliable differences between the two
branches. Without the pragmatic tool of the legisla-
tive veto, Congress may be compelled to become involved
indiscriminately in even routine foreign policy matters.
While the legislative veto provisions of major foreign
policy legislation such as the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Act', the Arms Export Control Act, and the War Powers
Resolution may have been nullified, the rest of the
legislation remains in force. And, therefore, even af-
ter the Supreme Court decision in 1983, Congress in-
sisted that the Reagan Administration comply with the
extant provisions of the War Powers Resolution regard-
ing the stationing Marines in Beirut as a peace-keeping
force.

In conclusion, the legitimacy of Congress' actions
in general is confirmed in the five policy areas, but

201

in three cases there ia reason to question the manner
in which Congress exercised its legitimate functions
This conclusion affirms the propriety of congressional
involvement in foreign policy, but leaves open impor-
tant questions about the manner of that involvement

(2) Interest Articulation and Public Information

Congress serves as a transmission belt between pub-
lic opinion and national policy it both reflects pub-
lic preferences and contributes to shaping them. Of
course, Congress ia not unique in thia respect the
President and even the court Bystem alBO interact with
public opinion The major distinction between Congress
and the President is that different constituencies and
staggered elections mean that public opinion Is often
reflected differently by the two branches The Presi-
dent has a structural advantage in seeking to shape
public opinion! he con speak authoritatively for the
entire executive branch, and in foreign affairs for the
whole 0 S government Ho single leader of either
House can speak for Congress, much less the nation

The five policy areas provide examples of Congress
leading public opinion, following public opinion, and
operating in a public opinion vacuum In the case Of
the Panama Canal Treaties, there was much discussion in
the Senate of whether senators should lead or reflect
public opinion At the beginning, public opinion was
clearly againBt approval of the treaties The exhaust-
ive Senate action waa in part an attempt to persuade
the public that the treaties were in the rational in-
terest However, there is little direct evidence that
the debate in the Senate had a positive impact. The
shift in public opinion toward a more favorable view
was largely the result of extraordinary Administration
public relations efforts Rad the Senate simply repre-
sented and reflected public opinion, the treaties might
well have been rejected The Senate approved the
treaties, albeit narrowly and after long and involved
consideration, and not without a strong dose of arm-
twisting and logrolling by the adminiatration

The justification for taking a position contrary to
popular opinion in a case such as Panama would seen to
lie In the exhaustive Senate deliberations. The Panama
Canal Treaty votes were taken after a long debate and
careful consideration on the part of moat senators.
Many of those who voted in favor of the agreements be-
lieved that statesmanship rather than political expedi-
ency was necessary. And some senators paid a price for
this statesmanship} the Panama treaty votes were an
issue in the campaigns of several Senate liberals in
1978 and 1980, an issue that conservative political ac-
tion groups emphasised in successful campaigns against

such Democratic Senators as McIntyre (New Hampshire),
Culver (Iowa), Church (Idaho), and McGovern (South
Dakota ) .

In the case of the SALT II Treaty, the Senate was
certainly concerned about public opinion and reflected
changes in public opinion in the course of the SALT
deliberations. The Panama precedent was much on the
minds of senators, although the impact of the Panama
vote on re-election prospects was not clearly estab-
lished until after the November 1980 elections, long
after SALT II had been shelved. The greatest impact of
the Panama fight was to make some senators reluctant to
publicly commit themselves on SALT n prematurely, in
part because of the anticipated reaction in public
opinion, and in part because those who had taken early
positions on Panama believed that they were ignored in
the Administration’s effort to garner support among
doubters. Holding back from committing themselves
could leave senators in a better bargaining position.
For example. Senators Nunn, Glenn, and Zorinsky each
held back from public support for the SALT II Treaty in
order to acquire some quid pro quo from the Administra-
tion — defense spending increases, greater intelligence
monitoring capabilities, strategic force modernization,
etc. Had the SALT II Treaty reached the Senate floor,
there would have been an all-out White House effort to
persuade doubting senators that support for the treaty
was also good for their constituencies. Robert Beckel
and the White House staff members who had helped to
deliver votes on the Panama treaties were ready to make
a maximum effort to win approval of SALT II.

Consideration of SALT II was suspended before a
floor debate occurred in the Senate, although it had
held up very well through the long weeks of hearings by
three separate Senate committees. The technical level
of the debate in public and in the media was certainly
raised by the Senate hearings, which were broadcast
live over public radio. On the other hand, linkage
with other issues — e.g., the "Soviet troops in Cuba"
issue — also resulted from the actions of a few sena-
tors, and served to detract from discussion of the
merits of the SALT II agreement. Public opinion showed
little change as a result of Senate hearings.

In failing to debate the SALT II Treaty, the Senate
reflected the changing climate of public opinion. It
was Majority Leader Byrd’s opinion, widely shared, that,
considering the public mood in late 1979 and early 1980,
the SALT II Treaty could not be debated on its merits.
In the wake of the flap over Soviet troops in Cuba and
the seizure of the U.S. hostages in Iran, the Soviet
Embassy in Washington apparently concluded that by
December 1979, SALT II was a dead letter, and that an
invasion of Afghanistan would do no more than seal its
fate. The Soviets seemed to credit the claims of

203

Senator Jackson and otter treaty opponents more than the
view o£ pro-treaty senators such as Byrd and Cranston,
who believed that SALT II still had a chance for approv-
al before the election campaigns began. The Afghanistan
Invasion aroused American public opinion against the So-
viet Onion, led to a major shift in Carter Administra-
tion policy, and sealed SALT tl*s fate in the Senate

In the three other policy areas, aid to Turkey, the
Indian nuclear fuel case, and arms sales, there was
less direct impact of the opinion of the general public
on Congress Hovever, when the Turkish embargo was
imposed, there was e very direct impact on the Senate
by a small segment of the public, the Greek-American
lobby And, on specific arms sales to the Middle East,
the American dewish community can have a major cEfcct
on Congress

When issues are of low salience to the general pub-
lic, it is easier for small numbers of concerned indi-
viduals end groups to have a major impact on how Con-
gress behaves The Turkish invasion of Cyprus was not
an issue that created widespread public concern, nor
was the question of whether or not to lift the embargo
on aid to Turkey a high visibility issue But to
Greek-Airerienna, these were crucial questions, and
Greek-American groups were very active in trying to
influence Congress Middle East arms sales may not
always be major concerns for the general public, but
for the vcll-organixed supporters of Israel, these are
of the highest importance They have also been a mat-
ter of increasing concern to American firms with busi-
ness Interests in the Middle East

That a policy outcome should be heavily influenced
by well-organized groups representing very few people—
either ethnic groups or economic interests such as
weapons manufacturers and oil companies — poses a prob-
lem* should apeeial interests be allowed to determine
U S. national interests? "Special interests" can, of
course, be a loaded term, but there is a perceived dif-
ference between "special interests" and the kind of
issue-oriented organizations that are active in many
high-visibility public policy debates Issue-oriented
groups that sre not tied to specific material or ethnic
Interests project an image of disinterested public in-
volvement, as a means for citizens to express their
views in an organized, collective way. In the Panama
Canal case, the Conservative Caucus was one such exam-
ple, in the SAW LI ca.ae» the Committee on the Present
Danger and Americano for SALT were examples of issue-
oriented groups. Ethnic lobbies and economic groups
are by definition "interested" and are perceived as
benefiting from the policies that they advocate This
direct link to policy benefits places the activities of
a apeeial interest group in a somewhat different light
fron the activities of issue-oriented groups which are

motivated only by a concern for public policy.

Interest groups in the foreign policy field do not
perceive themselves as working in opposition to the
national interest of the United States. Rather, they
see themselves as participating in the process by which
the national interest is defined, an inherently politi-
cal process. According to its peculiar strengths, each
of the foreign policy lobbies seeks to influence Con-
gress through standard techniques of political influ-
ence — campaign contributions, public information or
disinformation, and the mobilization of voting blocs.

The imposition of an embargo on aid to Turkey was
seen as a triumph for one ethnic lobby, Greek-Ameri-
cans. But it would be a mistake to attach too much
influence to the Greek- American lobby. There were a
varity of factors contributing to the congressional
decision, which came at a time of particularly troubled
relations between the executive and legislative
branches. The fact that the Greek-Americans could ar-
gue that the existing law was on their side clearly
made their case more persuasive in the eyes of Con-
gress. The decision to lift the embargo four years
later was taken in spite of the Greek-American lobby,
and required that members of Congress waive domestic
political considerations and look beyond the earlier
"violation" of U.S. law in favor of geopolitical calcu-
lations. As this case demonstrates, no special inter-
est always prevails in Congress.

The Senate's decision to support the sale of AWACS
aircraft to Saudi Arabia represented a defeat for the
pro-Israel lobby in general, and the heretofore spec-
tacularly successful American Israel Public Affairs
Committee (ATPAC) in particular. The intensive lobby-
ing of economic groups — weapons manufacturers and com-
panies doing business in Saudi Arabia, such as the en-
gineering and construction giant, Bechtel Group Inc.—
showed how competitive foreign policy lobbying has
become. Groups such as AIPAC have advantages, especi-
ally their ability to mobil; je voters; but they may
find it difficult to match the financial resources of
economic interests such as the petroleum and arms
industries. If defining the national interest is a
political process, some special interests seem more
likely to prevail than others.

In the case of the Indian nuclear fuel question and
nonproliferation policy, there was little public inter-
est and no ethnic group nor economic interest group
pressures. Perhaps this helps to explain the different
decisions reached by the Senate and the House. There
were no outside organizations or groups exerting pres-
sures that would have given more coherence to the ac-
tions of the two Houses, leaving the decision to sup-
port or oppose the President to the internal dynamics
of each House.

205

There were bureaucratic pressures In the Indian
nuclear fuel case While the executive branch was
officially united behind the President's action, dissi-
dents in the State Department and elsewhere were in
constant contact with like-minded staffers on Capitol
Hill and those at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission who
were working to block the Indian nuclear fuel ehip-
cent These actors had some impact on Congress, but
rot much on public opinion Informed opinion, as
reflected in editorials around the nation, was against
supplying nuclear fuel to India The Rouse actions
reflected thla view, but the Senate narrowly decided to
support the President

No overall pattern emerges from these policy stud-
ies with respect to the role of public opinion In
part this is because the standard itself allows for po-
tentially contradictory conclusion# Congress' action
con be consistent with public opinion, in which case it
nay be said to reflect itj or Congress's action can be
contrary to public opinion, in which case it can be ar-
gued that Congress is attempting to inform and educate
the public There la little in these policy studies to
suggest that Congress had a major impact on shaping the
public's views on foreign policy. However, through me-
dia coverage of congressional debate and action, on is-
sues ranging from arms control to C.S policies in Cen-
tral America, public interest has been heightened. The
televised hearings of the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee on U 5. involvement in Vietnam began a gradual
awakening of the American public to V S. policies in
Southeast Asia. When a treaty or proposed arms sales
is before Congress, members of Congress nay become the
focal point of interest groups and of public atten-
tion, Nonetheless, instances when the public looks to
congress for leadership on foreign policy issues— such
ob evenu tally occurred with the Vietnam Mar— seem to be
exceptional.

Expeditious Consideration

There is a sense of urgency that attaches to for-
eign policy issues A genuine international crisis of-
ten requires an immediate response, but even non-crisis
situations require a timely response if that response
is to relevant in quickly changing international envi-
ronment on routine foreign policy issues, lengthy or
delayed consideration may not cause problems, but in
moat cases an expeditious disposition of a foreign pol-
icy problem ia beneficial to the national interest.

No collective body is able to act as quickly as a
unitary entity, at least in principle. In practice,
however, the differences In response tine between
legislative and executive institutions can be

exaggerated. Bureaucratic processes can slow executive
responses, just as Congress is sometimes capable of
moving with considerable dispatch. International
events can either precipitate or slow action in both
institutions. A sense of proportion has to be main-
tained: when it took more than a decade for the execu-
tive to negotiate the Panama Canal Treaties, it is not
unreasonable that Senate consideration of these treat-
ies consumed eight months.

Judgment is essential in weighing whether Congress
acted too slowly and, as a result, some substantial
foreign policy objective was jeopardized, or whether
Congress acted with appropriate speed. If it is judged
that Congress did not bet quickly enough, the explana-
tion for the delay is important. If cumbersome proce-
dures account for the lack of timely action, then there
are organizational remedies that should be considered.
If political differences account for the delay, then
organizational remedies may be of little value. The
question of expeditious consideration is important be-
cause one of the principal arguments against a strong
congressional role in foreign policy is that Congress
is incapable of acting quickly and, therefore, Con-
gress' role in foreign policy must be circumscribed.

Of the policy areas surveyed, the time span of Con-
gress' involvement ranges from a few weeks to a period
of years. Some cases involve recurring issues, as in
relations with Turkey — particularly the arms embargo,
which was imposed in 1974-1975 and lifted in 1978 — or
the reviews of successive arms exports. Some issues
occupy the attention of particular committees of Con-
gress or a few members for long periods of time, while
consuming relatively little attention of the body as a
whole: the SALT II Treaty was the subject of careful
study by dozens of senators and lengthy hearings by
three Senate committees, but it never reached the Sen-
ate floor. On Panama, the Indian nuclear fuel ques-
tion, and on most arms sales, there seemed to be a good
correspondence between the amount of time and attention
devoted to the issue by Congress and overall importance
of the issue as a foreign policy objective. However,
during the first four months of 1978, while being de-
bated on the Senate floor, the Panama treaties occupied
the attention of the Senate to the exclusion of almost
all other issues, foreign or domestic.

The imposition of the arms embargo on Turkey pro-
vides examples of Congress acting both expeditiously
and in a drawn-out way. Congress responded to the
Cyprus situation rather quickly in 1974 and voted to
impose the embargo on Turkey. However, Congress re-
sisted executive pressures to lift the embargo for
several years. in the end, the crucial factor was
support from key members of the congressional leader-
ship for ending the embargo. Even in these days of

20?

relative decentralisation in Congress, there la ouch
that a determined leadership can do to affect the pace
an( j substance of legislation.

tte Arms Export Control Act gave Congress 30 days
to consider proposed sale* and to take action to disap-
prevs then i£ Congress ae chose No major arms sales
hsve yet been blocked by congressional action, but
clearly both the content and timing of major sales such
si the 19 78 Middle East ansa package have been affected
by congress' participation in the approval process.
The arms e^rt legislation gave Congress a reasonable
period of ties to act and it has proven capable of do-
ing so More important, anticipation of congressional
reviev has led to a pattern of executive branch consul-
tation with Congress prior to making major arms sales
ceraltoents If Congress' role in arms sales jeopard-
ites American foreign policy objectives, it is due Ibbb
to the length of time that a debate over a proposed
sale My take than to the substance of tho debate, the
public airing of the issue — during which an arms recip-
ient cay be offended even though the arms sale i* ap-
proved. This is a wholly different problem from expe-
ditious consideration

The Indian nuclear fuel case is another example in
which the relevant legislation, the Nuclear Nonprolif-
eration Act, mandated a particular period of tine for
congrasiional consideration Both tha House and Senate
consumed much of the 60 days allowed before acting
The Senate delay* were leas the result of Senate proce-
dures than they were of Administration prefcrenceai
the Administration sought to postpone action until it
could muster as much support as possible for tha Presi-
dent's position. On the timing question, the Admini-
stration bad the support of Majority Leader Dyrd and of
foreign delations Committee Chairman Church, each of
wbca had his own reasons for accepting delay. Using
the full time a llcwed by law did not jeopardired for-
eign policy objectives. The Indiah licenses had been
pending for nearly two years, blocked st the discretion
of the Administration. While the Administration in-
sisted on the urgency of the matter in June 1980, it
could b« argued thst U £. -Indian relations had already
been damaged. Had the vote on the nuclear fuel ship-
ment been negative, the negative impact on U.S rela-
tions with India would probably not have been much
greater.

Treaties such aa SALT II and Panama are subject to
special rule* and procedures in the Senate. Unless
*iVfa by unanimous consent, these special treaty rules
esn require mare time on tha floor than most legiele-
tica The SALT II Treaty waa reported out hy tho
oroign Relations Committee and placed on tho Senate's
reeutive Calendar, but it was never called up during
or 1900, At the end of the 96th Congress, SALT li

208

was taken off the Executive Calendar and returned to
the Foreign Relations Committee . That committee had
held 30 public hearings and 12 closed hearings on the
SALT II Treaty? floor debate was expected to consume as
much as six weeks. In the eyes of treaty supporters,
the fact that the treaty was never debated or approved
did jeopardize O.S. foreign policy objectives. And
there were some attempts by the Carter Administration
to revive consideration of the treaty in the spring and
summer of 1980, which were resisted by the Senate lead-
ership. In the climate prevailing in 1980, it seems
difficult to believe that the treaty would have been
approved without some substantive changes or without a
debate that would have greatly exacerbated relations
with the Soviet Union. Practically, failing to debate
the treaty may have jeopardized national interests less
than rejection would have. Had the treaty been debated
and defeated, the Reagan Administration would not have
had the option of adhering to the unratified treaty's
terms .

The Senate consideration of the Panama Canal
Treaties was the most thorough since the Versailles
Treaty debate. If the implementation legislation and
oversight procedures are included, it could be said
that congressional involvement in the Panama issues has
not ended. But the length of the Senate's considera-
tion of the .Panama treaties was less likely to jeopar-
dize national interests than the type and substance of
that involvement. The Senate leadership of both par-
ties was successful in moving the treaties along in the
face of numerous attempts at obstruction. The almost
unprecedented degree of Senate involvement in negotia-
tions with a foreign government, which did consume some
time, could easily have resulted in an outcome that
would have thwarted Administration objectives; fortun-
ately, it did not.

Frequently, the executive and legislative branches
are at odds over scheduling. Executive branch offi-
cials are often frustrated when Congress does not re-
spond quickly to foreign policy initiatives. In some
instances the executive will overstate the "crisis"
aspect of an issue in order to spur congressional ac-
tion. As noted earlier, Congress can move quickly,
particularly if its leaders are committed to doing so.
But normally Congress prefers to move at its own pace,
and that can be very deliberate, especially when its
procedures are given full play.

There are numerous examples in the policy studies
of the timetable for legislative action becoming an
issue between the two branches, in the case of Presi-
dent Truman's proposal for aid to Turkey and Greece^
the Senate quickly made it clear that the administra-
tion’s timetable was seen as unrealistic. In 1911 •
President Carter eventually had to defer to the Senate

leadership in a showdown over scheduling of the pro-
posed AWACS sale to Iran Perhaps drawing on that ex-
perience, Carter looked to Majority Leader Byrd to set
the schedule for consideration of the Panaris Canal
Treaties. Finally, in the case of SALT XI, scheduling
problems obviously affected the prospects for favorable
Senate consideration, although in this caBe there were
a variety of factors that delayed action To begin
with i the Carter Administration encountered repeated
delay? in concluding treaty negotiations, thus submit-
ting it to the Senate much later than anticipated
Once it was sent to the Senate, the treaty was victim-
iied by a series of unexpected developments and a
changing political environment

On the whole, these policy studies indicate that
Congress is capable of acting expeditiously In perform-
ing its foreign policy responsibilities in two cases,
SALT II and efforts to resume aid to Turkey, there was
either incomplete action or action later than would
have perhaps been preferable from the point of view of
U S foreign policy interests But, in neither case
did procedural problems prove to be « significant hin-
drance to moving more rapidly, except for the two-
thirds treaty approval requirement impact on SALT II.
In both cases, substantial political considerations
dictated the lack of timely congressional action Con-
gress was able to act but chose not to There does not
seem to be any obvious remedy to this kind of politi-
cally determined check on presidential action in for-
eign policy

( 4 ) Coherence

Without coherence it ie arguable whether a nation
has a foreign policy, if policy is understood os a set
of means to implement a relatively well articulated
goal Coherence in foreign policy is important for ex-
ternal and internal reasons. It provides a basis for
predicting what the U.S will do, and this should re-
duce other nations' mistakes and miscalculations in
their relations with the U S But coherence in Ameri-
can foreign policy serves domestic political functions
as welli policy coherence is necessary if public sup-
port is to maintained, essential to conducting foreign
policy in a democracy. And coherence Is necessary if
foreign policy is to be successfully executed by a com-
plex, farflung bureaucracy.

There are two principal dimensions to foreign
policy coherer at with, respect to Congcesat agreement
between the executive and legislative branches, and
agreement between the two Houses Disagreement in
either of these dimensions contributes to incoherence,
but the moat important source of confusion in U S

210

foreign policy results from disagreement between the
two branches. The importance of foreign policy coher-
ence gives the President an advantage over the Congress
in making foreign policy; as the initiator and execu-
tor in most foreign policy situations, the President is
able to argue that failure to agree with him will weak-
en his ability to pursue American interests in dealing
with other nations. But this fact is also the source
of Congress' leverage over the President in foreign
policy: the President must tailor his foreign policy
initiatives to congressional, preference unless he
wishes to risk a defeat that would diminish his effect-
iveness. Congress too must weigh the consequences of
disagreeing with the President on foreign policy ques-
tions. Congressional action alone often has little
impact on the behavior of other countries; to be ef-
fective, Congress usually requires the positive support
of the executive branch. Thus, coherence is a concern
for both branches of government. Coherence does not
simply mean that Congress must always go along with the
President; rather, it means that the President must
also go along with Congress, reinforcing the norm of
compromise that is so important in American politics.

These foreign policy issue areas provide examples
across the spectrum from coherence to confusion. On
the Panama Canal Treaties, the two branches reached an
agreement, contributing to coherence. In imposing the
arms embargo on Turkey in 1974, the two branches disa-
greed but the two Houses of Congress agreed with one
another. In one of the most recent major arms sales
controversies, the Saudi AWACS case, and on the most
significant test to date of the nonproliferation legis-
lation, the decision to ship nuclear fuel to India, the
President and the Senate were able to reach an agree-
ment, while the House dissented. The judgment with
respect to the SALT II Treaty is unclear because the
process was stillborn; the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee reported out the treaty favorably, indicating
agreement with the Administration, but the subsequent
failure of the Senate to approve the treaty contributed
to incoherence in O.S. foreign policy.

The Senate's approval of the Panama treaties
brought to fruition years of negotiations by several
presidents. That the Senate amended the treaties does
not necessarily mean that its actions detracted from
policy coherence. To the extent that the amendments
and other conditions attached to the treaties by the
Senate were in line with the negotiations conducted by
the two governments, the Senate's action was coherent
in effect. Obviously, however, the results could eas-
ily have been different.

The Turkish example provides a mixed picture. In
imposing an embargo in 1974, the Congress was applying
existing law. But this was opposed by the President

211

who believed that the lav should be Ignored because
Turkey Is a valued MATO ally. The willingness to im-
pose sanctions on Turkey demonstrated that Congress was
prepared to stand behind the restrictive provisions
that are part of V.S lavs on the transfer of military
equipment to other countries However, it soon became
apparent, if it was not from the first, that the cir-
cumstances surrounding the Turkish embargo were very
particular and would not be a precedent for other
situations. For example, Israel repeatedly used arms
provided for defensive purposes for attacks on Pal-
estinian positions in Lebanon, and in the bombing of
the Iraqi nuclear research reactor in 1981, but was
never seriously threatened with even a diminution in
U.S. aid until 1982 Because CongresB would not follow
its own precedent, its action on Turkey created con-
fusion in C2 6 policy not only because Congress dif-
fered with the President, but also because Congress
behaved inconaistently

On issues such as arms sales and nuclear exports,
where legislative vetoes threatened, there is an incen-
tive for the President to accomodate some congressional
demands in return for the support of at least one of
the two Bouses In both the AWACS and Indian nuclear
fuel examples, the President vas allowed to proceed
having convinced barely enough senators that the initi-
ative in question would serve the national interest
more than rejection The early opposition of the House
in both cases probably Inclined the President to be
more accomodating to demands for concessions to sena-
torial concerns There is one major difference be-
tween these two examples, and that has leas to do with
coherence of foreign policy than with consistency
Major arms sales to Middle East countries are an estab-
lished part of the 0 S. policy in the region, however
controversial a particular arms deal might be. Con-
sistency reinforced the coherence on aellihg AWACS to
the Saudis. The nuclear fuel case was different in
that the President's initiative itself was a departure
from U S. nonproliferation policy, one that required
waiving provisions of the Nonproliferation Act The
President's action end Senate support for it were both
contrary to the spirit [but not the letter) of u s
nonproliferation legislation, signaling a dramatic
shift in policy that was rot then followed by a change
in the law The Senate and the House split over the

question. As a result, U S. nonproliferation policy
was going off in two different directions and so were
the two Houses of Congress Inconsistency undermined
whatever coherence resulted from the Senate's support
for the President

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee's considera-
tion of the SALT II Treaty contributed to foreign pol-
icy coherence rta findings agreed with the positions

212

of the Administration, and it recommended approval. of
the treaty that had been the result of several years of
negotiations, without crippling amendments. The at-
tempt by treaty opponents on the Armed Services Commit-
tee to make a negative report on the treaty was ques-
tionable on procedural grounds, and the existence of
official and unofficial reports with contradictory con-
clusions did create some confusion. By not proceeding
to debate the treaty, in the wake of the Soviet inva-
sion of Afghanistan, the Senate opened-up questions
about the ability of the U.S. to implement agreements
negotiated in good faith by the other parties. when
the Administration wanted to see the treaty debated in
1980, the Senate's refusal to do so contributed to for-
eign policy confusion, even though the Administration
also vascilated on the question as the whether or not
it was politically opportune to bring the treaty up.

Coherence, unlike consistency, is not merely a hob-
goblin of small minds. It is an attribute of an effec-
tive and successful foreign policy. While not neces-
sarily the most important factor in all cases, it can
be ignored only at the risk of being ineffective and
failing to achieve national objectives.

(5) Effectiveness

The most important questions are sometimes the most
difficult to answer satisfactorily. The bottom line in
evaluating any foreign policy action is whether it is
good or bad, right or wrong, in the national interest
or not. Immediately," one is in the realm of highly
subjective value judgments. This does not mean that
there is no answer, but means that there may be as many
different answers as there are observers. But there is
a standard that is less subjective, effectiveness: Did
the foreign policy action of the Congress achieve what
Congress intended? Asking the question, "did it work?"
is a crucial step in a total evaluation of an action,
and while it is not the only step, it is a more manage-
able task than answering the broader question, "was it
good?"

How often do Congress' foreign policy actions have
the intended results? It would be easier to answer
this question if intent were less problematic. In many
cases, intentions are either unclear, mixed, or openly
contradictory- -a 11 the more so given the fact that Con-
gress is a collective actor. Adopting a rational actor
assumption and imputing intent where motives are ob-
scure has obvious faults, but provides at least a point
of departure for the estimation of effectiveness.

In the case of policy towards Turkey in 1974, Con-
gress apparently sought to: (1) punish Turkey; (2) re-
spond to a powerful ethnic lobby; (3) assert itself

213

vis-a-vis the executive, {4} apply the law; and (5)
provide an example to other nations that receive ansa
aid Deciding to lift the embargo four years later
would seen to be at least a tacit admission that acme
of these objectives were expendable (apply the law, re-
spond to a powerful ethnic lobby), that some had been
achieved (punish Turkey, assert itself vis-a-vis the
executive), and that some were probably unrealistic in
the first place (provide an example to others) On the
whole, this was a relatively effective exercise of Con-
gress' foreign policy responsibilities It would have
been even better it, in addition to being effective, it
would also have teen coherent, 1 e , if Congress had
responded earlier to Administration requests to lift
the embargo Imposing the embargo may have been a good
thing; lifting it va& a better thing

salt provides mixed findings with respect to the
question of effectiveness The Senate’s consideration
of the SALT II Treaty vaa incomplete, stopping after
the hearings by the Foreign Relations Committee As
far as they went, these hearings (and collateral hear-
ings by the Armed Services and Intelligence Committees)
were effective in that they* (1) provided an opportun-
ity to air the major issues; (2) allowed key senators a
chance to work their will on the treaty; and (3) laid
the groundwork for the floor debate to come Refusal
to debate the treaty reflected several objectives; (1)
reacting against a disorderly world; (2) punishing the
Soviet Union; and (3) signaling e change In IIS pol-
icy; ( 4 ) avoiding a tough political issue in an elec-
tion year. The Senate did avoid confronting this issue
in 1900, and did signal a change, for better or worse,
in U S policy. But the other objectives do not seem
to have been realized by refusing to debate the treaty
As a reaction against a disorderly world, refusing to
debate the SALT II Treaty waa meaningless, a futile
gesture with respect to concrete issues such as the
Iranian hostage crisis and the invasion of Afghanistan
And it is difficult to see how the Soviet Union was
punished by the V S. failure to approve and ratify the
SALT II Treaty; quite the opposite, the Soviet Union
achieved a propaganda victory by making the U B seem at
beet irresolute, or, worse, hostile to the objective of
arms control. The failure of the Senate to act in 1980
did have an ironic consequence, largely unintended but
still important Those who supported the treaty and
feared that it would pot receive the necessary two-
thirds majority were reluctant to have a floor debate
in Since tire treat y was pending business at: the

end of the 96th Congress, it was returned to the For-
eign Relations Committee. The Reagan Administration
was then presented with an option that it would not
have had otherwise; to abide by the terms of the SALT
II Treaty, even though it had never been approved by

214

the Senate.

On the whole, the Senate's failure to act on salt
II was politically expedient, but of questionable ef-
fectiveness — at least, not intentionally effective.

The Senate's action on Panama indicates several
ostensible objectives: (1) exerting existing authority
vis-a-vis the President? (2) impressing public opinion
that the Senate was acting responsibly; (3) improving
the terms of the agreements with Panama; and (4) demon-
strating the statesmanship of particular senators. In
most respects, the Senate succeeded in realizing these
objectives. An independent Senate role in treaty ap-
proval was established, and the basis laid for an ar-
gument that the Senate had acted only after careful
consideration in the face of much public hostility.
Whether the terms of the treaties were improved is
arguable, but at least the treaties were not seri-
ously weakened. And key senators, particularly Byrd
and Baker, emerged with greatly enhanced reputations.
The Senate's action in this case was further strength-
ened by the fact that it was generally in line with
Administration policy, thus contributing to coherence
in foreign policy.

In the case of the Indian nuclear fuel, the House
and the Senate came to different conclusions. The House
action seems predicated on the desire to: (1) retain
the spirit and the letter of nonproliferation policy;
and {2) to dispose of a low salience foreign policy
question in an election year. On the basis of these
considerations, the House voted against the Adminis-
tration's decision to supply nuclear fuel to India.
The Senate's action seemed to be based on these same
premises and one additional consideration, the desire
to improve the U.S. position in South Asia. It was
this additional consideration that seemed to tip the
scales in the Senate in favor of the President's
position, especially since senators could do so and
still be consistent with the letter of the existing
legislation. But the Senate's action did not have the
effect of improving relations with India. At best, it
could be argued that relations were prevented from de-
teriorating further. This marginal goal has to be
weighed against the confusion resulting from the fact
that the two Houses of Congress could -not agree, and
the fact that in the wake of the decision to supply
nuclear fuel to India the overall direction of U.S.
nonproliferation policy was more in question than it
would have been had the House position prevailed.

In establishing the right to review and possibly
disapprove arms sales. Congress was pursuing at least
three objectives: (1) asserting its institutional pre-
rogatives vis-a-vis the executive; (2} seeking to limit
the volume of arms being exported by the U.S.; and (3)
seeking to assure that the particular arms sales would

215

be consistent with Congress’ definition o£ national in-
terest. The Saudi AwAcs example suggests that Cofwrese
had been effective in at least tvo of these object-
ives. Congress' right to be consulted was confirmed ,
and the Senate succeeded In winning some concessions
from the Administration with respect to the substance
of the arms transfer in question But the site of the
Saudi agreement — more than 58 billion— points to the
fact that Congress’ involvement in reviewing arms sales
has had little impact in reducing the volume of arms
exported. With the exception of the limited restraint
exercised during the Carter Administration, arms sales
to foreign governments continue to grow, and are in-
creasing!/ perceived as a necessary instrument of Amer-
ican foreign policy

Overall Congressional Performance

Within the limits to which it is possible to gener-
alize cn the basis of these policy studies, Congress
appears to have performed it* foreign policy responsi-
bilities reaacrtabjy well, better perhaps than it is
generally given credit for

Out of 25 possible •yea” ratings, Congress scored
U yeses and 6 qualified yeses (See Table 8 1) More
important, the negative ratings tend to cluster in two
problem arena— coherence and effectiveness Host "buts"
arise with respect to legitimacy problems These are
the areas, then, where possible reforms in congression-
al handling of foreign policy ate moat appropriate

Institutional Improvements

Of the problem areas, effectiveness does not seem
very susceptible to institutional reforms Although
procedures and analytic capability can obviously have
an impact on effectiveness, ultimately it is here the
result of wisdom and good judgment than information or
organisation In none of the policy etudies did a lack
of information or an inability to bring information to
bear in a timely and effective manner seem to be a fun-
damental problem If Congress failed to be effective,
it vaa because it exercised questionable judgment.
Stated another way, in aome cases political considera-
tions or short-term concerns loomed larger than a de-
tached view of the broader, long-term national inter-
est. Beyond the exhortation to "elect good men," there
ia a limit to what can be done to improve the exercise
ot wisdort.

The major area where institutional remedies may be
relevant would Beem to be with respect to policy coher-
ence* there are ways of making Congress’ foreign

216

TABLE 8.1

Evaluating Congress' Foreign Policy Performance

1

2

3

4

5

U.S. -Turkey
Relations,

Arms Embargo

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes,
but. . .

Nonproliferation ,
Indian Nuclear
Fuel

Yes
but. .

No

Yes

No

No

Panama Treaties

Yes,
but. .

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

SALT II Treaty

Yes,
but. .

Yes

Yes

and

No

No

No

Arms Sales,
Saudi-AWACS

Yes,
but. .

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

2. Interest Articulation and Public Information

3. Expeditious Consideration

4. Coherence

5. Effectiveness

policy actions more consistent with those of the execu-
tive and coordin'ating the foreign policy activities of
the two Houses of Congress. Reestablishing a national
consensus on foreign policy, stregthening party organi-
zations, and centralizing leadership within Congress
would all contribute to foreign policy coherence. In
particular, the possibility has been repeatedly raised
(e.g., the 1975 Murphy Commission Report) that some
sort of a national security committee be established to
deal with major foreign policy issues. It is argued
that consultation between the executive and the Con-
gress is hampered by the fact that congressional com-
mittee jurisdiction is confused and overlapping, making
it either difficult to know whom to consult with or
making the list of members and staff to be consulted so
long as to be unmanageable. Many national security is-
sues clearly overlap the present jurisdictions of For-
eign Relations, Armed Services, and Intelligence Com-
mittees, making consultation cumbersome in normal tiroes
and nearly impossible in times of crisis. A National
Security Committee would provide a small, select group

of members of Corgresa with whom the executive could
consult. logically, such a consultative committee
might be composed of the party leaders in each House,
and the chairmen and ranking members of the Foreign
Relations, Armed Services, and Intelligence Commit-
tees, with perhaps the addition of hey figures on Ap-
propriations Committees, It might be a Joint commit-
tee or, more likely, a similarly constituted committee
in each House.

Changes in committee structure in Congress in re-
cent years have gone In tvo directions* towards the
formation of more functionally specific committees such
os the Energy Committees, and of committees that have
broader jurisdiction and membership such as the Joint
Economic Committee There are cases in which the for-
mation of a new committee has resulted in the reduction
of jurisdiction of other, established committees as
happened when the Intelligence Committees assumed over-
sight functions previously exercised, if on a limited
basis, by the Armed Services Committees However, in
moat case3 committees have simply been added to the
existing list, resulting in even greater jurisdictional
overlap This is the primary objection to the organ-
ization of a National Security Committee — It would very
likely add additional members and mare staff to the
numbers of foreign policy interlocutors on the Hill,
without concentrating the consultation process On the
other hand, the possibility that such a committee might
gut the established jurisdictions of committees such as
Foreign Relations and Armed Services has been suffici-
ent to prevent congress from responding favorably to
the National Security Committee proposals that have
been made to date

There has been some informal realization of the in-
tent ot this proposal Ad hoc consultation by the ex-
ecutive branch often follows the pattern of the Nation-
al Security Committee idea. Executive agencies such as
the CIA and State Department make a habit of informing
the leadership of both Houses and key committee members
of foreign policy events and problems in the offing
During the Iranian hostage crisis, Secretary of State
Vance or Deputy Secretary Christopher regularly briefed
a select group of senators If this pattern of consul-
tation is successful on an ad hoc basis, it is diffi-
cult to see why it should not be formalized with the
organization of a National security Committee. But
practically, as long as a prudent President satisfies
Congress’ demands for consultation informally, there is
likely to be little pressure from the Rill for institu-
tionalizing this pattern of interaction It is only
when Congress feel* that it is being left out of impor-
tant foreign policy decisions that demands for the
formation of a National Security Committee or other in-
stitutional innovations are likely to be strong

218

Possible reforms or changes that address the manner
in which Congress carries out otherwise legitimate
functions have already been discussed. One device used
by Congress, the legislative veto, has apparently been
struck down as a means for exercising congressional
oversight of the executive branch. with respect to
treaty approval, both Senate approval by a simple ma-
jority or joint House and Senate approval by simple ma-
jorities would seem to be reasonable alternatives to
the constitutional two-thirds provision. But short of
overwhelming dissatisfaction with the way the Senate
performs its treaty responsibilities, changes in the
Constitution seem unlikely.

Setbacks and Successes

There is little prospect for substantial changes in
the way Congress participates in the foreign policy
process. The 1980s are likely to be an extension of
the 1970s with a mix of successes (e.g., the SAIT 1
agreements, the opening to China, the Panama treaties,
the Camp David accords) as well as foreign policy set-
backs (the oil embargo, the fall of South Vietnam, the
Iranian hostage crisis, the lack of progress toward a
comprehensive peace in the Middle Bast). As an active
participant in making foreign policy in this period,
Congress shares responsibility for both the successes
and setbacks. Congress' exercise of its foreign policy
prerogatives, as measured in the policy studies in this
volume, has been positive on the whole. Congress does
not deserve to be perceived as a problem in the policy-
making process.

The congressional foreign policy reassertion in the
last decade coincided with a dramatic shift in position
of the U.S. in world politics. Friends in Western Eur-
ope and Japan and adversaries such as the Soviet Union
have grown in power, reducing America's relative posi“
tion in the international system. Perhaps more impor-
tant, the role of great powers generally has been re-
duced as regional, local, and subnational forces have
asserted themselves. These changes in the world proba-
bly have had a greater impact on U.S. foreign policy
than any changes in policymaking within the U.S. If
American foreign policy seems less certain today than a
decade ago, it is because the world is less certain,
not because -Congress is an active participant in the
foreign policy process.

American Enterprise Institute,

1SB3

Kissinger, Henry The white House Tears Boston s
Little, Brown, 1979

219

Index

Abourerk, James 54, 97
Acheaon, Doan 25-26, 34-
35, 38-39, 44, 49
Adams, John 103
Xielman, Kenneth 5
Afghanistan 8, 137, 244,
146-147, 150, 178
202, 212, 213
Agency for International
Development (AID)
111, 113, 115
Allen, James B6, 65, 97 »
98

Allen, Levi* 61
American Conservative
Onion 167

American Hellenic Insti-
tute Public Af-
fair t Committee
57-58

American Israel Public
Affairs Committee
57-58, 125-126,

204

American Legion 88
Americans for SALT 203
Anderson, Clinton 139
Angola 7, 13
Anti-Ballistic Missile
System (ABM) 7,
162-163, 165, 173
Appropriations Committees
Bouse 112, US, 116,
217

Senate 33, 112, 217
Argentina 111, 142, 146

Arms control See strategic
Arms Limitation
Talks (SALT)

Armed Services Committee
(Senate) <3, 86,

91, 117, 162, 164,
166, 168, 174-175,
183, 192, 212-213,
216-217

Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency (ACDA) 5,

111, 162, 166, 178
ArmB Export Control Act
(1976) 106, 116,

119, 120, 123,
128-130, 200, 207
Anns sales (Transfers) 2,
106-130, 196, 199-
200, 203-207, 209-
211, 214-216
See also AWACSj Country
Xj Iran; Saudi
Arabia

Aapin, Lee 129, 179
Atomic Energy Commission
(AEC) 139, 141
Atoms for Peace 140
Atwood, Brian 66
AKA CS (Airborne Warning and
Control System) Z,

3, 7, 31, 121, 122-
128, 136, 196, 204,
2C9-211, 215-216
See also Arms sales)
Iran) Saudi Arabia

221

222

Under, william 109
Baker, Howard 3, 31, 39,
80-02, 84-85, 88,
100, 123-124, 127,
152-153, 171, 183,
188, 199, 214
Banking and Currency Com-
mittee

House 109-110, 112
Senate 109-110, 112
Beckel, Robert 91, 202
Bell, Griffin 90
uennet, Douglas 91
Bentsen, Lloyd 59, 01, 100
Bellmen, Henry 61
Biden, Joseph 130, 152
Binnendijk, Hans 68
Bingham, Jonathan 119,128,
HI, 149

Bipartisanship 30-31
Brademas, John 35
Brasil 148

Brezhnev, Leonid 169, 189,
199

Britain (United Kingdom)
23, 25, 28, 33, 54
Brooke, Edward 98, 163-165
Brown, George 79
Brown, Harold 61, 173
Brzczinski, Zbigniew 80,
146-147

Budget Committee (Senate)
91

Bunker, Ellsworth 79
Byrd, Harry F. 40
Byrd, Harry F., Jr. 151,
153

Byrd, Robert C. 8, 11, 38-
39, 57-62, 64-67,
80-87, 90-92, 95-
98, 100-101, 123-
124, 126 , 151, 153,
168-169, 175, 177,
182, 199, 202-203,
207, 209, 214

Cambodia 7

Camp David Accords 218
Cannon, Howard 94, 97
Capohart, Homer 39
Carter, jimmy (and Admin-
istration) 5, 7,

14, 17, 31, 34, 38,
57-58, 60, 78, 79-

Carter, Jimmy (and Admini-
stration) (cont'd)

82, 64-87, 90-91,

94, 99, 100-102,
121-125, 128, 136-
138, 141-144, 147-
157, 167-173, 176-
177, 181-184, 186-
18B, 190, 200, 203,
208, 209, 215
Case, Clifford 84, 88, 95
Canc-Znblocki Act 198
Central America 7
Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) 5, 28, <6, 47,

217

Chad 3

ChaCec, John 59, 61-62, 66,
84

China, Peoples Republic of

7-8, 11, 28, 49, 113

218

Christopher, Warren 60, 61,
65, 91, 93, 96-97,
145, 217

Church, Frank 9, 64, 68, 95-
97, 111, 113-114,
150, 152-153, 175,
177, 182, 188, 202,
207

Clark, Joseph 112
Clark, William 20
Clnucen, Don 63
Clinch River Breeder Reactor
143-144

Cold War 1, 16, 24, 32, 43,
48

Committee on the Present
Danger 203

Congress See individual com-
mittees and members
Congressional staff 10,
13, 19, 64, 66, 68,
84 , 95-96, 99, 107,
111, 118, 130, 151,
179

Congressional travel 11,
82-84, 87, 100, 121,
122, 163, 180, 199
Congressional Research Ser-
vice (Library of
Congress) 68, 128
Connally, Tom 26, 37, 42,

51, 199

Cnn«;prvnH vp CmieUB 203

223

Constitution, United

States 1, 14-17,

77, 85, 197-198
Senate constitutional
powers 2, 5, 44,

77, 101, 192, 197-
198

Conte, Silvio 115
Cooper, John Sherman 163
Country X Program 107-113,
115-119, 130
Cranston, Alan 86, 152-
153, 168, 170, 203
Cuba 8, 9, 82, 177, 202
Cuban Missile Crisis 53,

69

Culver, John 11, 121-124,
202

Cyprus 39, 53-58, 61-62,
203, 206

Davies, Roger 54
DeConclnl, Dennl* (and
DeConcinl Reser-
vation) 92-94,
96-97, 100-102
DeConde, Alexander 27
Defense budget/apend-
ing 4, 6, 106,

161, 182-184, 190,
197

Defense, Department of
86, 90, 107-108,
110 - 11 $

Democratic Policy Commit-
tee (Senate) 62,

64, 64, 95

Dervinski, Edward 63-64
Divine, Robert A. 28, 48
Dobrynin, Anatoly 166,

189

Dockery, Robert 84
Dole, Robert 90, 171
Douglas, Helen Gahagan
47, 48

Dullea, John Foster 52,
140

Eagleton, Thomas 11, 55,
66, 121-123, 153
Egevit, Bulent 60, 65
Edmon9ton, Ed 116
Edwards, Janes 136

Egypt $$, 125, 137

Eisenhower Administration 14 Q
*lekdag, Sukru 65
- llender, Alien 109, 112
fel Salvador 11
Energy, Committee on (Sen-
ate) 217

Energy, Department of 141
Energy Research ond Develop-
ment Agency 141
Equal Rights Amendment 198
Euratom 140 -

Evren, Kenan 69
Executive agreements 197-1S8
Export-Import Bank lExim)
107-113, U6
F-5 aircraft 115
P-14 aircraft 121
Ferguson, Homer 40
Findley, Paul 63
Food for Peace (PD 4B0) 50
Ford, Gerald land Adminis-
tration! U, 56-57,
79, 90, 120, 122,

141, 148, 167, 185
Ford, Wendell 96
Foreign Affairs Committee
(House) 64-68, 107,
112, 124, 142, 149-
150

Foreign aid (including mU*
itary/security as-
sistance) 2, 23, 33-
34, 50, 52-53, 55-
56, 66-67, 107-108,
112-119, 138

Foreign Relations Committee
(Senate) 5-6, 9-10,
35-37, 39-40, 48,
51-53, 58-60, 62,

64, 68, 83-85, 67,
90, 95, 107, 109-
114, 117-120, 123-
125, 129-130, 150-
154, 162-163, 168-
169, 174-177, 179,
182-183, 190, 192,
200, 205, 207-208,
21C-2U, 213, 216-
217

ForreBtal, James 35
France 140, 156
Freeland, Richard 34, 48
Friendly, Alfred, Jr. 68
Frye, Alton 163

224

Fttlbright, J. William 24, Hollings, Ernest 183
30, 42-45, 51, 68, Hosmer, Craig 139
109, 113, 117-118, Hull, Cordell 31
121, 190 Human Kights 2, 79, 82

Gaddis, John L. 48 Humphrey, Gordon 153

Gandhi, Indira 144, 147, Humphrey, Hubert 123, 165,
156 167

Gam, Jake 84, 153

Gaud, William 113, 115 Immigration and Naturali-
Gelb, Leslie 148 2ation Service v.

General Accounting Office Chadha 130

(GAO) 122-123, 179 India (and nuclear fuel
George, Walter 36, 52 shipment) 109, 141-

Germany 148 142, 144-158, 196,

Gilinsky, Victor 148 204-205, 207, 211,

Glenn, John 95, 141-142, 214, 216

150-152, 155, 173, Intelligence, Senate Select
178-179, 202 Committee 174, 192,

Goheen, Robert F. 151 213, 216-217

Goldman, Eric 27 Interim Agreement on Strate-

Gore, Albert (Senator) 45, gic offensive Arms

111 (1972) 163, 165-167,

Government Operations Com- 170, 176, 179

mittee (Senate) See also SALT I

141, 150, 155 International Atomic Energy

Grantham, Dewey W. 28 Agency 142

Greece 23-28, 33, 36-37, Iran 11, 19, 25, 59, 60, 62,
51-52, 54, 62, 68- 106, 111, 115, 121-

70, 208 125, 150, 178, 202,

Greek-Turkish aid 23-52, 209, 213, 217-218

69-70 Iraq 136-138, 211

See also Greece; Turkey; "Islamic Bomb" 137, 146
Truman Doctrine Isolationists 28

Green, Theodore F. 51 Israel 65-66, 110, 115, 125-

Grenada 4, 11 126, 136-138, 203-

Griffin, Robert 98 204, 211

Gromyko, Andrei 46, 171

Jackson Amendment (SALT I)
Habib, Philip 136 165-167

Haig, Alexander 127, 136 Jackson, Henry 113-114, 162,
Hamilton, Lee 67 165-167, 169-174,

Hart, Gary 153, 186 183-184, 190, 202

Hartmann, Susan 34-35 Jackson- Vanik Amendment 2

Hatch, Orrin 98-99 Japan 218

Hatfield, Hark 79, 153, 172 Javits, Jacob 48, 59, 64,
Hawk missiles 120 66, 150-153

Hayakawa, S. I. 89, 94, 97 Johnson, Edwin 37-39, 49

152, 171 Johnson, Lyndon B. (and Ad-

"Heavy" missiles 162, 165, ministration) 3, 17,

169, 172-173 50, 109, 114-117

Helms, Jesse 6, 13, 78-88, Joint Chiefs of Staff 79,

98, 152-153, 172 113, 162, 176, 184

Hickenlooper, Burke 139 Joint Committee on Atomic

Hickerson, John 27 Energy (Congres-

Holifield, Chet 139 sional) 139-141

225

Joint Economic Conduce HcP.rl.nC, Etseat 5 j

tCongrcccional) 217 HeCovern, Ceor S e 59' i ss .

153, 165, 167, i?2,

j 'met, Horvill 319
Jordan Uli 120
Jordan, Hamilton 60, 93
judiciary Committee (Sen-
ate) 86, 89

Katrenbach. NiehclaB 111
Kennan, George 32-33, 35
Kennedy, Edward 61, 153
Kennedy, John t (and Ad-
ministration) 50,
53, 106-107. 160
Khomeini, Ayatollah 125

176, 202

McIntyre, Thomas IDO, 167,
186, 201

McMahon, Brian 139
McNamara, Robert 107, 111
Mahon, George Us
Makarios, Archbishop 54
Malone, George 40, 42
Mansfield, Mike <5, 55, 113,
162-163
Marcy, Carl lo9

. . Marshall Plan 1, 38

Kissinger, Henry 55-56, 78- Marshall, George 25, 28,32,
79, 121 , 163, 166 " -

ISO, 165, 189
Kitchen, Jeffrey 111
Korea and Korean War 42,
49, 52, 69, US
Kochel, Thomas 114
Koss, Henry 110, 111

U Pebor, Walter 27
Lance, Bert 80
Uxalt, Paul 84, 89,
Lebanon 3, 136, 200,
Lefever, Ernest 6

Mathias, Charles McC , Jr
56, 57, 153, 167,

1B2

Maverick missiles 120
Meyer, Cord 45-47
Middle East 58-59, 110, 112,
120, 125, 136, 203,
207, 211, 218
See also specific coun-
tries

Mobutu, Joseph 117
Mondale, Walter 123

Legislative Veto 2, 3, 119, Moore, Prank 92

128, 130, 143, 154, Morgan, Thomas E 107
197, 200, 211
Levia, Gabriel 92, 97
Limited Test Ban Treaty
(1963) 160

tinder, Harold 109, UI
Linkage (SALT III 170-171,

202

Linovitt, Soul 79

Lobbies (and ethnic lobbies) 186, 192

57-58, 10, 89, 69, Hurphy Ccmiaaion 216
US* 125-127, 154, • • — — J '*

203-204, 212-213

Morocco 111
Morse, Wayne 113
Most, Ambler 91
Koyaihan, Daniel Patrick 152
Multiple Independently Tar-
getable Re-entry
Vehicle (MIRV) 162,
263-165, 172, 179,

Lodge, Jtenry C , Jr, 51
Long, Clarence l4l
Long, Russell 96, 177
Lugor. Richard 152, 171

KcAtillffe, Dennis 83
McCarthy, Eugene 114
McCarthy, Joseph (and Mc-
Carthy! em) 47-49
McClure, James 153
McCormack, John 11$

Huslcie, Edmund 61, 67, 91,
148, 151, 155

MX (Missile Experimental) 6,
10, 175-176, 1B3-1B4

National Commitments Reso-
lution 117-118

•National Security Commit-
tee" 192, 216-217

National Security Council
146, 147

Nelson-Binghasi Amendment
106, 129-120, 128-
129

226

Turkey (cont'd) 206, 208-
213, 216

United Nations 1, 28, 30,
36-40, 42, 46, 93,
136, 199

Vance, Cyrus 9, 78, 80-81,
125, 148, 171, 187-
188, 217

Vandenberg, Arthur 25-31,
33-42, 44, 51, 199

Verification (SAIT) 173-
174, 178

Versailles, Treaty of 7,
51, 98, 197, 208

Veterans of Foreign Wars
88

Vietnam 2, 4, 7, 13, 17,
24, 44, 77, 113,
117, 180, 205

Vladivostok Accords 167

Wallace, Henry 46, 48

Warnke, Paul 5, 168, 178,
180-182

War Powers 16, 44, 198
War Powers Resolution
2, 3, 30, 118, 200
Washington, George 102-103
Watergate 2, 56
Watkins, Arthur 52
Weicker, Lowell 79
Weinberger, Caspar 69
Wheeler, Earle 113
Wherry Kenneth 41, 42, 45,

52

Widnall, William 112, 114,
116

Wiley, Alexander 40
Wills, Garry 28
"Window of Vulnerability"
172, 184

Wright, Gim 59, B0

Yergin, Daniel 34

Zablocki, Clement 65-66, 149
Zaire (Congo) 117
zia-ul-Haq, Mohammed 146-147
Zorinsky, Edward 88, 152,

202

About the Editors and Contributors

Editors

non PURVIS is director of the Pulbright Institute
of International Relation* at the University of Arkan-
sas, where he teaches political science and Journalism.

Re served for many year* as an aide to senator J w.
rulbright and then as foreign/defense policy advisor to
Majority Leader Robert Byrd and ss deputy director of
tha Senate Democratic Policy Committee. Bo formerly
taught at the Lyndon B Johnaon School of Public Af-
fairs. University of Texas.

STEVEN J. BARER is associate professor of interna-
tional policy atudiea at the Monterey Institute of
International Studies He served as SALT H Treaty
consultant and foreign policy adviaor to Majority lead-
er Byrd. He vaa formerly on the faculty of the Univer-
sity of Texas at Austin

Contributors

JOBS OPPERHAN has a Baiter’s degree fron the Lyndon B.
Johnson School of Public Affairs. Be contributed to a
volume on Foreign Economic Policy Peels Ion-Making and
has served on the staff of the - Texas Legislature.

J. PHILIP ROGERS ie a fellow at the Center for Interna-
tional Security and Arms Control at Stanford University.
Be is a Ph 0. candidate in government at the University
of Texas, Austin.

TURA CAKPANELLA has master's degrees In Hiddle East
studies and in public affairs froo the University of
Texaa. She contributed to a published study on U»S
Policy and the Third World . She writes on foreign pol-
icy anj energy issues and translates Arabic.

229